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A B S T R A C T
This dissertation addresses the important challenge of efficiency
in anonymous communication. Solving this challenge is essen-
tial to provide anonymity in group communication.
Every exchanged message leaks metadata: this information de-
scribes the communication itself with, among others, sender, re-
cipients, frequency of the communication. While the law pro-
tects this information, it is often published and misused with
consequences for the participants of the communication—often
consequences particular for the senders of information.
Anonymous communication systems like Tor break the link be-
tween senders and recipients of messages and diminish emerg-
ing metadata. However, their design requires duplicating mes-
sages for all recipients early, mostly at the sender itself. With
that, the system has to handle an unnecessary burden of pro-
cessing identical messages. This dissertation contributes a novel
mechanism that establishes communication groups such that the
message duplication is pushed as close to the recipients as pos-
sible. This dissertation also shows that this efficiency improve-
ment does not come at costs of anonymity. Moreover, the group
establishment mechanism increases the robustness of the com-
munication against users that leave and join the communication
system. To encounter the additional information leakage, dif-
ferent mechanisms to share routing information are introduced
and discussed under the angle of efficiency and anonymity. To
also protect senders of messages, this dissertation adapts Dining-
Cryptographer networks to enable sender anonymity with an
adjustable trade-off between efficiency and anonymity.
contributions The scientific contributions of this disserta-
tion fall into the following categories:
1. Efficient Communication Overlays: A novel overlay establish-
ment mechanism is presented. This mechanism adapts Ant
Colony Optimization (ACO) to connect senders and recip-
ients with a reduced number of connections while the
anonymity remains stable.
2. Reliable Communication under Churn: Churn often disrupts
communication overlays, this thesis proposes a mechanism
to counter this disruptions and increase the robustness of
the communication. For that, the ACO-based mechanism
utilizes residual pheromones to reconnect subjects to the
communication overlay.
3. Routing Information Exchange considering Efficiency and
Anonymity: Four methods to share routing information,
namely successor lists, successor lists with multi-layer en-
cryption, Bloom filters, and distributed lookup tables, are
introduced into the anonymous communication setting,
discussed and evaluated with respect to their properties
concerning efficiency and anonymity.
4. Efficient and Effective Sender Protection: A novel mechanism
based on asymmetric dining-cryptographer networks (ADC-
nets) is proposed to improve the efficiency of sender pro-
tection without degrading anonymity over time. Moreover,
the trade-off between efficiency and anonymity can be con-
trolled.
evaluation The developed mechanisms have been exten-
sively evaluated using a combination of simulations and formal
arguments. For this evaluation, a graph-based simulation model
has been developed enabling to analyze the improvement of the
ACO-based communication overlays over conventional overlays.
An extensive simulation identified valuable parameter combina-
tions for the ACO mechanism, leading to communication over-
lays with an efficiency improvement of up to 40%. This efficiency
improvement increases the communication delay only by up to 2
extra hops. The calculation of the achieved anonymity degree in-
dicates no loss of anonymity in comparison to conventional over-
lays; even more, the anonymity degree does even improve. Un-
der churn, the robustness of the communication also increases
by 30% in comparison to conventional overlays.
The four approaches to routing information exchange are
discussed and compared using formal arguments. The evalua-
tion enables to select the appropriate mechanism based on the
requirements for memory and communication efficiency and
anonymity for the desired application scenario.
The novel adapted ADCnets enable sender anonymity with
configurable efficiency and anonymity. As such, they are supe-
rior to current approaches implementing cover traffic. A simu-
lation study shows that cover traffic randomization improves ef-
ficiency at the cost of anonymity. The proposed ADCnets have
been evaluated using formal arguments that demonstrate the
efficiency improvement and the preservation of anonymity. As
both efficiency and anonymity are conflicting, they cannot be
achieved at the same time; however, the proposed ADCnets en-
able to balance efficiency and anonymity to the requirements of
the application scenario.
Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Diese Dissertation adressiert die Steigerung der Effizienz anony-
mer Kommunikation um diese massentauglich zu machen.
Bei jeglicher Kommunikation entstehen Metadaten, welche
den Prozess des Nachrichtenaustausches beschreiben, beispiels-
weise mit Informationen zu Sender, Empfängern, sowie der In-
tensität der Kommunikation. Metadaten sind durch Gesetze ge-
schützt, trotzdem werden sie immer wieder veröffentlicht und
unbefugt genutzt mit oft unerwünschten Konsequenzen – insbe-
sondere für den Sender der Informationen.
Anonyme Kommunikationssysteme wie zum Beispiel Tor re-
duzieren Metadaten: durch die Weiter- und Umleitung der
Nachrichten wird die „sichtbare“ Verbindung zwischen Sen-
der und den Empfängern unterbrochen. Aufbau und Funktions-
weise anonymer Kommunikationssysteme erfordert zumeist die
frühzeitige Duplikation versendeter Nachrichten für jeden ein-
zelnen Empfänger; in der Regel erfolgt die Duplikation durch
den Sender selbst. Hierdurch entsteht eine unnötige Menge iden-
tischer Nachrichten im Kommunikationssystem. Es wird ein
neuer Mechanismus zur Erstellung effizienterer Kommunikati-
onsstrukturen eingeführt; dieser verschiebt die Duplikation der
Nachrichten so nah wie möglich an die Empfänger. Es wird
gezeigt, dass die daraus resultierende Effizienzsteigerung nicht
zu Lasten der Anonymität geht. Neben der Effizienzsteigerung
wird auch die Robustheit gegenüber Nutzern gesteigert, die das
System dynamisch verlassen und es wieder betreten. Hierdurch
müssen Routing-Informationen häufiger ausgetauscht werden;
um dem zu begegnen werden verschiedene Verfahren aus den
Blickwinkeln Effizienz und Anonymität betrachtet. Zuletzt führt
diese Dissertation ein neues Verfahren zum Schutz der Sendera-
nonymität ein; hierfür werden Dining-Cryptographer Netzwer-
ke (DC-Netze) angepasst und deren Effizienz gesteigert. Das Ver-
fahren ermöglicht die dynamische Abwägung von Effizienz und
Anonymität.
beiträge Die wissenschaftlichen Beiträge dieser Dissertation
sind in die folgenden Kategorien eingeordnet:
1. Effiziente Kommunikationsstrukturen: Basierend auf
Ameisenkolonie-Optimierung (ant colony optimization,
ACO) werden effizientere Kommunikationsstrukturen
erstellt, welche die Anzahl involvierter Verbindungen
minimieren; hierdurch wird die Anonymität nicht beein-
trächtigt.
2. Robuste Kommunikation: Dynamische Teilnehmer (churn)
unterbrechen Kommunikationsstrukturen regelmäßig. Um
diesen Unterbrechungen entgegenzutreten wird das eta-
blierte Wissen (d.h. die Pheromone der Ameisen) genutzt
um Teilnehmer schneller wieder mit der Kommunikations-
gruppe zu verbinden.
3. Austausch von Routing-Informationen: Es werden vier Me-
thoden zum Austausch von Routing-Informationen vorge-
stellt: Pfadlisten mit und ohne mehrschichtige Verschlüs-
selung, Bloom-Filter und verteilte Suchtabellen. Diese wer-
den diskutiert und bezüglich ihrer Effizienz- und Anony-
mitätseigenschaften beurteilt.
4. Effizienter und effektiver Schutz von Sendern: Basierend auf
dem Konzept asymmetrischer DC-Netze (ADC-Netze) wird
ein Verfahren zum effizienteren Schutz der Anonymität
der Sender eingeführt. Dieses Verfahren verhindert die Be-
einträchtigung der Anonymität im Verlauf der Zeit. Zu-
dem ermöglicht es eine dynamische Abwägung von Effi-
zienz und Anonymität.
auswertung Die entwickelten Mechanismen wurden mit
Hilfe einer Kombination von Simulationen und formaler Dis-
kussion ausgewertet. Für diese Evaluation wurde ein Graph-
basiertes Simulationsmodell entwickelt und implementiert. Da-
bei wurden die ACO-basierten Kommunikationsstrukturen mit
konventionellen Kommunikationsstrukturen verglichen. Eine
ausführliche Simulation bewertete relevante Konfigurationspa-
rameter des ACO-Verfahrens; dies führte zu Kommunikationss-
trukturen die bis zu 40% effizienter sind. Zudem konnte gezeigt
werden, dass die Verzögerung, die durch die Effizienzsteigerung
erzeugt wird, der Kommunikation mit bis zu zwei weiteren Wei-
terleitungen begrenzt ist. Es konnte weiterhin gezeigt werden,
das kein Anonymitätsverlust durch die Effizienzsteigerung be-
dingt wird, sondern die erreichbare Anonymität noch gesteigert
werden kann. Unter dem Einfluss dynamischen Nutzerverhal-
tens konnte die Robustheit um 30% im Vergleich zu konven-
tionellen Kommunikationsstrukturen auf Basis kürzester Pfade
gesteigert werden. Vier Ansätze zum Austausch von Routing-
Informationen wurden eingeführt und in einer formalen Dis-
kussion unter Berücksichtigung von Speicher- und Kommuni-
kationseffizienz und Anonymität verglichen. Der neue auf ADC-
Netzen basierende Ansatz zum Schutz der Anonymität des Sen-
ders von Nachrichten ermöglicht die dynamische Abwägung
von Effizienz und Anonymität. Hierdurch ist dieser Ansatz dem
heutigen Schutz durch zusätzlich eingefügte sinnfreie Nachrich-
ten (cover traffic) überlegen. In einer weiteren Simulation wurde
gezeigt, dass eine Effizienzsteigerung dieses Schutzverfahrens
mit einem allmählichen Anonymitätsverlust einhergeht. Die vor-
geschlagenen ADC-Netze wurden mittels formaler Diskussion
evaluiert; hierbei konnte gezeigt werden, dass diese die Effizienz
steigern können während die Anonymität über die Zeit konstant
gehalten werden kann. Der Zielkonflikt zwischen Effizienz und
Anonymität verhindert das gleichzeitige Erfüllen beider Ziele;
ADC-Netze ermöglichen jedoch das dynamische abwägen zwi-
schen diesen Zielen.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
[The Human Rights Council recognizes ...] that the right to privacy can enable
the enjoyment of other rights and the free development of an individual’s personality
and identity, and an individual’s ability to participate in political, economic, social
and cultural life, and noting with concern that violations or abuses of the right to
privacy might affect the enjoyment of other human rights, including the right to
freedom of expression and to hold opinions without interference, and the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and association [...]
— UN, Human Rights Council
A/HRC/34/L.7 Rev.1
1.1 motivation & problem statement
With the advancing connectivity of devices of all kinds, for exam-
ple, smartwatches, smartphones, and smart home devices, digi-
tal communication is becoming ubiquitous, and communication
often becomes internet-based services. Not only the increasing
number of connected devices but in particular always online de-
vices like smartphones foster ubiquitous communication.
(Digital) Communication concentrates on just a handful of
services. For example, Facebook had 2.2 billion monthly ac-
tive users as of the fourth quarter of 2017. With that, Facebook
achieves a worldwide market penetration of 26.3% as of June
2017; the market penetration for North America is 72.4%, for
Europe 41.7%. With WhatsApp and the Facebook Messenger,
Facebook owns two of the three most popular messaging ser-
vices (WhatsApp ranks first, Facebook Messenger third)1.
Ride-sharing is another exemplary internet-based service.
Here, a similar concentration becomes visible with Uber (having
an estimated market share of 77% in the USA) and Lyft (having
an estimated market share of 20%) [76].
With this concentration of communication to a small selection
of services, the service providers can collect (and consequently
monetize) immense amounts of data [101, p. 19]. Thus, service
providers can connect data sets across different services and gain
additional insights [101, p. 15f]. These data are then often used to
1 Source: www.statista.com
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perform targeted advertising, thereby financing the supposedly
free services for the users.
Collection and usage of data are regulated, for example, by
the EU’s general data protection regulation [55] and its prede-
cessor [54]. According to the UNESCO [101] and the EU [54],
processing of data should only be performed in such a way is it
would be expected by the information supplier (the user). The
inability—or unwillingness—of service providers to follow this
general rule is, for example, shown by Uber: in 2012, Uber re-
leased a blog post where they analyzed their database to iden-
tify so-called “rides of glory”, rides towards potential one-night
stands [144].
Users mostly are unaware of this data analysis, continu-
ous hacks and leaks of personal and sensitive information [88,
120], and probably unintended consequences of (anonymized)
data publication as, for example, Strava’s heatmap2 [14, 89, 95].
The continuity of these undesired events shows that service
providers are not willing—or able—to protect the user’s data.
While these privacy issues seem to be tolerable for some users,
others are impaired by information leaks and advanced data
analysis; this is particularly pressing when considering that of-
ten no illegal activity is conducted yet the harm for people may
be considerable.
To overcome emerging privacy threats, several attempts to
anonymize communication [15, 30, 37, 46, 61, 134, 146] have been
made. In a first step, these systems try to remove the service
provider as a central point with full data access by decentralia-
tion [15, 30, 146], i.e., assigning the functionality of communica-
tion establishment to multiple entities operated by different sub-
jects, or distribution of this functionality to all participants [37,
46, 61]. However, these approaches fail to provide sufficient pro-
tection of users due to efficiency-issues caused by different com-
munication schemes and anonymization mechanism. Currently
used and proposed anonymization systems [15, 46] mostly focus
on point-to-point communication whereas communication often
occurs in a many-to-many scheme. These mismatching commu-
nication schemes lead to excessive signaling overhead or require
centralized mediation services that arrange the communication
more efficiently at the cost of anonymity and privacy. Also, the
anonymization mechanisms often rely on cover traffic and ob-
2 https://labs.strava.com/heatmap
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fuscation, both requiring plenty of additional messages to be
effective.
Systems that tackle privacy-preserving and anonymous com-
munication for groups (many-to-many) either focus on access
control [10] and confidentiality [134] or do not utilize the full
potential of the used Publish/Subscribe (Pub/Sub) scheme [37].
Particularly in this application scenario of ubiquitous many-to-
many communication, privacy and anonymity are not the only
desirable properties. Increasing heterogeneity also increases the
need for efficiency in the establishment of the communication.
From smartwatches to servers, weak devices, such as smart-
watches, that participate in many-to-many communication are
less capable than, for example, computers or even servers.
1.2 this thesis
The goal of this thesis is to provide novel methods of efficient
and anonymous group communication. The following research
questions will be answered in this thesis:
• Which group establishment mechanism is able to consider effi-
ciency and anonymity? To what extent is the trade-off between
these two optimization goals controllable?
• Can the communication system react to dynamic users, i.e., react
to users that join and leave the communication system, while
minimizing message loss and maintaining overall efficiency and
anonymity?
• To what extent can the information leakage caused by routing
information exchange be limited? What is the resulting impact
on the overall communication efficiency?
• Which technique can protect senders of messages from
de-anonymization while considering both efficiency and
anonymity?
efficient and anonymous group communication
Early approaches to privacy-preserving many-to-many commu-
nication [122, 134, 141] focus on providing confidentiality. I.e.,
they focus on hiding information from adversaries that are not
in possession of key material that would enable them to partici-
pate in the communication system. More recent work by Daubert
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et al. [37–40] focusses on providing anonymity and confidential-
ity; here, also internal adversaries are considered, and protec-
tion mechanisms that alter the communication structures are
presented. These systems have in common that they rely on
rather inefficient, flooding-based communication overlays [37–
40] or cannot protect the anonymity of the users [122, 134, 141].
The first contribution of this thesis is a novel approach for es-
tablishing efficient yet anonymous communication groups. For
that, Chapter 4 presents a mechanism based on ant colony op-
timisation (ACO) that enables more efficient communication
groups by utilizing message aggregation and late message dupli-
cation. The adoption of ACO to the establishment of anonymous
communication overlays is described in a multi-phase approach
that establishes and optimizes communication groups. The influ-
ence of the parameters of the ACO-based overlay establishment
mechanism is evaluated in detail. The evaluation compares the
resulting ACO-based communication overlays to state of the art
flooding-based communication overlays.
Figure 1 shows an example of the difference between tradi-
tional flooding-based shortest path communication overlays on
the left-hand side and ACO-based communication overlays on
the right-hand side; subject 3 is a sender, subjects 5, 8, and 9 are
recipients. The ACO-based communication overlay aggregates
the path towards recipients; with this, the system reduces the
number of connections and moves the point of message duplica-
tion towards recipients. Thereby, the system lessens the number
of identical messages that are necessary to reach all recipients.
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Figure 1: Higher Efficiency Communication Groups by applying ACO-based
Overlay Establishment
This novel ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism im-
proves the anonymous communication model of Daubert et
al. [37] and has been published with a detailed analysis in [67,
68].
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robust communication under churn Distributed,
peer-to-peer (P2P)-based communication systems suffer from
churn, i.e., suffer from leaving and joining subjects. Leaving sub-
jects may disrupt communication overlays and require poten-
tially expensive repair to reconnect all participants to the com-
munication overlay. Figure 2 visualizes such an example: subject
7 is responsible for connecting the sender 3 to the recipients 5,
8, and 9; when subject 7 leaves the system, it disrupts the com-
munication overlay, i.e., the recipients cannot receive messages
from the sender. The system has to repair the overlay, here, by
establishing the alternative path using subjects 2 and 4.
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Figure 2: Coping with Churn using ACO-based mechanisms
While many related approaches focus on static snapshots for
their analysis [37, 146], i.e., churn is often ignored, the influence
of churn is undisputed and still a challenge [137, 151, 152].
Chapter 5 presents in its first part how the novel ACO-based
overlay establishment mechanism enables the underlying com-
munication system to recover from leaving users and improves
the performance for joining users. This improvement is achieved
by utilizing residual path markers and using them to connect
newly joining participants and repair the communication over-
lay when participants leave the system. The utilization of resid-
ual path markers enables fast repairs by biasing the agents that
establish the communication paths.
routing as a trade-off Particularly in dynamic systems
with subject churn, subjects need to exchange routing informa-
tion more frequently. Routing of messages requires exchanging
information between the subjects in the communication system.
The more information is exchanged, the better the efficiency of
the communication overlay, for example, by establishing optimal
dissemination paths. This information exchange, however, also
degrades anonymity as structural information about the com-
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munication overlays as well as information about the roles of
the participants is shared amongst all other subjects.
As a result of this, efficiency concerning communication and
memory, and anonymity of the routing information exchange
gains importance. Communication overhead is here related to
the amount of structural information that has to be included
in every message; naturally, a second option is to have the
knowledge distributed to all subjects to avoid sending it around.
Anonymity relates to the evidence about senders and recipients
that is leaked by the routing information. Chapter 5 compares
and evaluates the effect that four different mechanisms of shar-
ing routing information have on both efficiency and anonymity
in its second part.
efficient and effective sender protection Protect-
ing the anonymity of senders of information is a hard problem.
Obfuscation through noise causes large communication over-
head as it has to be in place continuously. Altering the topology
to conceal the sender does not solve the problem, from a global
perspective like the service provider’s perspective, the sender
will still be the source of a message.
Current systems that include sender anonymity utilize vari-
ous mechanisms to obfuscate the senders of messages [15, 30, 34,
58, 146]. All these mechanisms have in common that they rely on
cover traffic, i.e., they blur communication messages and, there-
fore, conceal the sender in noise. However, such cover traffic in-
creases the communication overhead which renders the systems
unusable for participants with fewer resources.
This thesis proposes a sender protection mechanism that is
based on dining-cryptographer networks (DCnets) [22]. There
are several improvements introduced to the classical DCnet ap-
proach to improve the communication overhead:
1. each DCnet spans only a relatively small subgroup (of con-
figurable size) and not all participants of the communica-
tion system,
2. the small(er) DCnet group is used to hide the sender of a
message only (instead of using it for the whole communi-
cation), and
3. the communication within such a group is directed to-
wards a single rendezvous subject who then releases
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the message into the communication system (instead of
broadcast-based communication).
The novel approach based on asymmetric dining-
cryptographer networks (ADCnets) for sender protection
provides provable anonymity based on the security guarantees
of DCnets with a configurable trade-off between efficiency
(smaller groups) and anonymity (larger groups). An adversary
confronted with this technique cannot reduce the sender’s
anonymity below the group size. Figure 3 visualizes the concept
of ADCnets, where the sender 4 is hidden in an ADCnet formed
around the rendezvous participant RS. With this ADCnet, an
adversary not able to distinguish the subjects c1–c3, 4, and RS
to identify the sender of a message.
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Figure 3: Sender protection using ADCnet: Sender 4 is hidden in an ADCnet
around rendezvous subject RS.
Chapter 6 discusses the challenge of sender protection in de-
tails and provides insights into state of the art as well as the
novel concept of ADCnets. The insights into state of the art have
been published in [70].
This thesis addresses several challenges. First, the challenge
of combining the opposing goals of efficiency and anonymity
in the establishment of communication groups is addressed
by proposing a novel mechanism establishing these communi-
cation groups. Second, the influence of dynamic user behav-
ior (“churn”) is analyzed and addressed by utilizing residual
information from the initial communication group establish-
ment. Third, the information leakage of routing information ex-
change mechanisms is analyzed, and four different mechanisms
are compared with respect to their effects on efficiency and
anonymity. Lastly, a novel mechanism for sender protection is
proposed that hides senders in a group of configurable size.
The core contributions of this thesis have been mainly pub-
lished in three peer-reviewed publications [67, 68, 70]. Addition-
ally, the author of this thesis (co-)authored nine further peer-
reviewed publications [18, 37, 39, 40, 69, 71, 72, 80, 145]. The list
of publications can be found on Page xi.
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1.3 outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2
establishes the background knowledge on core optimization
goals of this thesis efficiency and anonymity. The chapter then
continues with an introduction of the general communication
model, as well as a clarification of frequently used terms. The
following adversary model is derived using core properties of
the adversary and provides real-world examples. Finally, Chap-
ter 2 introduces metrics to evaluate anonymity and discusses
anonymization primitives.
The state of the art in anonymous communication systems is
reviewed in Chapter 3. The first part of this chapter derives a
series of requirements and characteristics that define essential
properties of anonymous communication systems concerning ef-
ficiency and anonymity. A detailed discussion of the start of the
art follows the requirements and characteristics.
Chapter 4 presents the novel ACO-based mechanism to es-
tablish anonymous communication overlays for group commu-
nication. First, it introduces ACO itself; then it introduces the
ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism and discusses an
extensive simulation study that evaluates the influence of the pa-
rameters and the performance in comparison with conventional
overlays and a Steiner tree approximation. Finally, a formal dis-
cussion calculates the possible anonymity protection.
Chapter 5 introduces subject churn, i.e., it discusses the chal-
lenge of joining and leaving users. Churn may disrupt the com-
munication overlay. Another simulation study shows that the
novel ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism improves
the robustness against these dynamic users. The chapter con-
cludes with a detailed discussion of mechanisms to disseminate
routing information in the tension of efficiency and anonymity.
Chapter 6 discusses why sender protection is a particular chal-
lenge. Next, the chapter discusses cover traffic as the state of the
art approach and analyzes efficiency and anonymity using a ran-
domized initialization. Finally, Chapter 6 introduces ADCnets as
a mechanism to protect senders in anonymous group communi-
cation with higher efficiency and abiding sender anonymity.
Chapter 7 summarizes this thesis and highlights the contribu-
tions and insights gained from the research performed. Chap-
ter 7 concludes with an outlook on future research directions.
2
B A C K G R O U N D
This chapter introduces concepts, terminology, and background
knowledge for efficient and anonymous group communica-
tion. These concepts will then be used to discuss the state-of-
the-art and the contributions in Chapters 3–6. The chapter is
structured as follows: Section 2.1 introduces the notions effi-
ciency and anonymity. Section 2.2 introduces the communica-
tion model and terminology that is used throughout this thesis.
Section 2.3 contains a thorough discussion of adversary models.
Section 2.4 introduces anonymity metrics as well as commonly
used anonymization primitives. This chapter concludes with a
summary in Section 2.5.
2.1 efficency & anonymity
Efficiency and anonymity in communication systems are entan-
gled measures with inherent tension. Efficiency measures costs
of communication concerning different metrics, e.g., time or
load. Anonymity measures the ability to conceal information
about the communication relationship and can achieve different
levels of protection. As such, efficiency improvements usually
require more information and anonymity improvements require
reduction of information.
This section first takes a closer look at efficiency and (native)
group communication, introducing the characteristics of both.
Second, the often synonymously used terms of anonymity, con-
fidentiality, and privacy are discussed and differentiated. After
that, this section introduces four levels of anonymity.
2.1.1 Efficient Group Communication
efficiency Efficiency in communication systems can be mea-
sured concerning time, i.e., the delay between senders and recip-
ients, or load, i.e., the number of messages that is necessary to
transmit messages between senders and recipients.
Time-efficiency is often expressed as a communication system
being low-delay or high-delay [48]. The classification of anony-
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mous communication systems into low- and high-delay is not
clearly defined by the state of the art. A “typical” separation
classifies anonymous communication systems that enable e-mail-
like, asynchronous communication as high-delay; anonymous
communication systems that enable real-time, synchronous com-
munication like chatting or voice-communication are classified
as low-delay.
The lower the delay, the higher the time-efficiency. Equation (1)
formulates the time-efficiency efftime as proportional to the dif-
ference between the time the message is sent tsent and the time
the message is received by the last recipient treceive. This differ-
ence mostly depends on the maximal distance distancemax(s, r)
between sender s and recipient r; this thesis uses this distance as
measure for the time-efficiency, i.e., expresses the time-efficiency
with the diameter of a communication overlay diam(Ot) (see
Section 2.2.1.3 Paragraph Graph-theoretical Properties).
efftime ∝ treceive − tsend ∝ distancemax(s, r) (1)
Load-efficiency is measured by the number of messages that
are necessary to relay a message from its sender to its recipi-
ent(s). The lower the number of messages, the higher the load-
efficiency.
With native group communication (see following paragraph
(native) group communication), messages are duplicated as
close to the recipients as possible, i.e., communication paths are
consolidated. A Steiner tree establishes the communication with
the least number of connections—with native group communica-
tion, Steiner trees provide the best load-efficiency by minimizing
the number of required messages.
When calculating the load-efficiency, maintenance messages
like heartbeats can be ignored as they depend on the communica-
tion system itself and not on ocuring communication. The load-
efficiency therefore only considers communication messages and
messages that are introduced by anonymity protection measures
like cover traffic. Acknowledgements may be used for all com-
munication messages, as such, they scale with both the number
of sent communication messages and the minimal number of
sent messages; therefore, the load-efficiency can be calculated
without considering acknowledgements. Equation 2 formulates
the load-efficiency effload as ratio of the number of messages
that are required to establish a communication msgcom+prot
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Figure 4: Efficiency may be optimized with respect to delay on the left-hand
side or with respect to overhead on the right-hand side.
by the minimal number of messages that are required to estab-
lish a communication with a Steiner tree msgSt+prot. Both are
composed of the number of messages for the communication
msgcom or msgSt respectively and the required number of pro-
tection messages msgprot. The number of protection measures
msgprot may be different in both situations and depends on the
employed anonymity protection measures.
effload ∝ msgcom+prot
msgSt+prot
=
msgcom +msgprot
msgSt +msgprot
(2)
Example 1 shows with Figure 4 the difference between delay-
optimized and load-optimized communication.
Example 1: In Figure 4, the sender (blue) sends a message to the re-
cipients (orange). On the left-hand side, the message dissemination is
optimized for time-efficiency, so it uses the shortest and, thus, fastest,
path. The dissemination structure on the right-hand side is optimized
for load-efficiency, so it uses the minimal number of messages to reach
out to all recipients.
Assume that a message requires one time-step to be relayed one hop,
the sender emits the message at time t = 1, no anonymity protection
measures causing additional messages, and both sides employ native
group communication, time-efficiency and load-efficiency values are as
follows:
efflefttime = 4− 1 = 3
eff
right
time = 6− 1 = 5
effleftload = 13/11 = 1.18
eff
right
load =
11/11 = 1
This thesis focusses on improving load-efficiency; thus, this
thesis will refer to load-efficiency as efficiency. Nonetheless, time-
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Figure 5: Native group communication significantly reduces the messaging
load.
efficiency is still considered and evaluated in the context of this
thesis.
(native) group communication Group communication
describes the communication scenario in which a message is sent
towards multiple recipients (1-to-n). When multiple subjects of
a group are sending messages, the scenario results in many-to-
many (m-to-n) group communication. Often, group communica-
tion is realized by repeated unicasts (1-to-1), i.e., realized by hav-
ing the sender emit the message for each recipient individually.
Native group communication is based on application layer
multicast and improves efficiency by moving the point of mes-
sage duplication as close as possible to the respective recipients
(late message duplication). With this late message duplication, the
number of messages that are required to disseminate a message
to all recipients is reduced from the overall system’s perspective.
Example 2: By applying native group communication, as visualized in
Figure 5 on the right-hand side, the load for subjects can be reduced.
In the example visualized, the load is reduced by 50%, from 12 to 6
messages.
2.1.2 Anonymity, Confidentiality, and Privacy
Anonymity, confidentiality, and privacy are often confused as
synonyms; even the state of the art research does not provide a
consistent distinction [34, 43, 118, 129, 134, 141]. This section pro-
vides definitions of the three security-related properties based
on either broadly accepted knowledge (to define confidentiality)
or a distinction based on the state of the art and elaboration (to
define anonymity and privacy).
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Sally
Bob (Service)
Renee
Rey
Alice Charlie
Figure 6: Example communication system. The dashed connections represent
the participation in the communication system; the solid arrows rep-
resent the actual communication.
The following definitions use the following scenario which is
also visualized in Figure 6: Bob offers the communication service.
Sally is a sender of messages in Bob’s service, and Renee and Rey
are recipients of messages in Bob’s service. Alice is a participant
in Bob’s service but is not involved in the communication of
Sally, Renee, and Rey, and Charlie is not participating in Bob’s
service.
confidentiality A communication system provides confi-
dentiality, if only intended parties, i.e., senders and recipients as
specified by the participation in the communication group, can
learn information about the content of a communication mes-
sage. In other words, the knowledge of all other parties, includ-
ing any adversary, does not change when they can access a mes-
sage during its dissemination, e.g., while relaying the message:
the adversary’s posterior knowledge about the content equals
the a priori knowledge about the content.
Example 3: In Bob’s confidentiality-providing communication service,
only Sally, Renee, and Rey can access the contents of a message. Nei-
ther Alice nor Bob can learn anything about the content of the message.
Alice, because she does not take part in the system, and Bob because
he is only relaying the message without sharing the necessary crypto-
graphic key material.
privacy Hughes and Shmatikov [77] define privacy as the un-
observability of identity-based system behavior. Thus, nobody who
is probing a subject should be able to discriminate whether the
subject participates in the system or not, based on the behavior
of the system.
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Example 4: While an adversary can observe the behavior of Bob’s
privacy-preserving service, he should not be able to learn whether
Charlie, Sally, Renee, or Rey are using the service at all by evaluating
his observations, for instance, seen messages.
anonymity Anonymity expresses the hiding of information
regarding linking of senders, recipients, and messages. Sender
anonymity considers the linking of senders to messages to be sen-
sitive and measures whether an adversary can collect evidence
to match a sender to a message. Recipient anonymity is symmet-
rically for recipients; thus, considers the linkage of a recipient
to messages to be sensitive. Sender-Recipient anonymity considers
the linkage of senders to recipients using a message.
Hughes and Shmatikov [77] provide a formal model, based on
Kripke structures, defining anonymity in four stages (here given
for the sender’s perspective, recipient’s and sender-recipient’s
perspective follow symmetrically):
• unlinkability: A communication system provides unlinka-
bility if an adversary is able to identify either the sender
of a message or the recipient of a message but not both for
the same message. Thus, an adversary is not able to link
the sender of a message with its recipient(s).
Example 5: An adversary can identify Sally as the sender or Re-
nee and Rey as the recipients of a message; however, the adver-
sary is not able to link Sally, and Renee or Rey simultaneously
to the same message.
• k-anonymity1: A communication system provides k-
anonymity if an adversary is able to reduce the respective
candidate set of subjects to k but not further. Thus, a sender
hides in at least k-1 other subjects, and each recipient hides
in at least k-1 other subjects as well.
1 Hughes and Shmatikov base their notion of k-anonymity on work of Samarati
and Sweeney [128]
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Example 6: An adversary can reduce the set of subjects being po-
tential senders of a communication message to size k, and Sally
as the sender is included in this set. Symmetrically, the adver-
sary can compute the set of potential recipients where Renee
and Rey are then included. The adversary is not able to remove
additional subjects from the candidate sets such that the mini-
mal size is stable with k subjects.
• absolute anonymity: In contrast to k-anonymity, a communi-
cation system provides absolute anonymity if an adversary
is not able to reduce the set of potential senders or recipi-
ents. Thus, senders and recipients hide within the set of all
subjects in the communication system.
Example 7: An adversary is not able to reduce the number of
potential senders beyond the number of subjects in the commu-
nication system.
• untraceability: A communication system provides untrace-
ability if an adversary is unable to observe any evidence of
communication taking place. Thus, the adversary is neither
able to discriminate senders or recipients nor to realize that
there is a communication ongoing.
Example 8: An adversary is not able to realize that Sally and Rey
are communicating. This inability of detecting communication
does not change, independent from the adversary being the ser-
vice provider Bob, an outsider Charlie, or a different participant
Alice, that is not involved in the communication.
By the order of the strength of anonymity, the following rank-
ing of an anonymous communication is achieved, from weak to
strong:
unlinkability < k-anonymity < absolute anonymity < untraceability
2.1.3 Levels of Anonymity
According to the scenario of this thesis, communication systems
are classified according to their level of anonymity. The level of
anonymity describes the ability of the system to hide the commu-
nication relationship—sender and recipient(s)—from the adver-
saries of different strength, i.e., from adversaries impersonating
participants, outsiders, or the service provider.
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In communications, two types of information may be leaked:
first, the actual content of the communication and second, the
metadata of the communication.
• Content: The payload of messages carries the content of
the communication. It may or may not include personally
identifiable information, i.e., information that may be used
to identify a human user [55].
• Metadata: During the communication process, metadata
emerge. These metadata encompass, among others, infor-
mation about senders, recipients, and frequency of com-
munication. As such, they can be used to identify human
users, and are, therefore, also personally identifiable infor-
mation [55]. Simply speaking, metadata comprise all infor-
mation that can be derived without utilizing the content of
a message.
Metadata can be further partitioned into explicit metadata
and implicit metadata. Explicit metadata are information
that help the communication system to provision its ser-
vice:
1. Routing information that is included in communication
messages
2. Information included in maintenance messages, e.g.,
route establishment messages
3. Information included in the infrastructure, e.g., routing
tables
Implicit metadata are derivable from observing the behavior
of subjects. As such, subjects may be identified as senders
of messages by observing that they are the source of the
respective messages.
Figure 7 visualizes the following levels of anonymity using the
analogy of a letter: the content is the actual letter; metadata are
included on the envelope. Explicit metadata are represented by
the actual addresses, and the implicit metadata are represented
by the list of forwarders.
• level-0 communication systems do not offer any protection
of their users’ communication and operate using plain text
messages.
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Figure 7: Levels of Anonymity Protection
• level-1 systems provide confidentiality but no anonymity.
The content of the communication is hidden from unin-
tended parties. However, the system does not provide any
protection of metadata. By inspecting message headers or
performing traffic analysis [123], sender and recipient(s) of
a message can be identified.
Example 9: Bob’s communication service provides confidential-
ity using end-to-end encryption. However, as Bob is relaying
messages between Sally and Rey, he can access the header of
the message and read source and recipient fields.
• level-2 communication systems provide confidentiality
and protect explicit metadata. Thus, anonymity is pre-
served when a non-global adversary accesses the message.
Example 10: Bob’s communication service provides level-2
anonymity by encrypting message headers. Thus, Alice is not
able to identify Sally and Rey as sender and recipient of a mes-
sage. However, as Bob has a global view of his service, he can
trace the message from origination to destination and, thus, iden-
tify Sally and Rey as sender and recipient.
• level-3 communication systems provide confidentiality
and protect all metadata. Thus, anonymity is not only pre-
served against local adversaries but also against global ad-
versaries by hiding the message dissemination paths.
Example 11: Bob’s communication service provides level-3
anonymity by encrypting message headers and obfuscating
message origination and destination(s) by utilizing a DC net-
work [22].
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Figure 7 visualizes the differences of the levels of anonymity.
This thesis focusses on anonymous communication systems that
aim to provide anonymity on level-3, as metadata threaten the
anonymity of users.
2.2 model and terminology
Anonymous group communication requires a formalized model
that encompasses the process of communication as well as its
establishment. Furthermore, the link towards distributed com-
munication based on P2P [113, 140] is provided in this section.
2.2.1 Group Communication based on Publish/Subscribe
This section describes how group communication is established
using the Pub/Sub paradigm and provides a model that intro-
duces the terminology and formal background for this thesis.
2.2.1.1 Concept
The Pub/Sub concept enables group communication based on
topics or interests. Based on these topics, senders are enabled
to send messages to recipients—without having senders and re-
cipients to know each other. Recipients enable the intermediate
broker (or Event-service according to the Pub/Sub terminology)
to relay messages by expressing their interests to topics using
the concept of subscriptions.
2.2.1.2 Publish/Subscribe and Generation of Communication Groups
Pub/Sub is a content-oriented routing scheme. In contrast to
other common methods that enable distributed systems and
communication, e.g., Inter-process communication (IPC), remote
procedure call (RPC), and distributed objects, Pub/Sub pro-
vides loose coupling between senders and recipients. Moreover,
Pub/Sub naturally supports many-to-many communication and
message dissemination based on topics and interests [53].
Loose coupling enables communication between senders and
recipients while those are not necessarily known to each other.
A broker in between acts as a proxy between senders and recipi-
ents and relays messages to establish the communication. By re-
ducing the coupling to a minimum, senders and recipients may
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remain anonymous to each other. The remaining coupling origi-
nates from the topic-based addressing scheme, were senders and
recipients share a topic which is used to relay messages between
them. This indirection enables both senders and recipients to
blend in larger groups of subjects.
The broker enables group communication—or many-to-many
communication—based on topics. For each topic, a group
is established using either advertisement-based process or a
subscription-based one. In the advertisement-based process, the
senders disseminate advertisements for topics to which they to
emit messages. Upon receiving an advertisement for a topic they
are interested in, recipients reply with a subscription. By follow-
ing these subscriptions, the broker can relay the messages ac-
cordingly. In the subscription-based process, senders skip adver-
tisements and recipients disseminate their subscriptions in the
communication system to enable the brokers to relay messages
from the senders.
Example 12: Sender Sally sends an advertisement mtadv to the broker
Bob. Bob then relays the advertisement to all other subjects. Upon re-
ceiving mtadv, recipient Rey sends the subscription message m
t
sub to
Bob. When receiving a communication message mtcom from Sally, Bob
forwards it to Rey by looking up preceding subscriptions.
2.2.1.3 Communication Model
The communication model comprises a formal representation
of the system, different abstraction layers, Pub/Sub as enabling
communication technique, and a differentiation of both content
and metadata.
graphs , participants , and roles A communication sys-
tem can be modeled as graph G with the subjects, for instance,
Sally, Rey, Alice, and Bob, represented as vertices V and their con-
nections represented as edges E ⊆ V×V. Both human users and
(smart) devices can participate in the communication system and
represent subjects v ∈ V. Users are typical human participants of
the system. As connected (smart) devices can also participate in
such communication systems, this thesis uses the general term
subjects to abstract from unnecessary specifics of participants.
Communication groups are formed along topics ti ∈ T . These
topics represent interests of communication groups and are the
characteristic attributes of these groups.
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The set of senders St comprises information producers, for ex-
ample, Sally. Accordingly, the set of recipients Rt comprises in-
formation consumers, for example, Renee and Rey. The set of
brokers Bt consists of the subjects that are required to relay mes-
sages, for example, Bob. In centralized or decentralized commu-
nication systems, dedicated subjects, for example, servers, popu-
late Bt. In contrast, distributed communication systems require
regular subjects to populate Bt and to relay communication traf-
fic.
The sets St, Rt, and Bt are not required to be disjoint, for
example, Rey can be a recipient ri ∈ Rt and still be required
to relay communication to subsequent subjects, i.e., be a broker
bj ∈ Bt with ri = bj = vk ∈ V .
underlay and overlays The subjects and their physical
connections2 form the underlay U. Subjects usually connect to
dedicated servers from the service provider, when the system
is a centralized or a decentralized system. These servers are
then establishing the end-to-end connection between subjects
by relaying messages. In distributed systems, this functionality
is taken over by the subjects themselves. They are connected
based on certain properties, e.g., their distances or physical con-
nections, and cooperate to establish the service, i.e., relay mes-
sages for each other to create the end-to-end connection between
senders and recipients.
The logical underlay G is formed above the underlay. It repre-
sents connections between subjects in the communication system
and, thus, depends on the connection structure of the communi-
cation system, for example, friendships or shared interests. In
P2P systems, the logical underlay G represents the physical con-
nections, i.e., in P2P systems, the underlay U and the logical
underlay G are equal.
Example 13: Scrutinizing the connections on Facebook, the underlay
and the logical underlay can easily be derived. The underlay is formed
by the Facebook server to which subjects are connected. The logical
underlay is then derived by extracting the so-called social graph from
Facebook which contains the logical connections between the users of
Facebook.
2 This definition of physical connections ignores the internet service provider as
entity as they are forwarding messages transparently.
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Figure 8: The layers of the communication system
For each communication, no matter whether it is a pairwise
communication or a group-based one, a communication overlay
Ot is established. This overlay comprises all participants that
are communicating, i.e., the senders s ∈ St and recipients r ∈ Rt,
and the participants that are necessary to deliver information
from sender to receivers, i.e., the brokers b ∈ Bt. The overlay
is denoted by Ot and induced by subjects Vt = St ∪ Rt ∪ Bt
and connections Et ⊆ E. A communication overlay is a set of
|St|-dissemination trees with the roots being the senders s ∈ St.
Above the communication overlay, the logical overlay LOt is
formed. This logical overlay includes the senders St and recipi-
ents Rt, i.e., only the subjects eligible to access the content of the
communication take part in the communication group form the
logical overlay.
Figure 8 shows the layers in their relation to each other. De-
pending on the actual system design, the underlay U and the
logical underlay G may be the same layer; decentralized P2P sys-
tems are often systems having equal underlay U and logical un-
derlay G layers. Following from here, this thesis abstracts from
the underlay; its contributions are based upon the logical under-
lay G to create and to improve the communication overlays Ot
while maintaining the same, stable logical overlays LOt.
graph-theoretical properties Each subject v inhibits
properties from respective graph-structures than can be derived
from the different layers. Within this thesis, properties with re-
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spect to the logical underlay G and a communication overlay Ot
are relevant.
In these layers, the structure of subjects and their respective
connections may be represented by the graphs G and Ot. In
these, each subject vi as a number of connections which is called
their degree d(vi). This degree can be separated by directed con-
nections, then a subject has an in-degree d+(vi) and an out-degree
d−(vi). The degrees count the respective incident connections of
vi. The adjacent subjects, i.e., the subjects directly connected to vi
with one of the incident connections, are called neighbors N(vi).
In the case of directed connections, N(vi) is differentiated into
N+(vi), i.e., the adjacent subjects that can communicate towards
vi, and N−(vi), i.e., the adjacent subjects that vi can communi-
cate towards.
A path between two subjects vi and vj is a sequence of connec-
tions p(vi, vj) = ((vi, va), (va, vb), ...(vc, vj)) with vi being the
source of the first connection and vj being the destination of
the last connection. The length of a path |p(vi, vj)| is the number
of connections in the sequence. A shortest path sp(vi, vj) is such
a path with the shortest sequence of connections possible; the
shortest path lengths is the respective number of connections in
such a path. The average shortest path length (apl) is the average of
the shortest path length between all connected pairs of subjects.
The diameter is the length of the longest shortest path between
any connected pair of subjects.
2.2.2 Synchronizing Subjects: Real World and Simulation
The communication model presented in this section assumes
that subjects progress in synchronized rounds, i.e., events like
receiving and sending messages can be ordered globally. This
ordering of events simplifies evaluation and comparison of the
contributions of this thesis and the state of the art.
In a distributed system, synchronization is not easy to achieve.
This model, however, mostly does not require synchronized
progress. In the following, the core modules of the simulation
model are discussed concerning their requirements for synchro-
nization in the context of this thesis:
• Overlay Establishment (Chapters 4 and 5): subjects follow
overlay the overlay establishment protocol in a fully dis-
tributed fashion. As such, subjects process messages based
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on their local knowledge and the protocol. Synchronization
beyond a time to live (TTL) is not required.
• Communication (Chapters 4 and 5): the sender may emit a
message at any time. The subjects in the respective commu-
nication overlay relay the message according to the overlay;
recipients consume the message, and may further relay the
message according to the overlay. Synchronization beyond
a TTL is not required.
• Cover Traffic (Chapter 6): cover traffic requires subjects to
emit cover messages in every round. Thus, synchroniza-
tion is required to ensure that cover traffic can deploy its
effect. The synchronization does, however, not require that
all subjects are completely synchronized; a common under-
standing of “rough” time intervals is sufficient. For exam-
ple, it is sufficient that subjects emit their cover message
with deviations from each other as long as every subject
emits a message before a subject may emit a second mes-
sage.
• Dining-cryptographer networks DCnets (Chapter 6): DCnets
rely on multi-party computation. As a result of this, all
participants of a DCnet are required to contribute to ev-
ery message to enable successful decryption. If a subject
misses participating, the content of the message cannot be
retrieved. Thus, the communication takes place in rounds
which have to be agreed by the participants. However, it is
not required that the subjects emit their messages at exact
same points in time.
Rounds can be translated to time; sometimes, the number of
elapsed rounds needs to be translated to elapsed time, for exam-
ple, when analyzing the delay of communication. The number
of rounds can be multiplied with the average connection delay.
Projects like PingER [99] measure the delay between end-hosts in
varying distances. Hereby, they derive average connection delays
for, for example, intra-continental and inter-continental connec-
tion. These can be used to estimate the delay that is introduced
by each hop.
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2.2.3 P2P Systems
P2P systems distribute the functionality of the server(s) to all of
the subjects that participate in the system. P2P systems can be
grouped into the following classes of centralized and decentral-
ized systems. The third class of hybrid systems combines both
centralized and decentralized elements.
Figure 9 visualizes the three classes of P2P systems that are
explained in the following.
(a) centralized P2P (b) decentralized P2P (c) hybrid P2P
Figure 9: P2P system classes. Blue vertices are central entities while black ver-
tices are usual subjects.
centralized p2p systems In centralized P2P systems, a
central entity helps the subjects to utilize the services. The cen-
tral entity may provide resource lookup or coordination func-
tionality; the service itself is then established between the sub-
jects without further involvement of the central entity.
Figure 9a visualizes an exemplary centralized P2P system.
decentralized p2p systems In decentralized P2P sys-
tems, no central entity is facilitating the service; all subjects are
equally responsible to cooperate to establish the functionality
of the service. Resource lookup and coordination are therefore
challenging, for example, the question whether a resource is not
available or “just not found yet” cannot be easily answered.
Figure 9b visualizes an exemplary decentralized P2P system.
hybrid p2p systems In hybrid P2P systems, the advantages
of centralized and decentralized P2P systems are combined.
While there are no explicit servers involved, more powerful sub-
jects can be selected as so-called “super-peers”. In this role, they
coordinate a subset of subjects that are connected to them; for
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this subset, the respective super-peer acts like a central entity
and provides the required coordinative support. The super-peers
are interconnected and can, therefore, support each other in fa-
cilitating the service functionality.
Figure 9c visualizes an exemplary hybrid P2P system; the blue
super-peer subjects coordinate their respective subset of subjects
in a centralized fashion and are connected among themselves.
2.2.4 P2P-/Graph-Topologies
The connection structure of an unstructured P2P system—or the
logical underlay—usually reveals patterns specific to, for exam-
ple, the application that “provides” the subjects and their con-
nections for the anonymous communication system improved
in this thesis.
The later evaluation in this thesis bases on the following three
models, the social model, the random model, and the random
geometric graph (RGG). Additional properties of these networks,
beyond the basic ones here, are discussed in Section 4.4.3.
2.2.4.1 Social Graph
A social graph results from natural “friend” structures, for ex-
ample, real-world friendships or Facebook’s social graph. In this
model, there are many subjects with a comparably low number
of connections while a few subjects gain lots of connections. A
biased selection probability for choosing destinations for new
connections causes a bias towards popular subjects: a higher
number of incoming connections result in a higher probability
of gaining additional new connections. This biased probability is
also called preferential attachment and caught by the phrase “the
rich get richer” phenomenon in social networks [13, 90, 110].
The highly connected subjects form the so-called backbone of
the graph and introduce some interesting properties. This back-
bone often enables a stable—or even an decreasing—(effective)
diameter3 even when the graph is growing, i.e., when additional
subjects are joining the system [90]. This property is called small
world and is usually indicated by an apl in the order of ln(V;
Cohen and Havlin [25] even suggested that the subjects in the
backbone often do not only establish the small-world property
3 The effective diameters measures the maximal path length that is required to
connect a sampled subset of all subjects.
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(a) Social Network with 750 subjects (b) Social Network with 750 subjects and
paths from one sender (red) to five re-
cipients (green)
Figure 10: The structure of social networks and the influence of the densely
connected backbone on shortest paths.
but the ultra-small world, property which is indicated by an apl
in the order of lnln(V), when the degree exponent is within [2, 3]
(see also [12]).
The subjects with a high number of connections, i.e., the sub-
jects in the backbone, provide “shortcuts” through the graph
and connect different areas of the graph. These shortcuts also
result in a higher load for some subjects in the P2P system as
the subjects have to handle messages from a higher number of
connections.
The backbone of the system is also visualized in Figure 10a in
the darker middle of the network; its influence is visualized by
Figure 10b, where a randomly chosen sender (red) is connected
to five recipients (green) using shortest paths (for the visualiza-
tion, usual subjects and unused connections have a lower opac-
ity). All shortest paths are first going into the densely connected
center (the backbone) before splitting and leading to their desti-
nations with just a few hops.
2.2.4.2 Random Graph
In a random graph, all subjects are equal, and all connections
are equally likely such that all subjects the same average de-
gree while the network is not growing. Erdo˝s-Rényi [51] and
Gilbert [60] propose two different methods to generate random
graphs.
In the Erdo˝s-Rényi model, a random instantiation of G=(V,E)
of all possible permutations is drawn; in contrast to this ap-
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proach, the Gilbert model evaluates every possible individual
connection and does not choose from the set of random graphs.
The resulting graphs of both approaches, however, are equiva-
lent.
(a) Random Network with 750 subjects (b) Random Network with 750 subjects and
paths from one sender (red) to five re-
cipients (green)
Figure 11: The structure of random networks and the influence of the equality
of subjects on shortest paths.
In contrast to the social graphs, random networks are not
forming a backbone—all subjects are “equal”. As a result of this,
the concentration of shortest path in the core of the network is
avoided, leading to fairer load distribution in a communication
network. Figure 11a visualizes such a random graph and shows
no densely connected backbone. Figure 11b shows the influence
of the equality of subjects and the missing backbone by visu-
alizing the shortest paths of one sender (red) to five recipients
(green). Due to the missing backbone, there is no area of the net-
work where the shortest paths are leading to before splitting to
the different recipients.
2.2.4.3 Random Geometric Graph
The RGG model—also known as unit disc graph and random
euclidean network—assumes subjects that can reach all subjects
within a specific distance. An exemplary application scenario
of RGGs is a wireless sensor network (WSN) where subjects
have the same radio transmission radii, i.e., subjects can reach
other subjects that are located within the range of their wireless
communication interface. An RGG is established by placing sub-
jects at randomly-chosen coordinates in a d dimensional space.
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The pairwise distances of all subjects are computed after plac-
ing them in the field; two subjects establish a connection if their
distance is smaller than a threshold t.
(a) RGG with 750 subjects (b) RGG with 750 subjects and paths from
one sender (red) to five recipients
(green)
Figure 12: The structure of RGGs and the influence of distance-based connec-
tivity of subjects on shortest paths.
Figure 12a visualizes an RGG with 750 subjects on a 2-
dimensional (d = 2, x ∈ [0, 1], y ∈ [0, 1]) plane with a distance
threshold of t = 0.1—varying the size of the plane or the thresh-
old t produces sparser (larger plane or smaller threshold) or
denser (smaller plane or larger threshold) RGGs. This configura-
tion can be translated into the common “||uv|| 6 1” notation by
simple scaling and is “typical” [11, 86, 92, 93] in the research of
WSNs and topology adaption. Figure 12b visualizes the shortest
paths from one randomly selected sender (red) to five randomly
selected recipients (green)—the distance based connectivity does
neither yield a densely connected core nor does it foster a spe-
cific path pattern.
2.2.5 Steiner trees
A Steiner tree is a tree ST of a graph G that spans a set of ter-
minals T ⊆ V ; the costs, or the weight, of a Steiner tree ST are
the sum of the costs (or weights) of the connections in ST . The
nonterminal vertices in a Steiner tree ST are called Steiner points.
The Steiner tree problem seeks a minimum-cost Steiner tree for a
given set of terminals T in a graph G and is NP-complete [79].
Kou et al. [84] provide a heuristic that solves the Steiner tree
problem with a distance (approximation factor ρ) of maximal
2.2 model and terminology 29
2(1 − 1/l), with l being the number of leaves in the optimal
Steiner tree. The heuristic establishes its Steiner tree approxima-
tion (StA) with the following steps, Figure 13 summarizes the
heuristic visually:
1. Construct the complete distance graph G1 from G and T .
The distance graph comprises the terminals in T , the connections be-
tween them have the costs/weight that correspond the sum of the cost-
s/weight of the connections on the shortest path between the respective
terminals. Figure 13b visualizes the distance graph.
2. Compute the minimal spanning tree, MST1, of G1. If there
are multiple minimal spanning trees, select any. Figure 13c visualizes
the minimal spanning tree resulting from the distance graph.
3. Construct the subgraph, GS, of G by replacing the connec-
tions in MST1 by their shortest path in G. If there are multiple
shortest, select any. Figure 13d visualizes the subgraph.
4. Compute the minimal spanning tree, MST2, of GS. If there
are multiple minimal spanning trees, select any. Figure 13e visualizes
the minimal spanning tree resulting from the subgraph.
5. Construct the StA ST by removing all Steiner points in leaf
position iteratively. Figure 13c visualizes the minimal spanning
tree resulting from the distance graph.
The example in Figure 13, which is given by Kou et al., uses
weighted connections. In the scope of this thesis, the weights of
connections are 1, for example, as achieved by using a constant
weight function.
2.2.6 Hash Functions
Following Menezes et al. [102], a hash function is a function h
that has at least the following two properties:
• compression: h maps an input x of arbitrary (but finite)
length to an output h(x) of defined and fixed length n.
• easy computation: given an input x and a hash function h,
the image h(x) is easy to compute.
Additionally, hash functions are mostly one-way functions, i.e.,
while the computation of the image h(x) is “easy” given h and
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Figure 13: Computation of a Steiner tree approximation [84]. Vertices in blue
are terminals; vertices in yellow are Steiner points.
x, the computation of x given h and h(x) is “hard”. For easy and
hard are no conclusive definitions given. Hard, for example, is
typically referred to as computationally infeasible [119] or compa-
rable to solving the factorization problem [121].
In the scope of this thesis, keyless hash functions are used.
These are commonly used for modification detection. Other hash
functions are constructed to use a key as second input parameter
and are then used, for example, as message authentication codes.
collision resistant hash function Informally, a colli-
sion resistant hash function is a hash function h for which the
finding of any two inputs x and y that have the same image
h(x)=h(y) is “hard” [33, 104, 105, 119, 121]. The collision resis-
tant hash function has to fulfill the following three requirements.
1. preimage resistance: given h(y), the image of y under h, it is
“hard” to find an input x such that h(x)=h(y).
2. 2nd-preimage resistance: given x, it is “hard” to find a second
input y which has the same image such that x 6= y and
h(x)=h(y).
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Recognizing that the right to privacy can enable the enjoy-
ment of other rights and the free development of an individ-
ual’s personality and identity, and an individual’s ability to
participate in political, economic, social and cultural life, and
noting with concern that violations or abuses of the right to
privacy might affect the enjoyment of other human rights,
including the right to freedom of expression and to hold
opinions without interference, and the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association. — UNHRC
528B
hSHA256
7D247B2057FCBB861F15EA59C0D72C682
8F46F9AFE1AFD55D9B3FD47DDBE7016
256B
Figure 14: SHA-256 hash function example. A 528 byte text-input (the
UNHCR-quote from Chapter 1) is mapped to its 256 byte image.
3. collision resistance: it is “hard” to find any two (different)
inputs x,y such that they have the same image under h,
i.e., h(x)=h(y).
2.2.7 Bloom Filter
Bloom filters [16, 57] bfi are containers that store information
in an array and (mainly) support two operations, the adding of
elements and the contains-check.
As such, Bloom filters enable to quickly check whether an el-
ement has been “processed” before without involving possibly
expensive disk or network lookups for non-existent information.
A Bloom filter holds its elements in an array of sizembf which
is initialized with zeros. An element is added by computing its
hash value under kbf (different) hash functions and setting the
respective entries of the vector to one.
By this construction, the Bloom filter can provide a definite
answer for the contains operation, if at least one of the kbf en-
tries is zero. Then, the element is undoubtedly not contained.
If all kbf entries contain ones, the Bloom filter may contain the
element—an indisputable positive response cannot be given, as
the kbf fields may have been set by the adding of other elements
(i.e., the contains-check may return true through collision).
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Deleting elements from a (simple) Bloom filter is not possible
as the fields may also be set to one by the addition of another
element. Then, the deletion of an element would introduce false
negatives to the Bloom filter. Fan et al. [57] introduced counting
Bloom filters as an improvement to the classical Bloom filters.
Here, the entries are not set to one but used as a counter—the
Bloom filter increments the counter every time an entry is used
to add an element; accordingly, the Bloom filter decrements the
respective counters when removing respective elements. As a
result of using these counters, the Bloom filter can remove ele-
ments without introducing false negatives.
Example 14: Figure 15 visualizes an exemplary Bloom filter bf. bf con-
sists of a vector with mbf = 20 fields and is filled by kbf = 3 hash
functions. Six elements are added to the bf—assume that element 6 is
not added to bf, the contains operation will still return a positive re-
sponse as the contained elements 1, 2, 4, and 5 set the respective entries
of element 6 to one.
1 2 3 456
!"
Figure 15: A Bloom filter bf with a mbf=20 bit vector, kbf=3 hash functions,
and six pieces of information added (1–6).
configuring the bloom filter to achieve a false
positive probability A Bloom filter returns false positives
with the probability pfp which depends on the number of in-
serted elements n and the configuration of the Bloom filter bf
which is defined by the size of the array mbf and the number of
hash functions kbf.
Equation (3) formulates the probability that a particular entry
of the Bloom filter is zero after the insertion of n elements.(
1−
1
m
)kn
(3)
Using Equation (3), the probability of a false positive evalua-
tion can be computed with Equation (4).
pfp ≈
(
1−
(
1−
1
m
)kn)k
6 (1− emk/n)k (4)
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The false positive probability can be pre-computed by estimat-
ing the number of elements that the Bloom filter will store. These
precomputed probabilities can then be used to configure the
Bloom filter bf according to the requirements of its application,
for example, demanding a limited number of false positives. Ap-
pendix C (page 227 ff.) provides tables with pre-computed false
positive probabilities for variations of kbf, mbf and n.
merging bloom filters Bloom filters can be merged by
combining their respective vectors with bit-wise application of
the OR-function as described by Equation 5. With that, the con-
tents are preserved and combined in a single Bloom filter of the
same size.
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,mbf} : bfm[i] = bfl[i] || bfr[i] (5)
The size of the all merged Bloom filters, for example, bfl and bfr,
as well as the size of the resulting Bloom filter bfm stays stable.
With that, the false positive probability can increase considerably.
Example 15 shows the considerable change of the false positive
probability when merging two Bloom filters.
Example 15: Figure 16 visualizes this process by merging the Bloom
filters bfl and bfr. The entries 7 and 8 of Bloom filter bfl as well as the
entries 6 and 9 of Bloom filter bfr are preserved in the resulting Bloom
filter bfm.
The respective false positive probabilities are:
Pfp,bfl = 0.0174 (mbfl = 20,kbfl = 3,n = 2)
Pfp,bfr = 0.0174 (mbfr = 20,kbfr = 3,n = 2)
Pfp,bfm = 0.0918 (mbfl = 20,kbfl = 3,n = 4)
7 9 86
7 8
9
!"#
!"$
!"% 1 i n
1 i n
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6
Figure 16: Merging two Bloom filters bfl and bfr.
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2.3 adversary model
Subjects in communication systems face severe challenges re-
garding information leakage. This section introduces the prop-
erties and capabilities, which will then be founded by real
world manifestations of adversaries. After that, attacks on users’
anonymity are introduced and discussed.
2.3.1 Properties and Capabilities
The achieved and achievable anonymity highly depends on the
faced adversary A. The adversary is defined by a goal, their inter-
action capabilities, and their locality restrictions.
goal In the scenario of anonymous communication systems,
the adversary tries to break either anonymity or confidentiality,
or both. Breaking anonymity allows an adversary to link a mes-
sage to its sender and recipients. Breaking confidentiality allows
an adversary to learn about the content of a message.
As this thesis is dedicated to improving anonymous commu-
nication rather than confidential communication, the adversary
follows the goal of breaking anonymity.
interaction An adversary A can be distinguished by their
power to interact with other subjects. The adversary can, how-
ever, only interact with messages according to their local spread,
i.e., the adversary can interact at all subjects c ∈ C that they
control. (see locality below).
An adversary can be limited to be passively observing. Such
an adversary Ap,_ will follow the protocol strictly, i.e., the ad-
versary will handle messages as defined by the communication
system. However, the adversary Ap,_ will gather and learn every
information that is leaked by messages that are accessible by the
adversary.
The adversary Ap,_ is restricted to the following functions:
• handleMessage(): process a message as required by proto-
col.
Ap,_ learns every information from the message but will not vio-
late the protocol otherwise.
In contrast to such a passive adversary, an adversary Aa,_ can
also be actively interfering with the communication. That is, they
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can, for example, replay, drop, delay, messages that they see at
subjects under their control or connections respectively. More-
over, as the adversary Aa,_ possesses the cryptographic key ma-
terial, they can create and emit new (and valid) messages. The
adversary Ap,_ is unrestricted in their interaction; the adversary
Ap,_ can, among others, therefore use:
• handleMessage(): process a message as required by proto-
col.
Aa,_ learns every information from the message but will not vio-
late the protocol otherwise.
• createMessage(): create a new message; the message is
not distinguishable from an authentic message.
Aa,_ may learn from potential replies, delays, and the visible mes-
sage handling.
• replayMessage(): emit a previously recorded message
again into the system.
Aa,_ may learn from potential replies, delays, and the visible mes-
sage handling.
• dropMessage()/delayMessage(): drops or delays a mes-
sage before processing the message according to the pro-
tocol.
Aa,_ may learn from reactions of other subjects like re-send mes-
sages.
locality An adversary A is restricted in applying their capa-
bilities to their local spread, i.e., an adversary can only interact
(see interaction above) with resources that are accessible to
them. The set of subject that are under the control of the adver-
sary A is denoted by C.
• The adversary A_,l can be limited to controlling a single
subject c in the network |C| = 1, i.e., they can interact with
and learn from this single subject’s point of view and its
incident connections:
{ei : (∀c ∈ C)(∀vk ∈ N(c))
[ei = (c, vk) ∈ E ∨ ei = (vk, c) ∈ E]}
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• A colluding adversary A_,c controls and coordinates multi-
ple subjects ci ∈ C with |C| > 1. However, it is a realistic
assumption that a non-state attacker is bound in the num-
ber of controlled subjects |V \ C| > 2, that is, there are some
(at least 1) non-hostile subjects that aim at enabling anony-
mous communication. As a result of this, the adversary
A_,c can learn from its controlled subjects ci ∈ C and their
incident connections:
{ei : (∀ci ∈ C)(∀vk ∈ N(ci))
[ei = (ci, vk) ∈ E∨ ei = (vk, ci) ∈ E]}
• A global adversary (or state-level adversary) A_,g is aware
of the whole network, e.g., by having access to the con-
nections themselves. Thus, a global adversary is hard to
defend against; nonetheless, such an adversary should be
considered as an extreme case. The adversary A_,g can
learn from all connections:
{e ∈ E}
The adversary A is then defined as a combination of interac-
tion and locality:
A ∈ {Ap,_;Aa,_}× {A_,l;A_,c;A_,g}
⇒ A ∈ {Ap,l;Ap,c;Ap,g;Aa,l;Aa,c;Aa,g}
2.3.2 Real World Manifestations
The last two decades revealed adversary manifestations that are
realistic, especially the last few years have shown that adver-
saries are stronger than expected. The increase of power of re-
alistic adversary manifestation is, among others, caused by the
increase in available data. This thesis assumes that these power-
ful adversary models are realistic and should be used to provide
a worst-case analysis.
colluding or near global , passive adversary A ser-
vice provider is a near global adversary as they can access nearly
all emerging data. Despite the theoretical ability of active inter-
ference, the service provider will most likely be passively observ-
ing to avoid risking their business model.
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Example 16: Bob, the service provider, represents a near global adver-
sary that can passively observe the communication of the subjects par-
ticipating in the communication service. By being able to observe all
communication, the service provider can break anonymity.
The curious service provider is shown to be realistic by, for exam-
ple, Uber’s4 “rides of glory” [144], de Montjoye et al. [41], and
Narayanan and Shmatikov [109].
global , passive or active adversary A state-agency is
a global adversary being able to connect data from different ser-
vices. Such an adversary is not limited in any way and can access
data without restriction concerning their location. Despite being
able to interfere with the communication actively, laws usually
restrict power of adversaries to passive: while a service provider
may gain the right to access and analyze data using their terms
(thus, circumventing for example StGB §§201,202a–c), actively
interfering with the communication and emerging data remains
questionable (see, for example, StGB §§206(2)2.,303a-b). Laws,
however, are a fragile construct to argue for limiting the power
of adversaries as they may be adapted in the adversary’s favor—
this adaptation of laws may happen before such an adversary is
implemented, for example, by implementing the so-called
Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses (Ar-
tikel 10-Gesetz - G 10) [“Act on Restrictions on the Secrecy of Mail, Post
and Telecommunications, G10 Act”] [21],
and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 “FISA” [26] which got sev-
eral amendments as, for example, the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA
FREEDOM Act [27, 28].
In both cases, laws have been adapted to grant adversaries (here:
intelligence agencies) additional rights. It is also possible that
the laws framing the power of the adversary are adapted in ret-
rospective [100, 147].
Example 17: A state-agency, for example, intelligence, accesses and ob-
serves communication of Sally and Rey in Bob’s service by tapping into
the connections of Sally, Rey, and Bob itself or lawfully requesting the
data from Bob directly. By being able to access these data, the adversary
is able to break anonymity.
4 ride-sharing service Uber: https://www.uber.com
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This type of global adversary is shown to be realistic by EU
reports about the ECHELON surveillance program [115] and the
so-called Snowden revelations [65, 97].
The combination of interaction and locality of before-
mentioned exemplary real world manifestations are summa-
rized in Table 1.
Table 1: Combinations of Interaction and Locality of Real World Ad-
versary Models
Interaction Locality
active passive local colluding global
curious service prov. × X × X X Ap,c, Ap,g
intelligence agency X X × × X Ap,g, Aa,g
2.4 anonymous communication
Anonymous communication—and the enabling anonymous
communication systems—is strongly dependent on primitives
that provide anonymization and metrics that measure the qual-
ity of anonymity, i.e., measure “how much” privacy is being
achieved by the communication system. This section introduces
common and prevailing anonymity metrics. After that, this sec-
tion introduces and discusses the primitives that are used to
provide anonymization in most anonymous communication sys-
tems under the angle of efficiency and anonymity in a group
communication scenario.
2.4.1 Anonymity Metrics
Anonymity measurement is a much-debated field of research. A
rigorous measurement of anonymity is necessary to reply to the
ever-present question of “how much anonymity does the com-
munication system achieve?”
Many anonymity metrics, for example, k-Anonymity, l-
Diversity, t-Closeness, were initially developed to measure
anonymity in data sets but are today also used to measure
anonymity in communication systems.
This section summarizes the prevailing metrics to measure
anonymity.
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anonymity set size The anonymity set size measures
anonymity as the number of subjects that are indistinguishable
from each other. According to [116], the anonymity set size (ass)
measures the minimal number of subjects that form a group
which hides the subjects (either senders s or recipients r).
A similar measure of anonymity is commonly used in DCnets
(for example, [22, 30, 61]), Mix-nets (for example, [15, 23, 24]),
and also in k-Anonymity [128].
k-anonymity and its successors Samarati and Sweeny
proposed k-Anonymity [128, 139] as a metric to measure
anonymity and anonymize in datasets that are to be published.
According to Samarati and Sweeny, a dataset is k-anonymous,
if each subject in an equivalence class yields at least k− 1 other
subjects. k is an adjustable parameter and defines the size of the
anonymity set. k-Anonymity is, among others, susceptible for
lack of diversity in the sensitive attributes and adversaries with
additional background information.
Machanavajjhala et al. [98] proposed a measure called l-
Diversity to overcome the weaknesses of k-Anonymity. l-
Diversity requires each equivalence class to contain at least l
different sensitive attributes. As a result of this, l-Diversity en-
sures that an adversary may guess the sensitive attribute with a
confidence of maximum 1/l.
However, the degree of sensitivity for sensitive attributes is not
equal for all of these attributes. Thus, even l-diverse datasets may
leak information which can break anonymity. Li et al. [91] pro-
posed t-Closeness as a measure to ensure that sensitive attributes
themselves do not leak information. t-Closeness requires the sen-
sitive attributes in an equivalence class to have a distribution of
values that are at a maximum distance of t from the distribution
of values in the original full dataset.
Xiao and Tao [150] pointed out that datasets are often re-
published with changes (inserted and removed entries) while
k-Anonymity, l-Diversity, and t-Closeness assume the dataset to
be anonymized and published once. Republication with updated
values yields the possibility of statistical inference by analyzing
and correlating consecutively released datasets. Xiao and Tao
proposed m-Invariance to overcome this challenge by ensuring
that at least m entries are invariant in consecutive anonymized
datasets.
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entropy-based anonymity Set-based anonymity metrics
assume that the probability of actually being a sender or re-
cipient is equal for all participants populating the respective
anonymity sets. Adversaries A are often able to utilize additional
knowledge during their attacks. Thus, the assumption of equal
probability does not hold in many cases.
Example 18: Assume an anonymous communication system that es-
tablishes communication overlays Ot based on shortest path. Ot will
then be a dissemination tree with the sender being the root. If the
adversary A is able to utilize topological knowledge in their attack,
they will realize that leaf-subjects (that are subjects without outgo-
ing connections) have a probability of pleaf = 1 of being a recipi-
ent. The remaining “inner” subjects have a probability of pinner =
(|Rt|−|leaf−subjects|)/(|Vt|−|leaf−subjects|), thus, pinner 6 pleaf.
Serjantov and Danezis [130] and Diaz et al. [44] propose mod-
els to measure anonymity using the Shannon entropy [131].
Anonymity is measured by computing the probability of an ad-
versary A to identify a subject in the whole population V (in
related work often denoted as Ψ) as being part of the group of
active participants St ∪ Rt. For that, they establish a probability
distribution p that models the posterior probability pu of the
adversary A identifying subjects u ∈ V as being a sender or
recipient. The Shannon entropy over p (given in Equation (6))
evaluates the achieved anonymity by measuring the certainty of
the adversary in identifying the active participants.
S = −
∑
u∈V
pulog2(pu) (6)
Diaz et al. normalize the Shannon entropy (Equation (6)) to
provide a normalized anonymity degree as visualized in Equa-
tion (7). The maximum entropy provided by Smax = log2(|V|).
Diaz et al. assume a degree of 0.8 to be sufficient to provide
valuable anonymity. However, they suggest that the minimum
acceptable anonymity degree depends on anonymity require-
ments of the actual system which in turn require intensive model
testing.
d = 1−
Smax − S
Smax
=
S
Smax
=
S
log2(|V|)
(7)
selecting the appropriate metric The measurement
of anonymity depends on system properties and the selection of
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an appropriate adversary model. Recently, Danezis [35] pointed
out that the answer to the question of anonymity measurement
is not answered satisfactory. Nonetheless, users of the system
need to understand the applied anonymity metrics. Thus, the se-
lection of the “correct” anonymity metric depends on required
level and granularity of anonymity measurement by the commu-
nication system, and the ability of the audience to understand
the anonymity evaluation.
The contributions of this thesis are evaluated with both
anonymity set size and the entropy-based anonymity degree.
The more intuitive anonymity set size is used where appropri-
ate; the entropty-based anonymity degree is used where the
anonymity set size fails to provide an accurate anonymity mea-
surement.
2.4.2 Anonymization Primitives
Most anonymous communication systems utilize one (or multi-
ple) of a set of anonymization primitives. These primitives were
typically developed during the 1980s and 1990s. This section pro-
vides an overview of these primitives.
2.4.2.1 Proxy
Proxy-based anonymization decouples senders si and recipients
rj by inserting an intermediate entity (“proxy”) between them.
This intermediate entity is the proxy or broker that is relaying
messages between sender si and recipient rj.
While the proxy in between si and rj allows senders and re-
cipients to stay anonymous concerning each other, the proxy it-
self can identify and link sender and recipient(s) of a specific
instance of communication.
Example 19: Sally sends a message to Rey using Bob as a broker. Using
Bob, Sally can stay hidden from Rey. However, Bob can easily link the
message to Sally and Rey.
2.4.2.2 Mix Network
Chaum [23] proposed mix networks as “untraceable, anony-
mous remailers”—an asynchronous anonymization system to ex-
change messages anonymously. Mix networks extend the idea of
proxy-based anonymization with
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Figure 17: Anonymization Primitive: Mix network.
• collecting and shuffling of messages, and
• chaining of multiple of these collecting and shuffling sub-
jects (called mix nodes).
The shuffling follows a random permutation of the previously col-
lected messages. Together with the multi-hop forwarding. There
is no single broker able to identify sender and recipient at the
same time and lessens the chances of a global adversary to iden-
tify sender and recipient as well. Figure 17 shows a mix chain of
three mix nodes, a full mix network will be composed of multi-
ples of those chains that are either fixed by the service provider
(cascades) or selected by the subjects (free routes). In Figure 17, ev-
ery mix node receives a set of messages, depicted by the colored
squares, shuffles them and relays them to the next mix node; the
repeated shuffling in combination with the changing encryption
in every hop prevents an adversary A_,g from tracing communi-
cation messages from sender to recipient.
2.4.2.3 Onion Routing
Goldschlag et al. [62, 124] introduced Onion Routing (OR) as
an improvement of mix networks. OR lowers the burden of per-
forming the actual permutation of mix networks; willing sub-
jects can join the system as node to support the anonymiza-
tion. More precisely, anybody willing to contribute can set-up
a computer to act as a relay. Subjects can select their chains of
relays (called circuits) depending on their preferences and estab-
lish their communication using their respective circuit.
Figure 18 visualizes such an exemplary circuit. The blue
sender adds all layers of encryption and sends the message to
the first subject in the circuit. This subjects removes one layer of
encryption and forwards to the next subject in the circuit which
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is now visible. The following subject also removes one layer of
encryption and forwards the message to the last subject in the
circuit; this last subject removes the last layer of encryption and
delivers the message to the recipient.
To improve the latency of mix networks, OR removes the
batching and shuffling of messages, and forwards messages im-
mediately to the next hop.
 
Figure 18: Anonymization Primitive: Onion Routing (OR).
2.4.2.4 Randomized Forwarding
Reiter et al. [125] proposed randomized forwarding which hides
communication relationships by using a distributed broker net-
work. Subjects work together as brokers to deliver the message
to its recipients. By probabilistically relaying messages until a
random broker delivers the message to its destination, a non-
global adversary cannot easily link a message to a sender and
recipient.
Due to the probabilistic behavior, messages circle among the
subjects (the broker network) for an unknown and undefined
amount of time before the messages arrive at their destination.
Figure 19 visualizes the exemplary dissemination of three con-
secutive messages towards a single recipient; these messages use
potentially different paths as every subject that processes a mes-
sages decides independent from other subjects whether to de-
liver or relay (and to which subject to relay).
2.4.2.5 Cover Traffic
Cover traffic, as used, for example, in [15, 58], hides communica-
tion messages behind noise, i.e., hides communication messages
behind messages with random content. The noise is indistin-
guishable from real communication messages, for example, by
applying encryption; the indistinguishability of communication
messages and noise prevents adversaries from learning implicit
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Figure 19: Anonymization Primitive: Randomized forwarding.
metadata. A global adversary is only able to identify active con-
nections; thus, the subjects are required to utilize each connec-
tion in each round. The adversary can perform an intersection
attack otherwise, effectively removing the noise and identifying
senders and receivers over time.
Figure 20 visualizes partial cover traffic. The blue sender sends
their message; the cover subjects in dark-gray are sending a cover
message. From an adversary’s perspective, the messages are in-
distinguishable. As a result of this, the message flow is no longer
visible and the adversary cannot collect evidence about senders
and recipients.
Figure 20: Anonymization Primitive: Cover traffic.
2.4.2.6 Dining-Cryptographer Network
Chaum [22] introduced the Dining-Cryptographer (DC) prob-
lem. In DCnets, subjects send their messages to all other subjects
in the system. Based on secure multi-party computation, every
subject in the DCnet has to contribute an encrypted message.
These messages are then combined to derive the sender’s mes-
sage. This combination can be performed by every subject; thus,
all subjects are potential recipients.
The message of the sender can provably not be linked to any of
the subjects; the DCnet provides anonymity in the set of honest
participants of the DCnet.
Figure 21 visualizes a small DCnet where five subjects are shar-
ing their part of the multi-party computation. As a result of this
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multi-party computation, all subjects are aware of the message
that the blue-orange sender s included in their part of the multi-
party computation.
Figure 21: Anonymization Primitive: Dining-Cryptographer network.
2.5 summary
This chapter introduced definitions, basic terminology, and
model, as well as metrics and anonymization primitives. This
information is essential to understand and motivate the mecha-
nisms presented in this thesis. Table A.26 provides a summariz-
ing overview of the introduced terminology and abbreviations.
A distinction of anonymity, confidentiality, and privacy has
been given. This distinction is followed by a detailed reflection
of the different forms and levels of anonymity. Anonymity mani-
fests itself in four stages with increasing protection: unlinkability,
k-anonymity, absolute anonymity, and untraceability.
Next, this chapter introduced a communication model based
on the Pub/Sub paradigm. This communication model can rep-
resent group communication and anonymization techniques and
introduces senders and recipients as active participants (subjects)
of a communication, brokers as enabling subjects as well as over-
lays as a level of abstraction. The introduction of Pub/Sub-based
communication for P2P systems is the communication model for
the later chapters. A differentiation of different classes of P2P
systems, namely unstructured and structured P2P systems, com-
plements the P2P communication model.
After fixing the model and terminology, this chapter discusses
metrics to measure anonymity. The introduced metrics can be di-
vided into two big classes: set-based and entropy-based metrics.
The set-based anonymity measures express anonymity by evalu-
ating the size of the group of indistinguishable subjects in which
senders and recipients are hiding. Entropy-based anonymity
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measures express anonymity as the certainty of an adversary
about active roles of subjects in a communication.
Following these definitions, this chapter explains the core re-
quirements of efficiency and anonymity and introduces auxiliary
requirements that are essential to provide efficient and anony-
mous group communication at large scale.
3
S TAT E O F T H E A RT
This chapter introduces characteristics of anonymous commu-
nication systems and discusses and compares state of the art
in anonymous communication systems according to these char-
acteristics. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.1 in-
troduces requirements for anonymous communication systems;
Section 3.2 expounds system characteristics that influence effi-
ciency, anonymity, and structure of anonymous communication
systems—properties that show challenges that need to be fo-
cused. Section 3.3 then discusses and compares state of the art
systems that aim to provide anonymous communication. The
discussion is structured according to the main anonymization
primitive used in the respective system. In Section 3.4, the cur-
rent state of the art is recapitulated, and conclusions are drawn.
3.1 requirements
This section provides an introduction to requirements that are
relevant for contributions of this thesis. First, this section intro-
duces the two central requirements of this thesis efficiency and
anonymity. Second, this section introduces a selection of sec-
ondary requirements. These secondary requirements are impor-
tant for the functionality of anonymous communication systems
and noted for completeness. However, as this thesis focusses on
efficiency and anonymity, the secondary requirements are not
discussed in detail.
3.1.1 Efficiency
Efficiency is a core requirement to achieve widespread usage
of a communication system, which is apparent when comparing
the adoption of anonymization services as, for example, Mixmin-
ion [34] and Tor [46]. Tor in contrast to Mixminion considered
the time-efficiency important; as a result of this, Tor was able to
become one of the leading anonymization services. As described
in Section 2.1.1, efficiency is not only considering time behavior
but also message load.
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Efficiency requires to lowering the number of transmitted mes-
sages across the system to unburden the subjects in the system.
Also, the connection stress [135], i.e., the number of duplicate
messages over a connection, should be minimized.
In the scope of this thesis, efficiency abstracts from computa-
tional overhead, and energy and memory consumption.
3.1.2 Anonymity
Anonymity is the ability of the communication system to hide
senders and recipients, as well as their respective relationships.
Following the definitions given in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3,
anonymity is provided if at least unlinkability with level-3 is
given. For that, adversary according to Section 2.3 are consid-
ered for an anonymity analysis based on graph-theoretical over-
lay properties that are induced by the establishment of the com-
munication overlay.
3.1.3 Secondary Requirements
Auxiliary requirements cover those requirements that are impor-
tant to the overall functionality. These requirements are, however,
only discussed in brief to show that they are included in consid-
erations and still fulfilled but not evaluated in all detail.
3.1.3.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the ability of the system, to hide the contents
of a communication from unauthorized subjects, i.e., the system
discloses the content of messages only to intended subjects.
Confidentiality in a communication system based on Pub/Sub
comes in two flavors:
• Information Confidentiality is concerned with the protection
of the content of the communication itself. Information con-
fidentiality ensures that unauthorized are not able to learn
anything from the messages by handling them.
• Signaling Confidentiality is concerned with the hiding of
the content of signaling messages (advertisements and
subscriptions). Thus, signaling confidentiality ensures that
unauthorized subjects are not able to learn about the top-
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ics of advertisements and subscriptions from messages that
they handle.
3.1.3.2 Accountability
Accountability requires that all events (sending and receiving a
message) can be associated with a subject. This association of
events to subjects is not to be impeachable, i.e., if an event is
associated with a subject there has to be substantial evidence.
By requiring the ability to attribute events to subjects, account-
ability is in tension with anonymity.
3.1.3.3 Integrity
Integrity ensures correctness and completeness of communica-
tion, i.e., integrity provides evidence that messages are neither
altered nor suppressed. According to Wang et al. [148], integrity
has three flavors in Pub/Sub-based systems:
• Information Integrity is concerned with the messages. Infor-
mation integrity ensures that a message is not altered and
originates indeed from the sender.
• Subscription Integrity ensures that an adversary cannot al-
ter the interests of recipients without authorization. These
interests are essential to enable routing and message for-
warding.
• Service Integrity ensures that the anonymous communica-
tion system itself is not maliciously acting, i.e., the service
itself does not behave outside of its parameters. With this,
the service performs all functionality as agreed.
3.1.3.4 Availability
Availability requires that the system be (functionally) available
to subjects whenever they request the service. That includes the
ability to advertise topics, subscribe to topics and to send and re-
ceive information. Also, availability requires successful routing
of messages, i.e., requires a successful and complete establish-
ment of communication overlays to ensure that all recipients can
connect to the respective senders and vice-versa.
Counterexamples may be induced by, for example, denial
of service (DoS) attacks or insufficient scalability (see Sec-
tion 3.1.3.5). Using DoS attacks, an adversary tries to paralyze
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the service by exhausting the resources of the service, for ex-
ample, by overloading the communication system with requests.
Insufficient scalability can diminish the availability of the ser-
vice, for example, in the expensive overlay establishment phase
where subjects exchange plenty of messages.
As requirement, availability is tightly coupled to efficiency
(Section 3.1.1) and scalability (Section 3.1.3.5).
3.1.3.5 Scalability
Scalability describes the ability of a system to cope with increas-
ing load, for example, by an increasing number of subjects or
increasing number of messages that subjects exchange.
Scalability may be limited by complex routing mechanisms
and expensive optimizations. For example, reliability guarantees
enforce extensive logging to enable detection and retransmission
of lost messages; thus, these reliability guarantees require lots of
memory at each subject which in turn decreases scalability due
to resource limitations.
Limited scalability can affect availability (Section 3.1.3.4) if the
subjects are not able to cope with increasing load.
3.2 characteristics
Anonymous communication systems exhibit characteristics that
affect their ability to achieve efficient anonymous group commu-
nication positively—or negatively. In this section, a set of char-
acteristics is introduced that is used to compare the state-of-the-
art in the field of anonymous communication systems with each
other.
3.2.1 Communication Paradigm
Selecting the appropriate communication paradigm for an ap-
plication scenario is essential to reduce the number of identical
messages in the communication system.
Naturally, there are four communication paradigms: one-to-
one (1-to-1), one-to-many (1-to-n), many-to-one (m-to-1), and many-
to-many (m-to-n). When analyzing efficiency and anonymity a
single message is focussed; therefore, this thesis uses only the
one-to-one (1-to-1), one-to-many (1-to-n) paradigms. The latter two
paradigms (m-to-1 and m-to-n) can be represented by repeating
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the first two paradigms (1-to-1 and 1-to-n) m-times with m differ-
ent senders. Therefore, neglecting the latter two communication
paradigms does not involve a loss of generality.
As already described in Section 2.1.1, late message duplication
is a key feature of native one-to-many communication. As such,
late message duplication reduces the message overhead in most
application scenarios drastically.
Despite it’s being hardly realized in today’s communication
systems, native group communication is essential for commu-
nication in heterogeneous and distributed environments. Many
communication services that offer group communication to their
subjects, e.g., WhatsApp [111, 112], are realizing the group
communication essentially using repeated unicast transmissions
(with some server-based performance optimization) to realize
group communication.
Summary considering efficiency and anonymity:
The load in an P2P system can be reduced by duplicating messages
as late as possible. As such, selecting the appropriate communication
paradigm influence efficiency by controlling the number of messages
that need to be handled by the system.
The communication paradigm alone does not influence the anonymity.
3.2.2 Connection Mode
A communication system can be characterized by its imple-
mented connection mode. A connection-oriented communication
system establishes a connection spanning all involved subjects;
this connection is then used for usually both directions and for
more than a single communication event (assuming that the com-
munication lasts for more than a single message).
The second method is to establish communication on a per-
message basis, using a connectionless message transmission. This
connectionless approach establishes multiple overlays for each
direction of communication, each of which is then optimized for
its direction; moreover, it also allows to utilize different paths for
each communication message.
Both connection modes have their advantages with respect to
anonymity. A connection-oriented system design allows the com-
munication system to adjust protective measures to the needs
of this very connection. Yet, using a connection repeatedly in-
creases the success probability of adversaries performing traffic
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analysis attacks (e.g., the statistical disclosure attack [36]) as the
number of potential communication partners can be reduced
with every communication event. A connectionless approach
avoids the establishment of connections, establishing only a
loosely coupled overlay. In such a communication overlay, mul-
tiple messages from the same sender to the same recipient may
be routed along different paths, thus, increasing the number of
potential communication participants.
Summary considering efficiency and anonymity:
The connection mode itself does not influence the efficiency; both con-
nection modes can transmit communication messages with the same
efficiency.
The connection mode influences anonymity. A connection-oriented sys-
tem establishes connections that are used for multiple messages. As a
result of this, anonymity protection measures can be applied. In con-
trast to that, the connectionless system may use different routes for ev-
ery message. As a result of this, an adversary may not be able to observe
all messages—which resembles the randomized forwarding primitive.
3.2.3 Topology
The topology of a communication system represents the struc-
ture of connections that are linking the subjects and, thus, are
used to establish the communication. Here, three classes of
topologies are considered: centralized, hybrid, and decentralized
topologies (Figure 9 visualizes these classes, and Section 2.2.3
elaborates on different the P2P classes and their resulting topolo-
gies.).
centralized Connecting the subjects in a centralized topol-
ogy, the central entity (the service provider) establishes the com-
munication by relaying the messages from sender si to recip-
ient(s) rj. In such a topology, the service provider can infer
senders and recipients easily by assessing its routing table.
hybrid Distributing the functionality of the central entity to a
(limited) number of subjects results in a decentralized or hybrid
topology. Here, the selected subjects (super-peers) are maintain-
ing a subset of subjects that are only connected to one active
subject; the selected subjects are connected among themselves to
establish system-wide routing and communication. In a decen-
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tralized topology, there is no single subject being able to discrim-
inate all possible senders and recipients.
decentralized A full distribution of the functionality of
the central entity to all subjects forms a pure P2P system, form-
ing a distributed topology. In such a distributed topology, all sub-
jects may cooperate to establish the communication. This distri-
bution of responsibility requires more effort in the establishment
of communication but yields better anonymity protection as the
effort for an adversary to collect evidence to identify senders and
recipients increases.
Summary considering efficiency and anonymity:
The topology influences efficiency by facilitating different levels of
knowledge to deliver messages. In a centralized topology, a single en-
tity is aware of all subjects and may deliver messages with the best
efficiency. In a hybrid topology, a selection of subjects has to cooperate
to deliver messages; in decentralized topology, all subjects have to co-
operate. Reduced knowledge accompanies the necessity of cooperation
in hybrid and decentralized topologies. This reduced knowledge may
decrease efficiency as non-optimal decisions may be made.
Here, anonymity is inversely proportional to efficiency. The fewer
knowledge is shared, the better the anonymity as an adversary can
collect less evidence to identify senders and recipients.
3.2.4 Provided Anonymity
As described in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, anonymity may be pro-
tected in different peculiarities.
A system can be characterized by its strength to protect the
anonymity of subjects from protecting only contents (confidential
communication without anonymity) to hiding the all information
about the communication (untraceable communication with maxi-
mum anonymity). All systems considered as state-of-the-art in
this thesis are providing at least anonymity according to level-3
and are, thus, distinguished by the stage of protection from un-
linkability to untraceability (see Section 2.1.2 for more details):
• unlinkability: senders and recipients may be identified but
not both for the same communication message
• k-anonymity: senders and recipients are hidden in an
anonymity set of at least k other subjects
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• absolute anonymity: senders and recipients are hidden in an
anonymity set that contains all subjects of the system
• untraceability: senders and recipients are not distinguish-
able from other subjects, there is no evidence of communi-
cation
Summary considering efficiency and anonymity:
Anonymity is increased with protection measures like adding cover
traffic. Depending on the stage of protection, subjects have to employ
different mechanisms. Usually, a higher stage introduces more load to
the system and, thus, reduces the efficiency.
The higher the stage of protection, the better the anonymity.
3.3 anonymous communication systems implemen-
tations
Using the anonymization primitives of Section2.4.2 and charac-
teristics of Section 3.2, anonymous communication systems can
be described and grouped according to five classes of systems
that achieve anonymity following the same idea.
First, the proxy-based anonymization systems are discussed.
Then, the more sophisticated systems based on mix networks
and OR are discussed. After that, the section introduces the sys-
tems that are based on DCnets and randomized forwarding.
The results of the discussions are summarized by Table 2 at
the end of this chapter.
3.3.1 Proxy-based
The anonymization servcies anon.penet.fi and Anonymizer [4]
realize a proxy-based anonymization.
anon.penet.fi anon.penet.fi is an anonymous remailer. Sub-
jects send their e-mails to the proxy, where technical information
that is possibly identifying the sender is stripped away and re-
placed with a pseudonym; the mapping of sender-identity and
pseudonym is persisted at the proxy.
anonymizer Anonymizer is a similar service, but focussed
on anonymous web browsing. Subjects are requesting websites
using the proxy, which is relaying the request on behalf of the
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subject. By that relaying, the recipient does only realize the
proxy as initiator of communication but does not learn about
the sender’s identity (assuming that the content of the message
does not leak information).
assessing proxy-based anonymization Proxy-based
anonymization is comparably efficient and easy to accomplish.
However, it lacks effective anonymity protection as it is suscepti-
ble adversaries A being able to compromise the service provider
or to inspect the connections of the network. anon.penet.fi, for ex-
ample, was shut down after being repeatedly subpoenaed and
ordered to reveal sender identities [48]. Proxies establish 1-to-
1 communication by relaying communication messages without
further intelligence. The connection mode depends on the used
implementation and use case, anon.penet.fi relays messages and
is, thus, connectionless. In contrast, Anonymizer aims to obfus-
cate web surfing and relays a connection between sender and
recipient. The created topology is centralized with the proxy be-
ing the central entity.
3.3.2 Mix-based
Mix-based anonymization advanced over many generations that
elaborated on different aspects of efficiency, timely behavior (la-
tency), and anonymization.
cypherpunk remailers (type i remailer) Cypherpunk
remailers [48, 114] are loosely based on Chaum’s mix design [23]
and advance over the idea of anon.penet.fi by relaying messages
over a series of proxies. As cypherpunk remailers do not pick
up message padding and shuffling, thus, they are vulnerable to
global adversaries.
Cypherpunk remailers introduced the notion of reply blocks.
These reply blocks enable the recipient to reply to a message
without revealing the sender’s identity.
mixmaster (type ii remailer) Mixmaster [107, 114] im-
proves the cypherpunk remailers by adding message padding
as well as batching and shuffling of messages. Moreover, to also
defeat replay attacks, Mixmaster mix nodes check message ids
and discard duplicate messages.
56 state of the art
Unlike the cypherpunk remailers, Mixmaster does not include
return blocks excluding the ability for anonymous replies.
mixminion (type iii remailer) Mixminion [34] is the
latest improvement on the remailer type of anonymous com-
munication. Mixminion improves the efficiency of the replay-
prevention by introducing periodic key rotation; thus, mix nodes
have to memorize message-ids only while the respective key is
valid. Also, the bootstrapping is simplified by providing avail-
able mix nodes using public directories.
Mixminion re-introduces the reply blocks with one-time usage
restriction to improve the anonymity of anonymous replies.
web mixes (jondo, an.on, jap) Web Mixes [15], also
known as JonDo, AN.ON, and Java Anon Proxy (JAP) is both
a commercial and free implementation of mix-based anonymiza-
tion with cover traffic. Web Mixes is based on the type I–III re-
mailers; Web Mixes improve the anonymization by adding cover
traffic and also enable synchronous communication like web
surfing. Subjects have to send and to receive a message in ev-
ery round. If one of these messages is missing, cover traffic is
generated by subjects (in case of a missing message towards the
mix chain) or the mix nodes (in case of missing messages toward
subjects). To further improve anonymity, Web Mixes also em-
ploys fixed message sizes. Thus, smaller messages are padded
and larger ones are split.
vuvuzela Vuvuzela [146] combines a mix network with
cover traffic to anonymize communication. Subjects establish
communication using a specific establishment protocol, if the
recipient accepts, a rendezvous point is assigned to this commu-
nication. The rendezvous point is valid for one round only and
re-assigned each round to prevent long-term intersection attacks.
Subjects have to check for communication-requests every round
and are only able to be involved in one communication at a time.
Subjects have to generate cover traffic by sending a message to a
disposal rendezvous point in each round in which they are not
emitting a message.
riffle Riffle [87] combines the message shuffling of mix net-
works with OR and cover traffic. Mix nodes in Riffle are able—
and required to—verify the shuffling of the preceding mix node.
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The sender in Riffle is hidden using cover traffic; thus, every sub-
ject is required to send a message in every round, if subjects are
not involved in communication, they have to generate a dummy
message. Recipients are hidden by delivering messages using
either broadcasts (if a multitude of subjects are recipients) or pri-
vate information retrieval (if only a few subjects are recipients).
Using latter option, all subjects are required to emit a private
information retrieval request to cover actual recipients.
cmix cMix [24] is a recent approach to enable large-scale
anonymous communication using a mix network. In contrast to
traditional mix networks, mix nodes are not cascaded but pooled
behind a network handler. The network handler relays messages
from senders to the mix nodes as well as from the mix nodes to
the recipients. The mix nodes perform their shuffling and cryp-
tography based on precomputed key materials and avoid costly
public-key cryptography.
cMix is intended to be embedded in PrivaTegrity, a project
that tries to balance anonymity and accountability to end the
Crypto War [64]. In PrivaTegrity, the operators may be convinced
about illegal actions of subjects by authorities and can decide to
cooperatively deanonymize this subject.
assessing mix-based anonymization Mix networks or
mix-based anonymization services improve the anonymity pro-
tection of proxies by relaying messages over multiple relays.
Anonymity is also increased by shuffling the messages at each
mix node. However, by this end-to-end design, mix networks
mostly do not support native group communication. As all ap-
proaches but cMix rely on public-key encryption subjects are not
required to establish explicit connections to the mix nodes. All
mix network-based approaches rely upon special entities to per-
form the anonymization. Thus, they establish a decentralized
topology. Anonymity at the level of unlinkability is achieved
by this class of systems. If additional measures, for example,
cover traffic, are taken, untraceability is possible. The protec-
tion of anonymity is independent of subject’s contribution, mix
network-based approaches can provide anonymity in dynamic
environments. However, as mix networks blend messages in
larger groups of messages to break the coupling, they require
a minimum number of senders in each round to achieve reason-
able anonymity.
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3.3.3 OR-based
OR-based anonymization is based on the same idea of multi-
layer relaying as mix networks do. The anonymization primitive
OR (see Section 2.4.2.3) is most prominently realized by Tor [46].
tor Tor [46] improved OR and is the first and only widely
accepted anonymization service. To improve latency, Tor waives
shuffling of messages, padding, and traffic shaping. Subjects es-
tablish a usually circuit of three Tor-nodes, each of which shares
a secret key with the subject. These keys are then used to per-
form multiple layers of encryption on messages so that each Tor-
node can access a single layer of encryption. In principle, Tor is
able to be used entirely distributed without any central entity. In
reality, Tor is depending on centralized, though replicated, direc-
tories that are used to bootstrap subjects and inform them about
available Tor nodes.
Tor was initially designed to connect subjects to other external
subjects, e.g., web services. Hidden services in Tor enable subjects
to communicate with other subjects that are located within Tor;
subjects providing such a hidden service, for example, a bulletin
board, establish a circuit that ends at a Tor node that listens at
a specified port. By connecting to this Tor node on the specified
port, using an own Tor circuit, subjects are able to use the hidden
service with bilateral anonymity.
Over time, Tor has been analyzed and improved with re-
spect to its performance, efficiency, and resistance against adver-
saries [2, 3, 7, 8, 56, 78, 108]. In general, Tor is vulnerable against
global adversaries that are able to inspect the two endpoints of a
circuit. The probability of being able to inspect or control these
endpoints can be increased by an adversary, as, for example, the
routing mechanisms and subjects in Tor prefer high-bandwidth
Tor nodes and attacks like the congestion attack [56, 108] shift
the selection probabilities of Tor nodes.
mtor MTor [94] is a extension of the traditional Tor by Dingle-
dine [46] which aims to provide anonymous group communica-
tion at large scale. MTor establishes a multicast tree that is com-
posed of Tor-internal subjects; to send a communication mes-
sage, a subject sends the message towards the root of the multi-
cast tree to distribute the message accordingly to recipients.
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Since MTor is fully integrated in the original Tor system, it re-
lies on the same assumptions as Tor does and inherits the weak-
nesses against global adversaries.
pisces Pisces [106] leverages the concept of social trust be-
tween subjects, i.e., leverages out-of-band knowledge and trust
between subjects.
Based on social connections between subjects, Pisces selects
connections and establishes OR-like circuits for anonymization.
Pisces employs a routing scheme that is based on a distributed
hash table (DHT) to ensure efficient message dissemination. Sub-
jects regularly check whether neighbors are excluding them from
their routing tables, for example, to shift the routing of messages
in their favor, and exclude them from their own routing table
in a tit-for-tat manner. Moreover, Pisces limits the frequency of
changes of the underlying network to prevent adversaries from
spawning new identities frequently (“whitewashing”).
assessing or-based anonymization OR-based
anonymization services waive time-consuming protection
measures such as batching and shuffling of messages as well as
traffic shaping to enable low-latency communication.
While the topology of OR-based anonymization mechanisms
can be fully distributed mechanism-wise, Tor is relying on di-
rectory servers for bootstrapping and announcing hidden ser-
vice locations, and is biased towards high-bandwidth Tor nodes.
Thus, Tor establishes a decentralized topology.
This avoidance of protection measures in combination with
biased routing mechanisms makes Tor vulnerable to global ad-
versaries and various attacks (e.g., [7, 8, 56, 108]).
Due to the circuit design that provides anonymous end-to-end-
connectivity, is native group communication not feasible using
OR-based anonymization in its current manifestations. However,
using extensions like MTor, group communication is realizable.
3.3.4 DCnet-based
DCnets provide provable anonymity at the cost of efficiency.
Therefore, the two main contributions in the class of DCnet-
based anonymization focus on improving the efficiency.
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herbivore Herbivore [61] is an approach to increase the ef-
ficiency of DCnets by splitting the subjects into smaller intercon-
nected groups, each of which builds a smaller DCnet.
Subjects in Herbivore are joining a group that is randomly
selected by a central topology control entity. The groups en-
able their internal communication using a DCnet and exchange
inter-group communication using P2P network that connects the
groups. Groups are restricted in size with a parameter k: groups
larger then 3k are split, groups smaller than k are closed. As
groups are limited in size, the communication overhead is also
limited.
dissent Dissent [30, 149] combines the shuffling of mix net-
works with DCnet. Dissent employs multiple servers that are
responsible for the anonymization.
Groups in Dissent are created by subjects that select a set of
servers and define an admission policy. In opposite to traditional
DCnet approaches, in Dissent the secrets are not shared amongst
subjects but each subject shares secrets with all of the servers
that are assigned to the group of the subject. By sharing the se-
crets with servers, the subjects only exchange messages with the
servers of the group which lowers the overhead drastically. This
enables Dissent, in contrast to traditional DCnets, to not have all
subjects sending a message in every round—servers can exclude
keys of not participating subjects easily without rendering the
messages of remaining subjects useless.
As Dissent is utilizing dedicated servers for the anonymiza-
tion, native group communication is not possible.
assessing dcnet-based anonymization DCnets pro-
vide low latency anonymization as, in contrast to mix networks
and OR-based anonymization, the anonymization is based on
information coding instead of on time-consuming obfuscation.
The necessary key-exchange establishes connections between
subjects that are—at least to a certain degree—stable and re-
used for multiple messages. The DCnet design itself allows
anonymization in a fully distributed topology. Dissent, how-
ever, relies on dedicated servers to improve the efficiency of the
DCnet, thus establishing a decentralized topology. By utilizing
information coding, DCnet-based approaches are able to provide
provable anonymity to the level of untraceability. However, the
discussed systems Herbivore and Dissent enable dynamic sub-
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ject behavior; the achievable anonymity set sizes depend on the
long-term availability of subjects. Strong dynamics may degrade
anonymity over time when facing long-term communications.
DCnets distribute messages among all participants; thus, all sub-
jects in possession of the key material can access all communica-
tion messages—native group communication is inherently avail-
able. However, as Dissent, for example, is utilizing dedicated
servers to improve the efficiency of the anonymization, native
group communication is no longer working.
3.3.5 Further Approaches
Besides the anonymization systems that are based on the four
primitives treated in Sections 3.3.1–3.3.4, there are systems that
achieve anonymization based on other approaches like random-
ized forwarding, cover traffic, and restricted (friend-to-friend-like)
connections.
p5 P5 [133] establishes anonymous communication using the
anonymization primitive cover traffic.
Subjects in P5 are forming groups along a binary tree; recip-
ients are hidden in their respective groups. A sender emits the
communication message to the group that shares the longest pos-
sible shared prefix with the recipient(s), the addressing scheme
follows from the binary tree. Messages are send to the whole
group of the respective recipients. To provide anonymity for
senders, all subjects generate cover traffic.
Subjects may join multiple groups to improve efficiency; these
subjects may provide their lateral connections to other groups
for direct message relaying.
riposte Riposte [29] establishes anonymous communication
based on cover traffic and a combination of secure multi-party
computation and private information retrieval.
Riposte aims to provide group communication, assuming the
existence of few senders and many recipients. To disseminate
a message, Senders perform a reverse private information re-
trieval to submit a message secretly to the servers. To increase
the anonymity set for senders, all subjects are required to pro-
duce cover traffic in form of an empty reverse private informa-
tion retrieval request. The servers keep the messages available in
a form of a public bulletin board.
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Recipient anonymity is not considered in Riposte.
anonpubsub AnonPubSub [37, 38] utilizes the ideas of
multi-hop relaying from mix networks and OR. For increased
recipient anonymity, the primitive randomized forwarding is in-
cluded and combined with topology shuffling.
AnonPubSub employs the Pub/Sub communication scheme
to support native group communication; anonymity is provided
by additional mechanisms to ensure anonymous group estab-
lishment. Using probabilistic forwarding, Recipients may forward
communication messages to subsequent neighbors to cover their
own active role in the communication. AnonPubSub enables
overlay-position swaps by neighborhood exchanges between
subjects with the mechanism shell game; hereby, AnonPubSub
avoids leakage of role-information from structural properties of
the groups
Sender anonymity is not considered in AnonPubSub.
3.4 conclusion
This chapter introduced a set of characteristics that is setting the
scene for the core properties efficiency and anonymity.
Group communication raises efficiency as a challenge, espe-
cially in anonymous communication systems where information
sharing is restricted. Late message duplication reduces the load
in the system by pushing the creation of the individual messages
as close to the recipients as possible. Without native group com-
munication, the individual messages are created directly at the
sender. Similarly, do the connection mode and the topology in-
fluence the ability of the communication system to protect the
anonymity of the subjects while realizing efficient message dis-
semination. Lastly, the provided anonymity does not only eval-
uate the level of anonymity that an anonymous communication
system can yield to its subjects but can also be used as an esti-
mator for possible efficiency.
These characteristics at hand, this second part of this chap-
ter discussed state of the art systems in the field of anonymous
communication. The discussion is structured along the used
core anonymization primitive (see Section 2.4.2) of the respec-
tive communication systems.
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Table 2 summarizes the comparison of the discussed anony-
mous communication systems. The key lessons from this chapter
are as follows:
• Native group communication is hardly supported. Most
systems require the senders to disseminate one-to-one mes-
sages repeatedly.
• Enabling dynamic user behavior, i.e., being able to cope
with user churn, comes with the dependency on dedi-
cated anonymization subjects. These subjects perform the
anonymization on the subject’s behalf and are to be stable
participants of the communication system.
• Unlinkability is the major anonymity level provided, i.e.,
the current anonymous communication systems accept
that participation in the system is not sensitive and some-
times even identification as a sender (or respectively recip-
ient) is acceptable if both roles are not identifiable at the
same time and cannot be linked to the same message.
• Efficiency is hardly considered when developing anony-
mous communication. Even when considered, the focus is
mainly time-related efficiency.
With these learnings, the next chapter provides a novel overlay
establishment mechanism that connects senders and recipients
while considering efficiency and anonymity.
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Table 2: Comparison of State-of-the-Art Anonymization Services
Class System
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Proxy
anon.penet.fi 7 7 3 7 ﬂ
Anonymizer 7 7 3 7 ﬂ
Mix
Cyph. Remailer 7 ﬂ 3 ﬂ 7
Mixmaster 7 ﬂ 3 ﬂ 7
Mixminion 7 ﬂ 3 ﬂ 7
Web Mixes 7 ﬂ 3 ﬂ 7
Vuvuzela 7 ﬂ 3 ﬂ 7
Riffle 7 ﬂ 3 ﬂ ﬂ
cMix 7 ﬂ 3 ﬂ ﬂ
OR
Tor 7 ﬂ 3 ﬂ ﬂ
MTor 3 ﬂ 3 ﬂ ﬂ
Pisces 7 3 ﬂ ﬂ 7
DCnet
Herbivore 3 ﬂ 3 3 ﬂ
Dissent 7 ﬂ 3 3 ﬂ
Further
P5 3 3 ﬂ 3 ﬂ
Riposte 3 ﬂ 3 3S/7R ﬂ
AnonPubSub 3 3 ﬂ ﬂ 3
7: 1-to-1; 3: 1-to-m
7: centralized; ﬂ: decentralized; 3: distributed
7: no dynamics; ﬂ: limited dynamics; 3: dynamic
7: no protection; ﬂ: unlinkability; 3: untraceability
7: not considered; ﬂ: limited consideration; 3: considered
4
E F F I C I E N T A N D A N O N Y M O U S
C O M M U N I C AT I O N
This chapter introduces a novel overlay establishment mecha-
nism for anonymous group communication that is based on P2P-
based Pub/Sub systems. The overlay establishment mechanism
is based on ACO and establishes near optimal connections be-
tween senders and recipients of information; with the core opti-
mization goal being the communication efficiency. Nonetheless,
anonymity is essential and thus, has to be preserved at a reason-
able level despite the efficiency improvements.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 motivates
this chapter and discusses overlay establishment and current
approaches for overlay establishment in brief. Section 4.2 intro-
duces the concept of ACO. It is known since the 1990s and has
been adapted to various fields of heuristical optimization. More-
over, this section also shows how and why ACO is applicable to
anonymous group communication systems if adapted as shown
in this chapter. Section 4.3 introduces a novel mechanism for
establishing communication overlays by reducing the number
of connections between senders and recipients resulting in im-
proved efficiency. This section discusses the algorithm of ACO-
based overlay establishment in three phases with the general
establishment and as well as the specifics controlling the overlay
optimization. Section 4.4 discusses the quantitative simulation
results for efficiency, anonymity, and the trade-off between both
efficiency and anonymity. Section 4.5 draws conclusions for this
chapter and summarizes the findings.
4.1 motivation
Communication overlays assume the functionality of a service
provider. As such, communication overlays connect senders and
recipients per communication group and enable message trans-
mission between them. By establishing the routing information,
communication overlays outlines the efficiency and anonymity
of the communication system.
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In anonymous communication, efficiency and the provided
anonymity level are two conflicting optimization goals. Efficient
communication requires topological information to disseminate
message along reasonable communication paths which avoid
unnecessary detours. In contrast to efficient communication,
anonymous communication requires minimizing the amount of
shared information. Adversaries may collect additional evidence
from this shared information which enables them to discrimi-
nate senders and recipients from other subjects. Also, efficient
shortest-path overlays, as they are currently used in [37, 53], leak
information about the senders and recipients as the communica-
tion paths are deterministic. Deterministic overlays enable adver-
saries to learn from topology and overlay establishment mecha-
nism and to draw conclusions about potential senders and recip-
ients.
Overlay establishment mechanisms can establish two types
of overlays, persistent and transient ones. Communication sys-
tems with persistent overlays reuse them to transmit multiple
messages; in contrast, communication systems that use transient
overlays establish their communication paths for each message
individually. Both types of overlays have advantages and disad-
vantages. Persistent overlays enable the communication system
to incorporate additional anonymization measures; nonetheless,
persistent overlays provide an adversary with more possibili-
ties to collect evidence as it uses the same paths multiple times.
In contrast, transient overlays impede these efforts of an adver-
sary by reconstructing (possibly) new paths for every message.
This reconstruction, however, also weakens the applicability of
anonymization measures.
mechanisms to establish communication overlays
Currently, the following approaches are typically used to estab-
lish (anonymous) communication overlays in P2P systems [53]:
advertisement-based and subscription-based protocols. Following
an advertisement-based approach, participants can flood their re-
spective interests (advertising their intent to send information)
and their counterparts reply (subscribing to express their interest
to receive information; advertisement-subscription-based over-
lay establishment). The established overlay equals a shortest
path dissemination tree.
Following a subscription-based approach, participants can dis-
seminate their respective interests, for example, using a random
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walk, without preceding advertisement (subscription-based over-
lay establishment).
Both approaches do not focus on efficiency during the estab-
lishment of the overlays. Flooding optimizes the overlays regard-
ing delay by incorporating only shortest paths; random walks
are used to increase the costs for an adversary by avoiding de-
terministic path selection but do also increase the length of dis-
semination paths.
4.2 aco – a look at the past and to its application
to anonymous communication
Dorigo et al. [47] propose ACO as a method for stochastically
solving optimization problems. ACO is an analogy to the me-
chanics of real ant colonies—ants explore paths independently in
their search for food. However, ants favor joint paths that are indi-
cated by a pheromone trigger. ACO is grounded on distributed
computability, and positive feedback, i.e., ACO does not need
global knowledge to find a solution, and it will discover efficient
solutions rapidly [17, 73, 74].
4.2.1 Real World Analogy – Basic Idea
ACO is an analogy to the behavior of real-world ants foraging.
Ants are social beings, working together to ensure the survival
of the whole colony—a goal that the ant society considers more
important than the needs of a single ant.
When roaming between their nest and food sources, ants de-
posit pheromones on their paths to mark them. Ants can smell
other ants’ pheromones and prefer paths that are used by many
ants. As a result of this and the circumstance that shorter paths
are likely to be used by more ants in the same time compared to
longer paths, ants eventually establish short and efficient paths
between food sources and their nest.
When ACO is adapted to decentralized, anonymous commu-
nication systems, ants can be seen as, for example, intelligent
messages or (mobile) agents.
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4.2.2 Applications of ACO for Heuristical Optimization
By providing formal requirements for the problem design, setup,
and ant properties, Dorigo et al. [47, 96] widened the applicabil-
ity of ACO and provided a first overview on the field of ACO-
based application solving a multitude optimization problems.
Blum et al. [17] provide a survey of ACO-based applications and
show that ACO is applicable, for example, to problems that can
be mapped to the Travelling Salesman Problem and to schedul-
ing problems as well. Moreover, ACO is already used to con-
struct P2P overlays [5] and in telecommunication networks [42].
However, in both applications, ACO is supported by additional
knowledge about the network topology, for example, the global
topology. Anonymous communication systems aim to avoid this
additional information as this kind of topology information may
assist an adversary who tries to focus their attack. In file-sharing
applications [126, 127], ACO is used to establish a connection be-
tween the publisher of a file and the respective requesters. In this
scenario, however, the connections are only used in a one-to-one
manner; therefore, the concepts lack efficiency when they are
applied to anonymous group communication with one-to-many
connections.
4.2.3 Optimal Solutions
The concept of ACO can compute optimal solutions for some
domains and with some limitations. Gutjahr [73, 74] derived a
graph-based ACO system and showed its convergence to the op-
timal solution. For that, ants perform a random walk on a con-
struction graph containing all possible solutions. Gutjahr pro-
poses an “elitist” pheromone spreading strategy within which
only the best path gains pheromones. Thus, if the optimal path
is selected by an ant eventually, this path will succeed over the
other solutions in the end, and ACO converges to the optimal so-
lution. Gutjahr poses requirements to this convergence behavior
such as having an optimization problem that can be represented
by a graph, possesses a unique optimal solution, a single fixed
start node for all ants, and requires that all random walks of
ants be free of loops and of maximal length. The overall proba-
bility to converge to this solution is 1− for arbitrarily small 
by varying the parameters of the ACO-heuristic [73].
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Later, Gutjahr was able to show that the convergence of ACO
to the optimal solution can be guaranteed [74]. To achieve this
guarantee, Gutjahr introduced a cooling mechanism, similar to
the metaheuristic simulated annealing [83]. With this cooling, the
ants are restricted in their random walk, thereby improving their
probability to converge to the optimal solution.
Nonetheless, both approaches rely on parameter-tuning that is
hardly possible in distributed systems without a global control
entity. Moreover, the uniqueness of the optimal communication
overlay in the overlay establishment can mostly not be guaran-
teed. The key lesson of this section is that ACO can establish
efficient solutions even though there is no guarantee for its con-
vergence to an optimal solution.
4.2.4 ACO’s Adequateness on Anonymous Group Communication
ACO is a metaheuristic that is used to approximate optimal solu-
tions to hard problems, such as the traveling salesmen problem,
graph coloring. Thus, ACO stands in row with other metaheuris-
tics as, for example, simulated annealing [83], particle swarm op-
timization [82], genetic algorithms, and evolutionary program-
ming, see for example [49].
A communication system establishes communication overlay
by spreading topological information about senders and recipi-
ents. Anonymous communication systems try to minimize this
information and additionally try to avoid that a single subject,
for example, the service provider, can gather all information.
Despite the minimization of shared information, the established
overlay should minimize the number of connections in the over-
lay to ensure efficient communication. With ACO, each subject
in the system handles agents based on their local knowledge,
thereby limiting the information spread.
The convergence guarantees of Gutjahr [73, 74] are not applica-
ble as neither the uniqueness of the optimal overlay can be guar-
anteed nor is the necessary parameter tuning possible without
leaking information that would overturn anonymity. Nonethe-
less, the concept of ACO is promising to be adapted to the over-
lay establishment in an anonymous group communication sys-
tem.
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4.3 ant colony optimization to establish communi-
cation groups
This section describes the novel adaption of ACO to anonymous
group communication and specifically to establish overlays for
them. First, the ACO-specific model and terminology are intro-
duced, and a high-level concept provides an overview concern-
ing the ACO-based overlay establishment; after that, the three
phases of ACO-based overlay establishment are introduced in
detail.
The proposed novel overlay establishment mechanism ad-
dresses the following challenges:
• Establish communication overlays that ensure connectivity
between senders and recipients.
• The established communication overlays should minimize
the number of connections—without involving more than
the local knowledge of the subjects.
• The overlays should provide a reasonable trade-off be-
tween efficiency and anonymity.
4.3.1 Model and Terminology
This section introduces the ACO-specific model and terminology
and complements the background in Chapter 2. The notations
are summarized in Appendix A.
agents The ants of ACO are used to find solution to an opti-
mization problem. In the scope of this thesis, their digital repre-
sentations are called agents a ∈ A. Hereby multiple instantiations
are possible:
• Mobile Agents or intelligent messages that carry their (im-
plementation) code with them. Each subject then enables
the agents to execute their code by delivering their data as
input to the computations.
• Containers that carry only the properties of the agents
while subjects themselves have the (implementation) code.
Agents enable the subjects to perform the necessary com-
putations by providing the necessary data as input.
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Both instantiations will produce equivalent results. However,
the trust to perform the required computations honestly and pro-
vide the correct data is shifted either onto the subjects or the
agents.
This thesis uses agents only as containers. Subjects are
equipped with the implementation, and perform the necessary
computations using the properties carried by the agents.
All subjects organize the agents that they received in two sets
that correlate with the phase of the respective agents:
• ADisc that holds agents looking for senders (Phase 1)
• ARet that holds agents returning from senders (Phase 2)
The full set of agents A is the union of the sets ADisc and ARet.
senders and recipients and their roles Senders
and recipients have different roles depending on the imple-
mentation of the ACO-based overlay establishment. Similar to
the advertisement-based or subscription-based overlay establish-
ment in Pub/Sub [53], senders or recipients may initiate the over-
lay establishment using ACO.
The initiator takes the role of an ant colony and creates agents
that search for food which is represented by the respective coun-
terpart(s) of the initiator. In this thesis, recipients take the role of
ant colonies and initiate the overlay establishment; senders rep-
resent food and are therefore the destination of created agents.
The usage of such a recipient-initiated overlay establishment
reveals advantages in this scenario:
• Multiple recipients collaborate to explore the network
quickly, successful recipients speed up the search of other
recipients by sharing the pheromones
• Recipients may establish their connection to the communi-
cation overlay by connecting to an already connected recipient.
If an application scenario is more suitable for the sender-
initiated overlay establishment, senders and recipients have to
reverse roles in the ACO-based overlay establishment: Senders
emit agents and recipients are the destination of the agents. The
overlay establishment mechanism itself does not require addi-
tional changes.
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pheromones Pheromones τ are deposited by agents in
phase 2 and can be used to assess the popularity of a connec-
tion; pheromones are directed to indicate the direction of move-
ment and to avoid attract agents towards dead ends. As such,
pheromones τ can be expressed towards a neighboring subject
n ∈ N− by τn or on a connection e by τe.
Agents in phase 1 bias their exploration of the system based
on their preference for pheromones (see the strictness parameter
and its influence on the random walk procedure in the description
of phase 1 in Section 4.3.3.)
4.3.2 Concept
Adapting ACO to the subscription-based overlay establishment
enables reasonably fast overlay establishment: all recipients emit
agents that perform their random walk to search for the senders
in parallel; these agents help each other to establish the over-
lay. The agents influence each other by spreading pheromones
which bias the random walk of the agents. In contrast to this, in
an advertisement-based overlay establishment, only the senders
would emit agents. As a result of this, the number of agents
sinks and therefore the time until the overlay is established will
increase.
The core idea of adapting ACO to the overlay establishment
is sharing pheromones of the agents within a communication
group; other recipients can connect themselves faster to the over-
lay by exploiting already established paths and pheromone trails.
Moreover, by sharing the pheromones, agents foster path consol-
idation and reduce thereby the overall message load in the com-
munication system. Figure 22 visualizes the difference between a
state of the art communication overlay based on flooding and its
ACO-based counterpart. The ACO-based communication over-
lay uses a lower number of connections and, thereby improves
the efficiency of the communication.
The overlay establishment is performed in three stages: the
first two by usual agents, the third by activation agents.
1. Sender Discovery: Agents are emitted by recipients to search
and discover senders. Agents perform a random walk with
a (controllable) bias towards existing pheromone trails un-
til they either discover a sender or their TTL expires and
terminates the random walk.
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Figure 22: By consolidating the dissemination paths, ACO (right overlay
OACOt ) is able to improve the efficiency compared to the flooding-
based overlay (left overlay OSPt ) that relies on shortest paths.
2. Return to Recipient: When agents found a sender, they re-
turn to their recipient (i.e., they return to their source) on
the previously discovered path. On the return path, agents
deposit pheromones on connections to bias the random
walk of following agents. Over time, participants in the
system reduce the number of pheromones on incident con-
nections with a linear factor to avoid convergence to non-
optimal overlays.
3. Overlay Activation: To ensure stable message dissemina-
tion and to terminate the overlay establishment itself, the
strongest pheromones trails are “activated” eventually. For
that, recipients emit activations agents that strictly follow
the strongest pheromone trails towards the senders and ac-
tivate this path upon their return from the sender to their
recipient. With that design, message loss is avoided. Mes-
sages from the sender either follow old paths if they are
emitted before the potentially new path is activated, or
they follow the new paths if they are emitted after the new
path is activated.
The following sections introduce the three phases in detail and
discuss the configuration parameters and design decisions.
4.3.3 Phase 1 - Sender Discovery
In this first phase, each recipient creates agents that explore the
system to find senders. These agents are emitted into the commu-
nication system and randomly relayed between the participants.
Subjects collect the agents that look for senders in the set ADisc.
Subjects forward agents from the set ADisc to random neigh-
bors, i.e., the agents perform a random walk, to discover the
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vicinity. As a result of this, agents may walk indefinitely with-
out discovering a sender. Therefore, agents maintain a TTL that
is decremented after each hop and the walk terminates if the
TTL reaches zero.
agent creation In this first phase, recipients create agents
to explore their vicinity to discover senders.
The strictness σ of an agent controls the controls the ex-
plorative behavior of agents by weighting the influence of
pheromones τ on the transition probabilities of their random
walk—which resembles the positive feedback mechanism of
ACO. When recipients create new agents, they initialize strict-
ness σ of the agents with a random value to ensure a mixture of
exploring and exploiting agents; σ is restricted to [0.0, 1.0].
Larger values of σ reduce the influence of pheromones on the
weighted random walk, i.e., larger values of σ foster exploration.
In contrast to that, lower values of σ increase the influence of
pheromones on the transition probability, reducing the ability of
an agent to explore their vicinity, i.e., lower values of σ foster the
exploitation of already established pheromone trails.
Equation (8) shows how an agent a weighs the pheromones
to calculate the transition probabilities to a neighbor vk depend-
ing on their strictness σ and the pheromone values τ towards
the neighbors. Larger values of σ increase the probability of se-
lecting neighbors with higher pheromone values towards them.
Figure 23 visualizes the probability of choosing a specific neigh-
bors depending on an agent’s strictness σ and the neighbor’s
pheromone value τ. In this example, four neighbors (a–d) have
pheromones (τa = 5, τb = 15, τc = 30, τd = 50) that sum up to a
value of 100. The probability of choosing a specific neighbor is
then computed using Equation (8).
pτ,σ =
τa.σvk∑
vm∈N-(τ
a.σ
vm
)
(8)
Proposition 1 Drawing a random strictness value σ from [0.0, 1.0]
ensures a mixture of exploring agents (smaller values of σ) and exploit-
ing agents (larger values of σ).
The TTL of agents is initialized with a value that estimates
the apl (see Section 2.2.1.3) of the logical underlay G, i.e., ini-
tialized with an estimate of the average shortest path in the sys-
tem. This enables agents to connect recipients without risking
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Figure 23: Probability of selecting a neighbor depending of the strictness σ of
an agent a and the pheromones τ towards the neighbor
to congest the communication system with agents that do long
random walks Nonetheless, limiting the agents’ TTL may ren-
der some sender-recipient combinations not to be reachable by
agents. For that, recipients increase the TTL-value of newly cre-
ated agents over time. Limiting the TTL with the diameter of the
logical underlay G is also not sufficient: the agent’s random walk
to discover a sender is not restricted by the diameter—agents
can choose longer paths to utilize shared path segments over the
shortest possible connection. Nonetheless, an upper limit of the
TTL is required to avoid too lengthy paths. An upper limit of, for
example, three to four times the diameter seems reasonable—
however, this upper limit needs to be adapted to the specific
application scenario. For both the apl and the diameter rough
estimates are sufficient; these estimations can be derived from
the type of the logical underlay and its size (see Section 2.2.4
and [1, 90]).
The TTL of new agents is therefore given by Equation (9) as
the maximum of the apl, i.e., the lower limit of the TTL, and the
minimum of the current round and the upper limit. The upper
limit is configured to be a multiple of the diameter of the log-
ical underlay. The round expresses the time that the recipient
is already looking for senders. The recipient may translate the
round rd into hops by multiplying it with the average connec-
tion latency (see Section 2.2.2).
ttl = max(apl,min(rd,ul)) (9)
Table 3 reports exemplary apls and diameters of social net-
works, random networks, and RGGs and as well as the resulting
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limits of the TTL. These values show that the TTL of early agents
is configured to be comparably low which avoids the heavy load
of long random walks in the beginning; recipients, however, en-
able later agents to explore the system more extensive by raising
their TTL. In later phases, the longer random walks are not prob-
lematic as agents are then biased towards existing pheromone
trails.
Proposition 2 An increasing TTL value ensures that the communi-
cation system is not overloaded with agents in the beginning but also
ensures that all recipients reach the senders eventually when the TTL
has reached the necessary value to enable agents to travel the distance.
Proposition 3 The apl as initial TTL configuration enables agents to
reach senders on average shortest paths. Raising the TTL over time to
four times the diameter will enable agents to reach all senders eventu-
ally to establish a connected communication overlay.
Table 3: Apl and diameter of social networks, random networks, and RGGs
and the resulting minimal and maximal TTL of agents
Logical Underlay G apl(G) diam(G) min(TTL) max(TTL)
social ≈3.649 ≈6.15 4 24
random ≈5.515 ≈12.779 6 48
RGG ≈6.248 ≈15.755 7 60
random walk procedure Procedure 1 summarizes the
random walk that is performed by each agent aj at their cur-
rent position vi, i.e., Procedure 1 reflects the decisions made by
the subject vi that is currently homing agent aj.
Before relaying the agent to a subsequent neighbor, the subject
vi checks in lines 2–3 of Procedure 1 if they are a sender with
respect to the agent’s topic t ∈ T of interest. If v is a sender (that
is vi ∈ St), vi adds the agent a to the set of returning agents
ARet to initiate the second phase of the agent.
After checking whether the current subject is a sender or not,
lines 4–5 of Procedure 1 evaluate the agent’s TTL and whether
the agent established a loop or not. When the TTL hits 0, the
agent is removed. Also, subject vi assesses whether agent a es-
tablishes a loop or not. When a loop is established, the agent
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Procedure 1: walkAgent(Adisc)
/* vi: subject walkAgent(ADisc) is called on */
Input: A finite set ADisc = {a1,a2, . . . ,an} of agents looking
for senders
1 for a ∈ ADisc do
2 if vi ∈ St then
3 ARet ⇐ a
4 else if ttl = 0 || aj.loopDetetected() then
5 removeFromSystem(a)
6 else
7 vk ⇐ selectNextHop(vi)
8 a.decrementTTL()
9 a.moveTo(vk)
10 return
is removed as well. This assessment can be performed by evalu-
ating whether subject v has already forwarded the agent a, i.e.,
checking whether the unique agent-id of a is already known
to vi. Another possibility is the usage of anonymity-preserving
hash-chains [38], with this a random value is included in each
agent. Every subject hashes this value upon relaying the agent
and stores the resulting hash value also locally. By checking the
hash value of an agent with the stored hashes (and the results
of the next n applications of the hash functions on the stored
values) loops can be detected.
After that, in line 7 of Procedure 1, the agent’s next hop is se-
lected from the neighbors of the current subject vi. Equation (10)
formalizes the transition probability towards a specific neighbor
vk which is computed for all neighbors of vi. This probability
is composed of the standard random walk probability and the
probability pτ,σ, i.e., the weighted influence of pheromones τ
from earlier agents.
pvk = 0.5 ·
(
1
|N-(vi)|
+
τ
aj.σ
vk∑
nm∈N-(vi)(τ
aj.σ
nm )
)
(10)
The standard random walk probability (1/|N-(vi)|) ensures that
each connected neighbor may be selected and given equal im-
portance in the absence of pheromones. Thus, each neighbor has
the base probability 1/|N-(vi)| of being selected as the next hop
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of an agent—with N-(vi) being the set of neighbors of vi (see
Section 2.2.1.3).
The pheromone influence is then added to the probability us-
ing the probability pτ,σ which is introduced in Equation (8).
Both probabilities are equally weighted in Equation (10) and
normalized to achieve a probability value in [0.0, 1.0].
vi
va
vb
vc
vd
pva=0.5 ·
(
0.25+ 5
0.8
50.4112
)
≈0.1609
pvb=0.5 ·
(
0.25+ 15
0.8
50.4112
)
≈0.2116
pvc=0.5 ·
(
0.25+ 30
0.8
50.4112
)
≈0.2757
pvd=0.5 ·
(
0.25+ 50
0.8
50.4112
)
≈0.3518
∑
nm∈{va,vb,vc,vd}(τ
0.8
nm) ≈ 50.4112
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Figure 24: Transition probabilities to the neighbors of vi. Agent aj has a strict-
ness value of σ = 0.8 and the neighbors a–d have pheromone values
τ = {5a, 15b, 30c, 50d}.
Example 20: Figure 24 shows the neighbor selection according to Equa-
tion (10) for subject vi and four neighbors a–d. The pheromone
amounts on the connections are τ = {5a, 15b, 30c, 50d}, the agent’s
strictness is σ = 0.8. The resulting transition probabilities are p =
{0.1609a, 0.2116b, 0.2757c, 0.3518d}. The next hop is drawn according
to these probabilities.
Varying the agent, and therefore varying the strictness value σ, shows
the expected changing probabilities:
σ pva pvb pvc pvd
0 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500
0.25 0.2133 0.2413 0.2633 0.2821
0.5 0.1849 0.2288 0.2718 0.3145
0.75 0.1643 0.2145 0.2755 0.3458
0.8 0.1609 0.2116 0.2757 0.3518
1 0.1500 0.2000 0.2750 0.3750
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4.3.4 Phase 2 - Return to Recipient
When an agent a arrives at a sender s∈ S, s initiates the return
phase of the agent a. In this phase, the agent will return to its
recipient, i.e., the agent’s source subject. This section discusses
the walk of agents to their recipients using Procedure 2 which
describes the steps of this second phase.
return path & pheromone assignment In phase 1,
agents are recording their paths. In the second phase, they re-
turn to their recipient by reversing the saved paths which is de-
scribed in Lines 1–8 of Procedure 2. Subjects are collecting the
returning agents in the set ARet.
Procedure 2: returnAgent(ARet)
/* vi: subject returnAgent(ARet) is called on */
/* vi−1: subject from which the agent came to vi */
Input: A finite set ARet = {a1,a2, . . . ,an} of agents
returning to their recipients (sources)
1 for a ∈ ARet do
2 vi+1 ⇐ a.getNextHopHomewards()
// Pheromone Assignment
3 vi.τ[vi−1]⇐ vi.τ[vi−1] + a.τ
4 for vj ∈ N- do
// Diffuse pheromones to neighbors
5 if vj 6= vi+1 then
6 vj.increasePheromoneTo(vi,a.τ · d1h)
7 a.moveTo(vi+1)
// Evaporate pheromones
8 for vj ∈ N-(vi) do
9 vi.τ[vj]⇐ γ · vi.τ[vj]
10 return
While returning to their recipient, agents deposit pheromones
to inform later agents about the discovered path. The
pheromones are directed and placed towards the sender, i.e.,
when handling a returning agent, subjects place pheromones
on the connection towards the preceding subject on the path
of the agent. As in the basic ACO, the optimization of commu-
nication structures is based on this feedback loop. Statistically
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seen, more agents will travel on shorter paths and, thus, will de-
posit more pheromones on these paths. This higher pheromone
count increases the probability of selecting this connection for
subsequent agents—depending on the agents’ strictness σ—and
establishes a self-improving loop. Agents deposit pheromones
on connections according to Equation (11) and Line 3 of Proce-
dure 2. Each agent places its amount of pheromones (a.τ).
τem = τem + a.τ (11)
diffusion In the original ACO, pheromones diffuse in the
vicinity of the connections to enable agents to recognize nearby
paths. An adaptation of this diffusion to a decentralized system
will introduce a continuous wave of diffused pheromone dis-
tribution messages. These messages will massively degrade the
efficiency of the system.
Diffusion is restricted to the incident connections of the sub-
ject vi, i.e., pheromones spread only 1-hop, to avoid unneces-
sary message load. Thus, when a subject forwarded all return-
ing agents a ∈ ARet, they will share their pheromone gains
with their direct neighbors vj ∈ N-(vi) which add a “splash”
of pheromones on the connection towards the subject. Exempt
from pheromone diffusion is the actual path of the agent, i.e.,
the connection from which the agent a arrived at vi does not
receive pheromones through the diffusion mechanism; the same
holds for the connection that is used to forward the agent a
towards its recipient. The neighbors vj ∈ N-(vi) that receive
pheromones through this diffusion mechanism are not propa-
gating the pheromones to their neighbors.
The parameter d1h controls the amount of pheromones that
are diffusing as provided by Equation (12). The pheromones
τdiff are placed at the incident connections, except those con-
nections that are used by agents in this round.
τdiff = d1h ∗ τgain (12)
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Example 21: Figure 25 visualizes the 1-hop diffusion for a subject vi.
vi gained 20 additional pheromones (on the connection from vj) from
agents that are forwarded towards vl and vk. The remaining neighbors
of vi, i.e., vx, vy, and vz, receive a share of these pheromones. This
share is computed by taking the gained pheromones τgain and scale it
with the diffusion factor d1h=0.1. Therefore, the orange neighbors vx,
vy, and vz receive pheromones τ{x,y,z}=2 on their connection towards
vi.
The neighbors of vx, vy, and vz (indicated by dashed connections and
dashed circles) will not receive a share of pheromones.
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Figure 25: 1-hop Diffusion of Pheromones: The pheromone gain τgain of vi
from subject vj is 20. The diffusion to vi’s neighbors vx, vy, and vz
is 2 with a diffusion factor of d1h=0.1.
The dashed 2-hop neighbors will not receive pheromones through
the diffusion mechanism.
Proposition 4 The optimization of ACO stays functional even with
the limited diffusion to the 1-hop neighborhood.
evaporation The optimization of ACO requires the system
to reduce pheromones over time. Otherwise, the pheromone in-
fluence on established paths will influence optimizations by pre-
ferring these established paths over more recent ones. Moreover,
as denoted in Chapter 5, subjects can be dynamic; thus, sub-
jects can leave an overlay or the system at any point in time and
pheromones that indicate a potential path using such a subject
should be removed over time. As evaporation does not remove
pheromones completely, the remaining pheromones can be used
by (later) joining subjects to improve their start-up time, i.e., to
connect to existing communication overlays faster.
To this end, the ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism
adopts the common ACO part concept and simulates the evapo-
ration to reduce the pheromone amount on the system’s connec-
tions with a proportional function.
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Proposition 5 The usage of a proportional function ensures that the
simulated evaporation does not change the probabilities that are in-
duced by the pheromones. The reduced amount of pheromones, however,
enables subsequent agents to find new paths without being influenced
by older pheromones.
Equation (13) formalizes the reduction of pheromones by evap-
oration. The evaporation factor γ is limited to [0.0, 1.0] and con-
trols the reduction of pheromones. Lower values of γ will foster
exploration as the evaporation will lower pheromones signifi-
cantly; larger values of γ are beneficial for exploitation as the
evaporation will reduce pheromones only marginally.
∀e∈E : e.τrd+1=γ · (e.τrd) (13)
The goodness of discovered paths is not affected by this evap-
oration as all connections with pheromones are reducing the
pheromone count by the same factor.
4.3.5 Phase 3 - Overlay Activation
In Phases 1 and 2, ACO spreads pheromones in the anony-
mous communication system. Over time, the pheromones sin-
gle out the dissemination tree that connects the recipients and
senders. To further improve efficiency, each recipient emits acti-
vation agents that follow the strongest pheromone trail towards
the senders and activates this path. This mechanism effectively
establishes the communication overlay without lasting depen-
dency on pheromones. Disruptions by leaving subjects due to
subject churn are taken care of in Chapter 5.
persisting paths to improve efficiency Explicit over-
lay activation allows to terminate the overlay establishment pro-
cess as routing tables, and, thus, the communication overlay, are
persisted at the subjects.
Paths are persisted by sending activation agents that strictly
follow the highest pheromone counts towards senders—the ran-
dom walk property is disabled for these agents. Just like the
usual agents, they memorize the used path. When arriving at
a sender, path activation agents return on the same path and
place routing details, for instance, predecessor and successor
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with a group-identifier, at the subjects. Communication mes-
sages (mcomt ) are then only disseminated using these persisted
paths. The information leakage due to the path memorization
and explicit overlay activation is discussed in the second part of
Chapter 5
Paths are persisted and then updated to account for ongoing
optimizations of the ACO mechanism without risking to delay
communication without purpose. The duration of the overlay
establishment, i.e., the length of Phase 1–3 is configurable.
4.4 evaluation
This section analyzes the ACO-based overlay establishment in
detail with a simulation study. As this thesis focuses on effi-
ciency concerning the message load, the simulation abstracts
from the network layer and focuses on the application layer.
The anonymous group communication system is based on
the model in Section 2.2, and is implemented using the Java-
based GraphStream [117] graph library. GraphStream models
and analyzes static and dynamic graphs. This implementation
enables a quantitative simulation providing insights into the ef-
ficiency and anonymity using the ACO-based overlay establish-
ment mechanism in comparison to the state of the art flooding-
based approach. Also, this implementation is used to analyze the
parametrization of ACO. The whole simulation is performed on
various topologies of the logical underlay G to show that the
results are well-founded and independent from the actual appli-
cation scenario.
This section is structured as follows: first, the simulation setup
and parametrization is given. Second, the evaluation metrics
with respect to the ACO-based overlay establishment are dis-
cussed. After that, the network configuration is discussed and
backed using a simulation study. Then, this section evaluates the
parameters of the ACO-based overlay establishment and their
individual influence on the communication overlays. Then, this
section discusses the resulting communication overlays under
the aspects of efficiency and anonymity.
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4.4.1 Simulation Setup
The communication system uses a logical underlay G that is
based on the topologies discussed in Section 2.2.4:
• Social networks based on the Barabàsi-Albert model [13]. A
configuration with m0 = 2 and m = 3 is used to equip
the subjects with a social network-like connection structure
(see Section 2.2.4.1 for additional details). These social net-
works occur whenever a social network, e.g., Facebook or
Twitter, is used to bootstrap the connections of subjects.
• Random networks based on the Erdo˝s-Rényi model [51]. A
configuration with an average subject degree of 4 (random4)
and an average subject degree of 10 (random10) is used (see
Section 2.2.4.2 for additional details). These random net-
works occur in gossiping-based networks that are main-
tained, for example, by SCAMP [59].
• Random Geometric Graphs (RGG) with dimensions d = 2
and a distance threshold t = 0.1 are used (see Sec-
tion 2.2.4.3 for additional details). These networks occur
when any distance based networks like WSNs are in focus.
The simulation uses these synthetically generated networks
to avoid the influence of special topological situations that
may occur in exceptional cases and neighborhoods. The syn-
thetic networks enable repeated—and, thus, statistically sound—
simulations without relying on a limited number of real-world
networks that are published for research purposes. The single
requirement that has to be fulfilled by the networks is connectiv-
ity between any pair of subjects, i.e., there is only one connected
component that comprises all subjects v ∈ V.
For the overlay establishment, one sender is randomly picked
from the set of subjects V to form the sender set St and between
15 and 30 recipients are randomly picked from V to form the re-
cipient set Rt. The subjects in St and Rt are then connected using
the overlay establishment mechanisms; the system executes the
overlay establishment mechanism for 500 rounds, if not stated
differently.
In these simulations, the communication overlays Ot are cre-
ated using the following three overlay establishment mecha-
nisms to compare the properties of the resulting overlays. This
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thesis contributes the ACO-based overlay establishment mecha-
nisms, the flooding-based overlays (described, for example, by
Daubert et al. [37]) and the Steiner tree approximation StA (see
Section 2.2.5) are used as baselines.
• ACO: Establishing communication overlays Ot using the
ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism proposed in
this thesis, recipients r ∈ Rt are actively searching for
senders s ∈ St. By using the pheromone mechanism of
ACO, paths are aggregated to reduce the weight of Et;
thus, ACO is reducing the communication overhead that
is caused by superfluous communication messages.
• Flooding: Establishing communication overlays Ot using
flooding, senders s ∈ St emit an advertisement that is dis-
seminated to all other subjects in the logical underlay G;
upon receiving such an advertisement, recipients r ∈ Rt
reply with a subscription message. This subscription is
sent towards the sender using the shortest path1. Flooding-
based overlays are the current state of the art to estab-
lish communication overlays in P2P-based Pub/Sub sys-
tems [37]
• Steiner tree (StA): A Steiner tree connects a finite set of ter-
minals, the senders s ∈ St and recipients r ∈ Rt, using
additional Steiner points, these additional subjects form Bt.
The goal of the Steiner tree establishment is to derive the
Steiner tree such that the weight of Et is minimized, for
instance, by minimizing the number of connections in Et
(see Section 2.2.5 for more details on the Steiner tree and
the used heuristic of Kou et al. [84]).
For each network configuration, 10 network instances are gen-
erated. On each network instance, 5 sets of senders and recipi-
ents are selected. The simulation is executed on each of the in-
stances; thus, the simulation is repeated 50 times for each type
of network.
The adversary is assumed to be in the role of the service
provider, i.e., the adversary can observe the complete message
flow. The adversary A is therefore instantiated to be Ap,g.
1 The shortest paths refers to the quickest connection, for instance, the one
fastest path or the path with least hops. This thesis refers to shortest paths
as the path with the least number of hops.
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The complete simulation setup is summarized in Table 4. Sec-
tion 4.4.3 reasons about the chosen network configuration by
comparing the properties of networks that are generated with
different configurations and network sizes.
Table 4: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Runs 50
Rounds per run 500
Network size (|V|) 2000
Recipients (|Rt|) Gaussian distr. (µ=30, sd=2)
Adversary (A) Ap,g
Network types {social; random; euclidean}
Connectivity social network m0=2, m=3
Connectivity random network d(v)= {4, 10}
Connectivity threshold RGG 0.1
Dimensions RGG 2
4.4.2 Evaluation Metrics
The simulation is evaluated using the following metrics; these
metrics are grouped according to their respective goal: Efficiency
and Anonymity.
efficiency Regarding efficiency, the evaluation analyzes
first whether the overlay establishment with the ACO-based
mechanism is successful. Then, the evaluation analyses to which
extend the message load can be reduced. Additionally, the eval-
uation discusses the influence on the communication delay by
analyzing the distance between sender and recipients.
• Receiver Success Ratio measures whether all recipients r ∈
Rt are able to connect to the senders s ∈ St. The success
ratio in Equation (14) formulates the receiver success ratio.
The receiver success ratio srRt(Ot) is measured by divid-
ing the number of receivers r ∈ Rt for which there exists
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at least one connection e ∈ Et, which ends at ri, by the
cardinality of Rt.
srRt(Ot) =
|{r∈Rt : ∃e∈Et :e=(_, r)}|
|Rt|
(14)
• Weight, as measured by wE(Ot) expresses the communica-
tion costs for a single message mcom from a system-wide
perspective. Within this simulation, all connections have a
cost of 1, enabling the evaluation to measure the commu-
nication costs in the number of handled messages. Gen-
eralized, each connection has a weight associated, which
can be evaluated using the weight functionwe(ei)—within
this thesis, we(ei) returns 1 for all connections. Expanded
to the whole overlay, the weight function wE(Ot) evaluates
the costs of the communication overlay—within this thesis,
the weight of the communication overlay translates to the
number of connections in Et.
The lower the weight wE(Ot), the better the efficiency as
the overall messaging load in the system is lower.
wE(Ot) =
∑
ei∈Et
we(ei) = |Et| (15)
• Communication Delay, as measured by cd(Ot) evaluates the
average latency between a sender s ∈ St and the recipients
r ∈ Rt when sending a message mcomt . Equation (16) com-
putes the communication average delay between all sender
and recipient pairs. For that, the round differences between
receiving a message (r.rcvdAtRd(mcomt )) and sending a
message (s.sendAtRd(mcomt )) are summed and then nor-
malized.
cdavg(Ot) =
1
|Rt|
∗
∑
r∈Rt
(r.rcvdAtRd(mcomt )
− s.sentAtRd(mcomt ))
(16)
The communication delay can also be abstracted and as-
sessed through deriving the distance between sender and
recipients, i.e., computing the path length between the
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sender and the respective recipients of a communication
message. Equation 17 formalizes this approach to measur-
ing the average communication delay.
cdavg(Ot) =
1
|Rt|
∗
∑
r∈Rt
pt(s, r) (17)
anonymity
• Leaf Subjects are directly identifiable to be interested in a
communication topic, i.e., leaf subjects are exposed to an
adversary as senders s ∈ St or recipients r ∈ mathcalRt.
For that, an adversary needs learn the topology of Ot. A
global adversary A_,g simply analyzes the message flow,
local or colluding adversaries A_,l or A_,c may analyze the
existence of pheromones or analyze the routing tables and
combine this learned knowledge with knowledge about
neighborhoods. The information leakage of leaf positions
is caused by subjects that do only join a communication
overlay Ot when they are interested in the communication
topic t, i.e., being in St or in Rt, or they are required to for-
ward messages, i.e., subjects being in Bt. Obviously, when
located in a leaf position, a subject does not have a suc-
cessor (in case of a recipient) or predecessor (in case of a
sender). Thus, such a subject is by definition part of St or
Rt. Leaf subjects are contained in the set Lt:
ls(Ot) = |Lt| = |{v∈Vt : d+(v) = 0}| (18)
A communication overlay Ot with fewer leaf subjects can
achieve anonymity with less overhead of anonymization
measures.
• Anonymity Set Size measures the certainty of an adversary
A on identifying subjects that are receiving messages, i.e.,
the adversary A tries to discriminate subjects that take part
in Rt. For that, the adversary A establishes a candidate set
R∗t , which contains the subjects that are potential recipients
from the point of view of the adversary A. The goal of the
adversary A is to remove subjects from R∗t to approximate
Rt using their candidate set R∗t .
Initially, R∗t is set to V. Depending on the their priori knowl-
edge, the adversary is able to reduce the candidate set at
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the beginning, i.e., remove subjects from the candidate set
Rt without observing any communication. If the adversary
has knowledge about the overlay Ot, they can remove the
subjects from the candidate set that are not involved in Vt:
R∗t \ (V \ Vt) = R
∗
t = Vt (19)
This thesis assumes that the A is able to derive subjects
involved in a communication overlay Ot; thus, this reduc-
tion is always performed. Similar to the adversary in Leaf
Subjects, the adversary can analyze the message flow or
analyze neighborhoods and routing information to learn
information about the overlay Ot and its participants Vt.
Naturally, the adversary A is also able to remove the set
of subjects under their control Ct from the candidate set of
recipients resulting in R∗t = Vt \ Ct.
The anonymity set size ass is the size of the resulting set
R∗t :
ass = |R∗t | = |Vt \ Ct| (20)
• Anonymity Degree ad measures the certainty of an adver-
sary A of identifying a subject as recipient by evaluating
the entropy, i.e., measures the identification probability of
recipients r ∈ Rt. The anonymity degree is computed with
the Shannon entropy [131], which requires the probabilities
of selecting recipients r when randomly selecting subjects.
The probability differs for inner subjects and leaf subjects
and is summarized by Equations (21) and (22). Both first
compute the overall probability of selecting a subject of
the respective class as recipient which is then normalized
to ensure that the sum of probabilities is 1.0.
pinner =
|Rt|− ls(Ot)
|Vt|− ls(Ot)
· 1
|Vt|− ls(Ot)
(21)
pleaf =
|{r ∈ Rt : d+(r) = 0}|
ls(Ot)
· 1
ls(Ot)
(22)
The probabilities pinner and pleaf form the probability
vector pk as provided by Equation (23). The probability
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vector pk is used to compute the Shannon entropy S as
provided by Equation (24).
pk =
[
pk1 ,pk2 , . . . ,pki , . . . ,pk|Vt|
]
(23)
with pki =
pleaf, if vi ∈ Lt and vi ∈ Vt
pinner, if vi ∈ Vt
S = −
∑
vi∈Vt
(pk[i] · log2(pk[i])) (24)
The anonymity degree ad, as provided by Equation (25), is
defined as the normalized Shannon entropy S with Smax=
log2(|Vt|) [44].
ad = 1−
Smax − S
Smax
=
S
Smax
(25)
A larger anonymity degree expresses a higher equality of
subjects from the perspective of the adversary A, which
results in a better anonymity.
Table 5 summarizes the evaluation metrics that are used in the
following Sections 4.4.5 and 4.4.6 that discuss the improvements
of ACO-based communication overlays.
Table 5: Evaluation Metrics
Metric Explanation
Efficiency:
srRt(Ot) ratio of recipients that are connected to Ot
wE(Ot) costs of message dissemination
cdavg(Ot) average latency between s ∈ St and r ∈ Rt
Anonymity:
ls(Ot) number of leaf subjects in Ot
ass(Ot) ∈ [0, 1] anonymity set size in Ot
ad(Ot) ∈ [0, 1] anonymity degree of Ot
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4.4.3 Network Configuration
A thorough evaluation of the proposed novel ACO-based over-
lay establishment mechanism requires the simulation study to
be performed on representative networks. Therefore, this section
evaluates variations of the configurations of the network genera-
tors for the networks introduced in Section 2.2.4.
Research Question 1 Which configuration of network size |V| and
network specific parameters is required to create networks that reveal
stable graph-theoretic properties according to their model?
social networks Following [1, 13], the Barabàsi-Albert
model establishes networks that are invariant for different set-
tings of m, where m defines the number of connections that are
added for every subject that is added to the network. The only,
obvious, restriction ism6m0 asm0 defines the number of initial
subjects from which the social network is grown to its desired
size.
In this experiment, the Barabàsi-Albert generator is used with
four settings of m to understand the influence of the setting of
this parameter on the final network.
m = {2, 3, 4, 5}
Often, smaller networks do not inhibit the typical statistical
properties. Therefore, this study also evaluates the properties of
networks that are generated with increasing number of subjects
|V|.
|V| ={100; 200; 300; 400; 500; 750; 1, 000; 2, 000; 3, 000, 4, 000;
5, 000; 10, 000; 25, 000; 50, 000}
Each configuration of the Barabàsi-Albert generator is used
to create 20 network instance for the evaluation of their graph-
theoretic properties; Figure 26 provides an overview of the mean
values with their respective 97.5 percentiles.
• Subject Degree: Figure 26a visualizes the average subject de-
gree in the generated social networks over increasing num-
ber of subjects. As expected, the average degree increases
for small network sizes (6 1, 000 subjects) and converges
quickly to 2 ·m.
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The maximum degree is increasing as the preferential at-
tachment ensures that subjects with “more” connections
attract additional connections from newly joining subjects.
• Clustering Coefficient: The clustering coefficient measures
the ratio of connectedness of the neighbors of a subject, this
value is computed for all subjects and then averaged. Fig-
ure 26b visualizes the progression of the average clustering
coefficient for increasing number of subjects.
The preferential attachment causes newly added subjects
to favor connections to popular subjects in the backbone.
As a result of this, the average neighborhood is sparsely
connected; this sparse connectivity in neighborhoods is get-
ting stronger when the network size is increasing.
• Density: The density of a network describes the ratio of
connections that exist over the number of possible connections.
Typically ensures a higher the density of a network shorter
path length between any pairs of subjects.
Social networks provide shortcuts using their backbone
while the preferential attachment with low numbers of
added connections arrange that the density decreases with
increasing number of subjects.
• Path Length: The apl is a measure for the average distance
between any two subjects in the network. Figure 26c visu-
alizes the apl over increasing number of subjects. It shows
that the distances in social networks are only slowly in-
creasing even though the size of the networks is increased
heavily at the same time. Also, the larger m, the shorter
the distances between any two subjects.
The experiment indicates that a configuration with a network
size |V| of 2,000 subjects and m = 3 additional connections
with every added subjects is producing representative social
networks. The diameter, density, and the maximum degree are,
amongst the properties shown in Figure 26 visualized in Ap-
pendix B in Figure B.57.
random networks Random networks do not reveal a spe-
cific structure. Connections between any two subjects are created
randomly, only the average number of connections per subject is
specified.
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Figure 26: Graph-theoretic properties of social networks following the
Barabàsi-Albert model. The gray, dashed vertical line marks the se-
lected network size of 2,000 subjects.
In this experiment, the Erdo˝s-Rényi generator is used with
six different settings of the average number of connections per
subject:
d(v) = {3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11}
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The network size is varied as in the study of social networks:
|V| ={100; 200; 300; 400; 500; 750; 1, 000; 2, 000; 3, 000, 4, 000;
5, 000; 10, 000; 25, 000; 50, 000}
• Subject Degree: The average degree is not stable for smaller
networks (|V| < 1, 000), due to the law of large numbers
this deviation from the expected average degree is com-
pensated for larger networks. Without an additional mech-
anism biasing the probabilities of connection, the maximal
subject degree is not increasing as in the generation of so-
cial networks. Figure 27a visualizes the average subject de-
gree over increasing network sizes.
• Clustering Coefficient & Density: The number of connections
of each subject on the random networks is comparable to
the number of on the social networks. As a result of this,
the clustering coefficient and density are similar low.
• Path Length: Random networks do not provide shortcuts
through an inner core. Therefore, the apl and diameter
are larger than on social networks. Nonetheless, both path
lengths do not grow linearly with the network size. Fig-
ure 27b
This experiment indicates that a network size |V| of 2,000 sub-
jects is sufficient to establish networks that reveal the desired
graph-theoretical properties. The setting of the target average
subject degree has the expected effect (higher degrees lead to
shorter paths, higher density, and higher clustering coefficient),
yet, the changes in graph-theoretic properties are proportional
and not surprising. Figure B.58 in Appendix B visualizes the
results of this experiment, i.e., shows the graph-theoretic proper-
ties of random networks over increasing number of subjects.
As these random networks may be established using a gossip-
ing mechanism like SCAMP [59], the following evaluation con-
siders two settings of the average number of connections per
subjects:
• d(v)=10: the evaluation of the SCAMP mechanism shows
that the average degree of subjects in larger networks
(|V| > 50, 000) is larger than 10. These random networks
are referred to by random10.
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Figure 27: Graph-theoretic properties of random networks following the
Erdo˝s-Rényi model. The gray, dashed vertical line marks the se-
lected network size of 2,000 subjects.
• d(v)=4: the average degree of subjects in SCAMP is given
by log(|V |). Therefore, the average degree increases with
additional subjects in the communication system, an av-
erage degree of 4 is being used as an estimate for the
lower border. These random networks are referred to by
random4.
rgg RGGs inherit their structure from random placement of
added subjects and a distance-based connection structure. As the
plane on which subjects are placed is limited, an increasing num-
ber of subjects lead to a denser network with more connections.
Nonetheless, graph-theoretic properties inspect a global perspec-
tive on the network while the increasing number of subjects and
connections have a local effect. As soon as an area of the location-
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plane is covered by a subject, adding additional subjects to this
area does not change graph-theoretic properties.
In this study, three different settings of the connection distance
threshold of a subject are used:
threshold = {0.1, 0.15, 0.2}
The network is fixed to a 2-dimensional plane (d = 2). The net-
work size is chosen similar to the study of social networks:
|V| ={100; 200; 300; 400; 500; 750; 1, 000; 2, 000; 3, 000, 4, 000;
5, 000; 10, 000; 25, 000}
• Subject Degree: The degrees of the subjects in RGGs de-
pends largely on the number of subjects, the connection
distance threshold, and the dimension of the network.
Therefore, both the average and the maximal degree of sub-
jects increase linearly with increasing number of subjects.
• Clustering Coefficient & Density: The probability of connect-
ing any two subjects does not depend on the number of
subjects in the network but on their random location. As
a result of this, clustering coefficient and density are sta-
ble with an increasing number of subjects. The clustering
coefficient, however, is unstable for a smaller number of
subjects (|V| 6 2, 000).
• Path Length: The properties of path lengths, apl and di-
ameter, are also depending on the distance threshold and
the dimension of the network. If there are enough subjects
such that every location is covered in the connection thresh-
old of any subject, the apl and diameter are stable and do
not change with additional subjects.
The study indicates that a network size |V| of 2,000 sub-
jects is sufficient to establish networks revealing stable graph-
theoretical properties. Adding additional subjects does not
change graph-theoretical properties. Figure B.59 in Appendix B
visualizes the progression of the graph-theoretic properties with
varied network size and varied connection distance threshold.
summary The performed study of graph-theoretic properties
shows that the following configurations of the network genera-
tors establish representative network instances that can be used
to thoroughly evaluate the overlay establishment mechanisms.
Table 6 summarizes the selected configurations.
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Table 6: Selected Network Configuration
Parameter Instantiation
Social Network:
Network size |V| 2,000
Connections per added subject m 3
Random Network:
Network size |V| 2,000
Target average degree d(v)
10 (random10)
4 (random4)
RGG:
Network size |V| 2,000
Dimension d 2
Threshold t 0.1
4.4.4 ACO-Configuration
The ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism offers sev-
eral parameters that control the ability of the optimization
heuristic to establish a good—sometimes close to optimal—
communication overlay. This section analyzes the effect of the
individual parameters and concludes with a recommended con-
figuration.
In this evaluation, an experiment varies one of the parameters
while the others remain unchanged; the success ratio srRt(Ot)
and the weight wE(Ot) are analyzed to reveal beneficial—
and detrimental—parameter configurations. Each experiment
follows the simulation setup presented by Section 4.4.1; the net-
works are configured as shown in Section B, however, only the
random4 instance is being used to perform this experiment.
4.4.4.1 Number of Agents
The number of agents is a core parameter of the ACO heuristic
that trades convergence speed and probability against compu-
tational complexity. Considering an anonymous communication
system with heterogeneous subjects, it is essential to establish
the communication overlays Ot without overloading the system
with agents.
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Research Question 2 How many agents (noa) need to be emitted to
establish a communication overlayOt that connects the sender with all
recipients and exhibits a lower weight than traditional flooding-based
communication overlays?
The number of agents noa is varied between
{2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 150} to identify the number of agents
that are necessary to fulfill the given challenge.
The experiment shows that the ACO-based overlay establish-
ment mechanism is independent from the number of agents able
to create communication overlays with srRt = 1.0. Figure 28
visualizes the weight of the resulting communication overlays
wE(Ot) of the varied ACO configurations and added the base-
lines of the flooding-based communication overlay as well as
the Steiner tree approximation StA. As such, Figure 28 shows
that the overlays that are established with a lower number of
agents, for example, noa= {2, 5}, are not improving the weight
in comparison the flooding-based communication overlays. The
communication overlays that are established with noa> 10 are
improving the weight of the communication overlay wE(Ot) by
≈ 10%. The experiment also shows that increasing the number
of agents beyond 10–20 does not yield a significant reduction of
the communication overlay Ot.
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Figure 28: Varying the number of emitted agents (noa) and its influence on
the weight of the communication overlay (wE(Ot)).
4.4.4.2 Recipient Ratio
The recipient ratio rr is studied to analyze whether the first im-
pression of improvement weight improvement over the state of
the art mechanism to establish communication overlays Ot is
limited to a specific ratio of recipients.
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Research Question 3 Is the weight improvement of the ACO-based
communication overlays depending on the ratio of recipients rr?
A study is performed to see whether or not the ACO-based
overlay establishment is able to create efficient communication
overlays with different recipient ratios. The number of recipients
is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with the mean µ = |Vt| · rr
and sd = 2, and the ratio of recipients rr is varied:
rr ∈ {0.015, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5}
The ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism is able to
establish fully connected communication overlays (srRt = 1.0)
without being influenced by changes in the recipient ratio.
The novel ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism cre-
ates communication overlays that are using less connections than
traditional flooding-based shortest path overlays. In the worst
case, the ACO-based communication overlays contains close to
equal numbers of connections, i.e., similar weight wR(Ot), as
the traditional, flooding-based communication overlays; in bet-
ter cases the ACO-based communication overlays reduce the
weight in comparison to traditional, flooding-based communi-
cation overlays by up 8.4%. Table 7 summarizes the respective
overlay weights depending on the varied recipient ratio rr and
the relative weight improvement.
Table 7: Overlay weight wE(Ot) with varying ratio of recipients rr.
rr ACO flooding rel. weight im-
provement
0.015 64.66667 65.36667 1.0704
0.02 79.56667 82.63333 3.7112
0.05 161.89655 175.10345 7.5423
0.1 276.72000 302.12000 8.4073
0.2 471.68000 513.32000 8.1119
0.5 901.36000 956.20000 5.7352
Figure 29 visualizes the weights for the communication over-
lays over the varying recipient ratios rr and shows that the ACO-
based overlays are at least as efficient as the flooding-based over-
lays.
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Figure 29: Overlay weight wE(Ot) with varying ratio of recipients rr.
4.4.4.3 Time to Live of Agents
The increasing TTL for agents is required to ensure that all re-
cipients may find the communication overlay Ot, or the sender
s ∈ St, and the system is not overloaded with roaming agents.
For that, a configuration is required that limits the path length in
the communication overlay while it still enables to ACO-based
optimization, which leads to slightly longer paths.
Research Question 4 Is the variable TTL configuration enabling the
ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism to establish connected
and improved communication overlays?
To understand the influence of varying TTL settings, the
ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism establishes over-
lays with the following TTLs:
ttl ∈ {10, 25, 50, 75, 100, 125}
Setting the TTL to 10, the ACO-based overlay mechanism is
not able to establish a communication overlay with srRt=1.0 on
random networks; The ttl=10 TTL setting enables only approx-
imately 64% of recipients to connect to the sender. This result is
expected as the mean diameter of a random network and 2,000
subjects is already 12.5. All other TTL settings are able to suc-
cessfully establish communication overlays with srRt=1.0.
Figure 30 and 31 reveals two observations. In Figure 30, it is
shown that larger TTL values (> 75) lead to increasing overlay
weights on social networks eventually. This behavior is caused by
a “misleading” optimization where paths are aggregated even
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Figure 30: Weight wE(Ot) for varied TTL values on social networks. The blue
highlight shows “misleading” optimization. After the dashed line
round 200, no additional agents are emitted by the recipients.
though they become unnecessarily long, for example, by con-
necting distinct subtrees using longer detours. Smaller TTL val-
ues (20, 25), which are in the range of approximately 4 times the
diameter, provide more efficient overlays that even converge to-
wards the Steiner tree approximation StA. Figure 31a visualizes
the overlay weight for varied TTL values on social networks be-
fore the misleaded optimization takes place. It also confirms the
conclusion that the TTL is best configured in the range of ap-
proximately 4 times the diameter; larger TTL values increase the
overlay weight wE(Ot) again. Figure 31b visualizes the respec-
tive overlay weights for varied TTL values on random networks;
here, the “misleading” optimization on random networks is not
shown. All evaluated TTL values larger than 10 enable the ACO-
based overlay establishment mechanism to create communica-
tion overlays with less weight than the flooding-based shortest
path communication overlays.
4.4.4.4 Diffusion
The diffusion parameter controls the amount of new pheromones
that subjects spread to adjacent connections. Without diffusion,
agents have to be directly on a subject that is incident to a con-
nection with pheromones; the path aggregation, and therefore
the resulting overlay optimization, is harder. On the other side,
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(a) Weight wE(Ot) on social networks.
Flooding
Steiner tree
60
70
80
90
100
10 20 25 50 75 100 125
TTL
O
ve
rl
ay
W
ei
g
h
t
w
E(
O
t
)
(b) Weight wE(Ot) with varied TTL values on random networks.
Figure 31: Varying the TTL of emitted agents on social networks (a) and on
random networks (b). The ttl = 10 configurations are included for
completeness, even though this settings are to small to establish a
connected overlay.
if diffusion spreads the full amount of new pheromones, all inci-
dent connections of a subject are likely to have a similar amount
of pheromones. With that, the activation of an optimized overlay
becomes a matter of luck as the activation agents (see Phase 3 in
Section 4.3.5) may transition into dead ends or towards unprof-
itable paths.
Research Question 5 Is the ACO-inherent optimization functional
with the limited 1-hop diffusion mechanism?
A study varies the diffusion parameter and evaluates the re-
sulting success ratio and weight of the communication overlay.
The diffusion is configured with the following factors to spread
different ratios of pheromones to incident connections:
d1h ∈ {0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0}
A diffusion value d1h > 0.75 prevents the ACO-based overlay
establishment mechanism from creating communication over-
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lays with srRt=1.0. With a diffusion ratio d1h = 0.75, the ACO-
based overlay establishment is not able to connect more than 50%
of recipients; a diffusion ratio d1h = 0.75 occasionally misses to
connect one recipient.
Figure 32 shows the weight of the established overlayswE(Ot)
for varied diffusion settings d1h over time. Despite establishing
overlay successfully with no diffusion (d1h = 0.0), the optimiza-
tion of the ACO-based overlay establishment is difficult such
that the established overlays utilize more connections than nec-
essary. In between the extreme values (0.0d1h1.0), the one
hop diffusion supports ACO in the overlay optimization.
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Figure 32: Weight wE(Ot) for varied diffusion factors. The extreme values in-
hibit the establishment of optimized overlays; for d1h = 1.0, the
overlay establishment is not successful.
4.4.4.5 Evaporation
The evaporation γ enables the optimization of the communica-
tion overlays by removing old pheromones over time. However,
removing pheromones too fast may lead to a more difficult over-
lay establishment and optimization.
Research Question 6 In which order of magnitude has the evapora-
tion γ to be configured to enable the ACO-based overlay establishment
mechanism to exploit pheromones and to optimize the communication
overlay?
A study varies the evaporation γ to evaluate the established
communication overlays with respect to their success ratio
srRt = 1.0 and their weight wE(Ot):
γ ∈ {0.0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.07, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0}
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With γ = 1.0, the evaporation removes all pheromones in ev-
ery round. Without pheromones on connections, the ACO-based
overlay mechanism degenerates to parallel random walks and is
no longer able to consistently establish connected communica-
tion overlays with srRt=1.0.
High evaporation factors (γ > 0.1) remove larger parts of the
pheromones and result in overlays with a higher weight wE(Ot);
as larger parts of the pheromones dissolve in a short time, and
the agents of ACO loose the ability to exploit previously estab-
lished trails. Figure 33 shows that evaporation factors γ 6 0.1 fa-
cilitate the optimization of the established communication over-
lays.
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Figure 33: Weight wE(Ot) with varied the factor of proportional evaporation
γ. The γ = 1.0 setting is not able to establish connected overlays
reliably in 500 rounds and is included for completeness.
4.4.4.6 Strictness
The strictness σ of agents controls the relevance of pheromones
for the random walk of agents; the recipients initiate the strict-
ness of agents with a random value (see Section 4.3.3). The win-
dow of strictness values from which the recipients draw the
strictness value is capped with the provided values [σlow,σup].
Lower strictness values are expected to worsen the optimization
abilities as pheromones have a lower influence on the random
walk of agents.
Research Question 7 Which window of strictness values
[σlow,σup] provides the ACO-based overlay establishment mecha-
nism with a mixture of agents that exploit pheromones and explore the
system to optimize the communication overlay?
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Both strictness limits σup and σlow are varied in a study to
evaluate the established communication overlays with respect to
their success ratio srRt=1.0 and their weight wE(Ot):
σup ∈ {0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0}
σlow ∈ {0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 1.0}
Obviously, simulations with σlow > σup are skipped.
All strictness windows [σlow,σup] enable the agents to suc-
cessfully establish the communication overlays. Figure 34 visual-
izes the overlay weights wE(Ot) over varied strictness intervals.
For that, the x-axis represents the upper strictness limits σup
while the values represent the lower strictness limits σlow.
However, Figures 34a and 34b show that low upper limits pre-
vent the ACO-based overlay establishment from successfully op-
timizing the created overlays, resulting in a higher weight of the
communication overlays. A setting of σup = 1.0 yields the best
optimization as it enables recipients to establish a mixture of
exploring and exploiting agents.
The lower limit σlow enables the agents to exploit the struc-
ture by highlighting already known paths. On social networks,
the exploitation of the backbone is essential for the optimization.
Figure 34a shows that a lower limit σlow > 0.75 yields the best
results. Figure 34b visualizes that random networks do not ben-
efit from changing the lower limit σlow.
RGGs, however, do not benefit from specific strictness σ set-
tings. The resulting changes are negligible compared to the al-
ready achieved optimization. Figure 34c visualizes the compara-
bly stable overlay weights wE(Ot) for varied strictness σ inter-
vals.
4.4.4.7 Summary
The studies performed in this section reveal the influence of sev-
eral ACO parameters on the ACO-based mechanism to establish
optimized overlays. Table 8 summarizes the best performing pa-
rameter settings for the different networks that are also used for
the following evaluation.
4.4.5 Efficiency Improvements
This section recapitulates and evaluates the quantitative simula-
tion with respect to the communication overlay properties con-
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Figure 34: Overlay weight wE(Ot) with varied strictness values σ of agents.
cerning efficiency. For that, the key lessons of the evaluations of
the ACO parametrization in the previous Section 4.4.4 are recon-
sidered under the light of the following challenges and research
questions:
4.4 evaluation 107
Table 8: Best-performing ACO Parameters
Network NoA TTL Diffusion Evap. (γ) Strictness (σ)
Social 20 25 0.5 0.07 [0.9, 1.0]
Random10 25 25 0.25 0.07 [0.0, 1.0]
Random4 25 50 0.25 0.07 [0.5, 1.0]
RGG 50 50 0.25 0.01 [0.5, 1.0]
• Are ACO-based communication overlays affecting the abil-
ity of recipients to communicate, i.e., is ACO-based over-
lay establishment negatively affecting the receiver success
ratio srRt(Ot)?
• Is ACO able to exploit the topology of the logical un-
derlay G to improve the communication overhead, i.e., to
reduce wE(Ot) in comparison to flooding-based shortest
path communication overlays?
• To what extent is the communication delay cdavg(Ot) af-
fected the refrain from using shortest paths for overlay es-
tablishment?
The experiments in this evaluation follow the simulation setup
described in Section 4.4.1, the ACO mechanism is initialized
with the best performing setup which summarized in 8. Where
applicable, the conclusions of the previous evaluation (ACO-
Configuration in Section 4.4.4) are taken into account in the dis-
cussion.
4.4.5.1 Receiver Success Ratio – srRt(Ot)
The analysis of the receiver success ratio srRt(Ot) addresses the
first research question of this section:
Research Question 8 Are ACO-based communication overlays af-
fecting the ability of recipients to communicate, i.e., is ACO-based
overlay establishment negatively affecting the receiver success ratio
srRt(Ot)?
As shown in the evaluation of the ACO-parameters, the
novel ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism can always
achieve srRt(Ot) = 1.0. However, the configuration of the ACO
overlay establishment mechanism has to fulfill a set of require-
ments for that:
108 efficient and anonymous communication
• The TTL has to be larger than the diameter of the logical
underlay G. An appropriate setting is 3–5 times the diam-
eter. A smaller TTL may be chosen if the communication
group is known to be “closer” together, i.e., the distance
between sender and recipients is known to be smaller than
the TTL.
• The evaporation factor γ has to be configured such that
the pheromone trails guide the agents through the system
without forcing them into long detours. Also, the less struc-
ture the logical underlay G reveals, the lower the evapora-
tion has to be, for example, a social network enables agents
to utilize the inner core to establish the connectivity be-
tween sender and recipients, while a random network does
not support the agents with a “known” and exploitable
structure.
• The diffusion should spread around 50% of the gained
pheromones support the optimization. Lower values im-
pede the optimization; larger values impede the overlay
establishment.
However, small TTL limits (ttl < 10) may limit the ability of
the ACO mechanism to successfully connect all recipients; simi-
larly do extreme values of diffusion (d1h → 0.0 and d1h → 1.0),
and larger values of evaporation (γ > 0.1) impede the establish-
ment of connected communication overlays.
4.4.5.2 Communication Costs – wE(Ot)
The analysis of the communication costs, measured by the
weight of the communication overlay wE(Ot), addresses the sec-
ond research question of Section 4.4.5:
Research Question 9 Is ACO able to exploit the topology of the logi-
cal underlay G to improve the communication overhead, i.e., to reduce
wE(Ot) in comparison to flooding-based shortest path communication
overlays?
As the Pub/Sub-based communication model enables native
group communication, i.e., the message duplication is pushed
as close to the recipients as possible, the measuring of the com-
munication costs with the weight wE(Ot) is in line with the effi-
ciency definition in Section 2.1.1.
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The novel ACO-based communication overlays are improving
the weight wE(Ot) and approach the Steiner tree approxima-
tion StA (see Section 2.2.5 for more details) in many cases. Fig-
ure 35 shows the aggregated mean weights wE(Ot). The bars
are grouped on the x-axis by the network (social, random10,
random4, RGG); each bar represents the weight wE(Ot) of ei-
ther the ACO-based communication overlay, the flooding-based
shortest path communication overlay, or the StA.
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Figure 35: WeightwE(Ot) of the established communication Overlays. The net-
work types are arranged at the x-axis, the mean weight of the cre-
ated communication overlays is placed at the y-axis—a lower weight
wE(Ot) is better.
social networks The usage of the ACO-based overlay es-
tablishment mechanism enables to utilize the densely connected
core to the advantage of the path aggregation and therefore to
the improvement of the weight wE(Ot).
The flooding-based shortest path communication overlay
strictly favors shortest paths. Social networks facilitate this be-
havior as they enable flooding-based communication overlays to
exploit the densely connected core and benefit from path aggre-
gation as well.
The path consolidation of ACO reduces the weight wE(Ot)
by 5.69% compared to the flooding-based overlay and converges
towards the weight of the optimal solution of the Steiner tree ap-
proximation StA. Table 9 reports the respective absolute overlay
weights wE(Ot) of the overlay and the relative differences to the
StA.
random network In random networks, the ACO-based
overlay establishment mechanism cannot operate on a densely
connected core where many paths cumulate. Without revealing
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Table 9: Weights wE(Ot) of Ot on social networks.
ACO Flooding StA
wE(Ot) 62.2 65.95 62
rel. to StA +0.3% +6.4%
such a structure, it is more difficult to aggregate message dis-
semination paths and to reduce the weight wE(Ot) of the com-
munication overlay.
The focus of the flooding-based overlay establishment on uti-
lizing only shortest paths leads to a higher weight in structure-
less random networks; the flooding-based overlay mechanism
cannot benefit from the implicit path consolidation without a
densely connected core where shortest paths are cumulating.
The path consolidation of ACO reduces the weight wE(Ot) by
10.61% compared to the flooding-based overlay on the random10
networks, where subjects have an average degree of 10. On the
sparser random4 networks, with an average subject degree of
4, the improvement of the weight wE(Ot) is 6.71%. The dif-
ference is explained by the introduction of additional connec-
tions in the random10 networks; the ACO-based overlay estab-
lishment mechanism exploits these additional connections and
improves the weight wE(Ot) by additional 4%. In comparison to
the Steiner tree approximation StA, ACO-based communication
overlays nearly half the overhead of flooding-based communica-
tion overlays.
Table 10 reports the respective absolute overlay weights
wE(Ot) of the overlay and the relative differences to the StA.
Table 10: Weights wE(Ot) of communication overlays Ot on both random10
and random4 networks.
ACO Flooding StA
random10:
wE(Ot) 68.47 76.6 59.30
rel. to StA +15.46% +29.17%
random4:
wE(Ot) 90.93 97.47 82.48
rel. to StA +10.24% +18.17%
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random geometric graph (rgg) The ACO-based overlay
establishment mechanism is able to exploit the parallel structure
of connections that is caused by the locality-based connection
structure in RGGs. With that parallel structure, the ACO-based
overlay establishment mechanism can easily consolidate paths
and reduce the weight of the communication overlay wE(Ot).
Flooding-based communication overlays may have multiple
shortest paths to chose from and select one randomly. With that,
the weight of the communication is often unnecessarily high.
The ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism is able to re-
duce the weight wE(Ot) by 40.66% compared to flooding-based
shortest path communication overlays. Table 11 reports the re-
spective absolute overlay weights wE(Ot) of the overlay and the
relative differences to the StA.
Table 11: Weights wE(Ot) of Ot on RGG networks.
ACO Flooding StA
wE(Ot) 59.83 100.82 52.33
rel. to StA +14.3% +92.7%
4.4.5.3 Communication Delay – cdavg(Ot)
The communication delay is estimated by the length of the path
between sender s ∈ St and the respective recipients r ∈ Rt.
The analysis in this section addresses the third research ques-
tion of Section 4.4.5:
Research Question 10 To what extent is the communication delay
cdavg(Ot) affected the refrain from using shortest paths for overlay
establishment?
By aggregating dissemination paths and refraining from
strictly favoring shortest paths, it is expected that the average
distance between sender and recipients increases when creating
the communication overlays with the ACO-based overlay estab-
lishment mechanism.
social network The average distance between sender and
recipients on social networks increases by 10.42% from 4.8 hops
to 5.3 hops when using ACO-based communication overlays in-
stead of the flooding-based shortest paths communication over-
lays.
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By exploiting the inner core of the logical underlay, the exten-
sion of the average distance is usually no more than one addi-
tional hop. With that, the increase of the communication delay
by using the ACO-based overlay establishment is only marginal.
random network The average distance between sender
and recipients on a random network is larger due to the lack
of the inner core providing shortcuts between the subjects. The
extension of the paths is, however, only 8.19% from 4.52 hops
to 4.89 hops on random networks with an average degree of
10 when using the ACO-based communication overlays instead
of the flooding-based communication overlays. On random net-
works with average degree of 4, the average distances increases
by 4.53% from 5.96 hops to 6.23.
rgg The distance in RGGs is determined by their (random)
location and is limited by dimension and connection distance
threshold. The path extension that is caused by the usage of
ACO-based communication overlays is on average 26.47% from
6.8 to 8.6 hops.
Figure 36 and Table 12 report the respective absolute results
for the communication delay cdavg(Ot) and the relative distance
of the delay cdavg(Ot) between the ACO-based overlays and the
flooding-based overlays. While the relative growth of the com-
munication delay seems to outweigh the efficiency improvement,
the absolute delay growth is only between 0–1 additional hop for
social and random networks and 1–2 additional hops for RGGs.
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Figure 36: Communication delay cdavg(Ot) of the established communication
Overlays. The network types are arranged at the x-Axis, the mean
weight of the created communication overlays is placed at the y-
Axis—a lower communication delay cdavg(Ot) is better.
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Table 12: Communication delay cdavg(Ot) of ACO-based and flooding-based
overlays and the relative difference of the communication delay
cdavg(Ot).
Network ACO Flooding rel. Difference
Social 5.3 4.8 10.42%
Random10 4.89 4.52 8.19%
Random4 6.23 5.96 4.53%
RGG 8.6 6.8 26.47%
4.4.5.4 Summary
The novel ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism suc-
ceeds in all three research questions by providing fully con-
nected communication overlays srRt(Ot) = 1.0 (RQ 8) with a
reduced weight wE(Ot) (RQ 9) and only slightly increasing dis-
tance between sender and recipients cdavg(Ot) (RQ 10). Table 13
summarizes the results of the performed simulation study.
Table 13: ACO-based communication overlays compared to flooding-based
shortest path communication overlays.
Network srRt(Ot) wE(Ot) cdavg(Ot)
Social 1.0 62.2 (-5.69%) 5.3 (+10.42%)
Random10 1.0 68.47 (-10.61%) 4.89 (+8.19%)
Random4 1.0 90.93 (-6.71%) 6.23 (+4.53%)
RGG 1.0 59.83 (-40.66%) 8.6 (+26.47%)
4.4.6 Maintaining Anonymity while Improving Efficiency
The evaluation above was focussed on the efficiency improve-
ment of the overlays that are constructed with the novel ACO-
based overlay establishment mechanism. This section will com-
plement this by evaluating the anonymity of overlays that are
established with the ACO mechanism.
The following challenges and research questions are an-
swered:
• Is the novel ACO-based overlay establishment affecting
anonymity with its efficiency improvements?
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• What are the costs of the achieved anonymity?
The analysis in this section focusses on the anonymity of re-
cipients. Sender anonymity will be discussed in Chapter 6, the
Sections 6.1 and 6.3 substantiate this differentiation.
4.4.6.1 Anonymity Set Size – ass
The anonymity set size ass (see Section 2.4.1 and 4.4.2) measures
anonymity as the size of the set in which the recipients can hide.
That is the set in which the adversary A cannot discriminate any
member. This analysis studies the first research question of this
section:
Research Question 11 Is the ACO-based overlay establishment im-
peding anonymity with its efficiency improvements?
Facing the service provider as global passive adversary Ap,g,
the anonymity set size ass equals the overlay size |Vt| as the ad-
versary Ap,g can remove all subjects v /∈ Vt from the anonymity
set. The ACO-based overlay establishment consolidates overlay
paths, i.e., it reduces the number of connections in the communi-
cation overlay. As a result of this, the ACO mechanism reduces
the number of brokers |Bt| in the communication overlay in the
same order of magnitude as it removes connections.
On social networks, the ACO-based communication overlay de-
creases the mean number of subjects by 5.60% to 61.70 compared
to 65.36 on flooding-based shortest path communication over-
lays. On random networks with an average degree of 10, the ACO-
based communication overlay mechanism removes only 10.57%
of the brokers and reduces the number of subjects to 69.4 com-
pared to 77.6 on flooding-based communication overlays (on ran-
dom networks with degree 4, the reduction is 7.06% from 97.92
to 91.01). The connection structure on RGGs enables an immense
efficiency improvement, as a result of this, the mean number of
subjects on ACO-based communication overlays is dropping by
40.24% to 62.74 compared to 104.98 on flooding-based commu-
nication overlays.
The anonymity set size ass provides an intuitive anonymity
measurement and is reported for the networks analyzed in
the previous evaluation (Section 4.4.5) in Table 14. However,
the anonymity set size loses its expressiveness if the identifica-
tion probabilities of the subjects in the anonymity set are not
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Table 14: The average anonymity set size ass of ACO-based communication
overlays compared to the average anonymity set size ass flooding-
based communication overlays.
Network ACO Flooding rel. Difference
Social 61.7 65.36 -5.60%
Random10 69.4 77.6 -10.57%
Random4 91.01 97.92 -7.06%
RGG 62.74 104.98 -40.24%
equal. The following section, therefore, analyzes the identifica-
tion probabilities—and shows that not all identification proba-
bilities are equal—and takes a different approach towards the
anonymity quantification.
4.4.6.2 Entropy-based Anonymity Evaluation
The global passive adversary Ap,g is able to derive the commu-
nication overlay by tracing the messages through the communi-
cation overlay Ot. Moreover, the Ap,g can identify subjects v in
leaf positions d+(v) = 0) as recipients v = r ∈ Rt by utilizing
knowledge about the communication model.
With the ability to identify leaf subjects as recipients, the prob-
ability of identification is not equal for all subjects in Vt; there-
fore, the expressiveness of the anonymity set size ass is limited.
In the following paragraphs, it is argued why it is realistic that
the adversary Ap,g is able to identify leaf subjects as recipients,
how many subjects are exposed by this property, how this prob-
lem can be resolved, and the resulting anonymity protection us-
ing entropy-based anonymity is analyzed.
This section provides an accurate anonymity evaluation that
goes beyond the unsuitable anonymity set size. Hence, this sec-
tion is addressing Research Question 11 as well.
identifying leaf subjects as recipients Following the
communication model in Section 2.2.1, subjects v are only join-
ing an communication overlay Ot if one of the following require-
ments is fulfilled:
1. v is a sender: v= s ∈ St; v has to join the communication
overlay Ot to be able to emit messages.
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2. v is a recipient: v=r ∈ Rt; v has to join the communication
overlay Ot to be able to receive messages.
3. v is a broker, helping to connect a sender s∈St with recip-
ients r∈Rt: v=b∈Bt such that d+(v)>1
Assuming that the subject v is neither sender s nor recipient r,
but is positioned as a leaf of the communication overlay Ot. As
v is neither sender nor recipient, v has to be a broker b. A broker,
however, joins the overlay only to relay messages from senders
to recipients, thus, v must have at least one outgoing connection
d+(v)>1. d+(v)>1 contradicts the statement that v is positioned
in a leaf position and is neither sender nor recipient.
As a result of this, an global passive adversary Ap,g can
identify subjects in leaf position as recipient (or respectively as
sender, which is considered in Chapter 6).
recipients in leaf position The path consolidation in
ACO-based communication overlays also reduces the number of
leaf subjects and thus increases the anonymity for recipients.
Figure 37 visualizes the number of recipients in leaf position
ls(Ot) for the three analyzed network types.
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Figure 37: Number of recipients in leaf position ls(Ot) of the established com-
munication Overlays. The network types are arranged at the x-axis,
the mean number of recipients in leaf position is placed at the y-
axis—less recipients in leaf position ls(Ot) is better.
The small but densely connected core on social networks pre-
vents the path consolidation from ACO-based communication
overlays from significantly reducing the number of recipients
in leaf positions. The mean number of recipients in leaf posi-
tions ls(Ot) on ACO-based communication overlays is 28.34, on
flooding-based communication overlays 30.12.
The number of recipients in leaf position on ACO-based com-
munication overlays and flooding-based communication overlay
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on random networks is similar to the number of recipients in leaf
position on social networks.
The connection structure on RGG enables ACO-based com-
munication overlays to reduce the number of recipients in leaf
positions to 13.28 compared to 29.60 on flooding-based commu-
nication overlay.
Table 15 summarizes the number of recipients on leaf posi-
tions for both overlay establishment mechanisms as well as the
respective ratio of recipients in leaf positions.
Table 15: Number of leaf recipients ls(Ot) on ACO-based and flooding-based
communication overlays.
ACO Flooding total
Social:
ls(Ot) 28.34 30.12 30.72
ratio 0.92 0.98
Random10:
ls(Ot) 25.47 29.20 29.87
ratio 0.85 0.98
Random4:
ls(Ot) 26.07 28.67 29.47
ratio 0.88 0.97
RGG:
ls(Ot) 13.28 29.60 30.36
ratio 0.44 0.97
improving leaf-mixture by topology adaptation
Daubert et al. [37] propose two mechanisms, probabilistic forward-
ing and shell game, to increase the number of ordinary subjects in
leaf positions to lower the identification probability of recipients
in leaf positions.
Using probabilistic forwarding, subjects in leaf positions may in-
clude adjacent neighbors in the communication overlay by ex-
tending the dissemination paths. The number of recipients in
leaf positions is reduced proportional to the forwarding proba-
bility. However, by adding additional subjects to the communi-
cation overlay the efficiency is again impaired.
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Using the shell game, subjects that join a communication over-
lay may swap positions with adjacent neighbors (that are al-
ready in the communication overlay). With that, the recipients
can move to inner locations of the communication overlay. The
swap is controlled with an exponential decay function, to reduce
the number of swaps over time and to stop the shell game even-
tually. As the shell game does not involve additional subjects, the
communication efficiency of the communication overlay stays
stable.
Both probabilistic forwarding and the shell game relax the pre-
viously described requirement 3; it is no longer required that
subjects in leaf positions are recipients. More details on the func-
tionality of both mechanism are presented in Section 6.3.2.
Depending on the ratio of recipients in the system Rt/V, the
shell game can be sufficient to decrease the ratio of recipients
in leaf position below 0.5. For larger ratios, the communication
overlays Ot have to be extended using the probabilistic forward-
ing to include additional subjects to increase the anonymity of
recipients. The optimal leaf recipient ratio is given with the ratio
of recipients in the respective communication overlay Rt/Vt; the
desired maximal ratio of recipients in leaf position is 0.5 as this
reduces the identification probability of an adversaries Ap,g to a
coin flip when they inspect a single leaf-positioned subject.
achievable anonymity With the application of both
mechanisms probabilistic forwarding and shell game, the ratio of
recipients in leaf positions can be leveled down below 0.5 [40].
This analysis assumes, therefore, the worst case ratio of 0.5 for the
ratio of recipients in leaf position and follows the steps outlined
in Equations (21)–(25) of Section 4.4.2 to compute the anonymity
degree of the communication overlays.
The execution of the anonymity protection measures shell
game and probabilistic forwarding change the identification
probabilities in Equation (21) and (22) with the recipient ratio
of 0.5 in leaf position as follows:
pinner′ = |Rt|− 0.5 · ls(Ot)
|Vt|− ls(Ot)
pleaf′ = |{r ∈ R : d
+(r) = 0}|
ls(Ot)
6 0.5
pinner′ is the probability of a subject that is not in leaf position
being a recipient. For that, the number of recipients not in leaf
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positions (|Rt|− 0.5 · ls(Ot)) is divided by the number of subjects
in the overlay that are not in leaf positions |Vt|− ls(Ot).
Analogously, pleaf′ is the probability of a subject that is in
leaf position being a recipient. For that, the number of recipients
in leaf positions |{r ∈ R : d+(r) = 0}| is divided by the number
of leaf subjects (that do not only comprise recipients after the
execution of the shell game) ls(Ot).
The sum of all properties has to be 1.0 to ensure valid prob-
abilities for the computation of the entropy. Therefore, both the
probability of inner subjects pinner′ and the probability of leaf
subjects pleaf′ need to be normalized:
pinner =
pinner′
|Vt|− ls(Ot)
pleaf =
pleaf′
ls(Ot)
After the normalization, the computation of the anonymity de-
gree ad follows the steps outlined by Equation (23)–(25) without
changes:
1. establish the probability vector pk from pinner and pleaf.
(Equation (23))
2. compute the Shannon entropy S over the established prob-
ability vector pk. (Equation (24))
3. compute the anonymity degree ad by normalizing the
Shannon entropy S with the maximal entropy Smax;
Smax = log2(|Vt|) assumes that all subjects in the commu-
nication overlay Vt have the same identification probability.
(Equation (25))
Social networks provide the following anonymity degree with
their mean anonymity set size ass=Vt=61.7 and mean number
of leaf nodes ls(Ot) = 28.34. The identification probabilities of
the subjects in the communication over are given by:
pinner′ = |Rt|− 0.5 · ls(Ot)
|Vt|− ls(Ot)
=
30.72− 0.5 · 28.34
61.7− 28.34
= 0.4961
⇒ pinner ≈ 0.01487
pleaf′ = 0.5
⇒ pleaf ≈ 0.01764
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These identification probabilities enable the computation of the
Shannon entropy over the resulting probability distribution:
S = −((|Vt|− ls(Ot) · pinner · log2(pinner)
+ ls(Ot) · pleaf · log2(pleaf))
= −(33.36 · 0.01487 · log2(0.01487)
+ 28.34 · 0.01764 · log2(0.01764))
= 5.924378
The normalized anonymity degree d is then computed by:
d =
S
Smax
=
5.924378
5.947199
= 0.9961628
Diaz et al. [44] suggest an anonymity degree d > 0.8 to be suf-
ficient for anonymous communication. AnonPubSub [37] pro-
vides with the protection measures for recipients, probabilistic
forwarding and shell game, with the novel ACO-based overlay es-
tablishment mechanism an anonymity degree of d ≈ 0.9962 on
social networks.
The anonymity degrees d for the random10, random4, and RGG
networks are computed analogously:
random10 :
pinner ′ = 0 .3901 ⇒ pinner ≈ 0 .00888
pleaf ′ = 0 .5 ⇒ pleaf ≈ 0 .01963
d = 0 .8981276
random4 :
pinner ′ = 0 .2505 ⇒ pinner ≈ 0 .00382
pleaf ′ = 0 .5 ⇒ pleaf ≈ 0 .01918
d = 0 .7462872
rgg :
pinner ′ = 0 .3069 ⇒ pinner ≈ 0 .00621
pleaf ′ = 0 .5 ⇒ pleaf ≈ 0 .03765
d = 0 .7730252
Table 16 reports the anonymity degrees of ACO-based commu-
nication overlays as computed above as well as the anonymity
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Table 16: Anonymity Degrees d on ACO-based and Flooding-based Commu-
nication Overlays.
ACO Flooding
Social 0.9962 0.9962
Random10 0.8981 0.8322
Random4 0.7463 0.7139
RGG 0.7730 0.7002
degrees of the respective flooding-based communication over-
lays.
The reason for the lower anonymity degree d on random net-
works and RGGs is the larger difference of the identification
probabilities of inner subjects pinner and pleaf. With additional
shell game position swaps (and, if required additional subjects in-
cluded using the probabilistic forwarding), the anonymity can be
improved.
The results of this analysis show that the novel ACO-based
overlay establishment mechanism does not impair anonymity
even though it improves the efficiency of the communication.
4.5 conclusion
This chapter introduced a novel ACO-based overlay establishment
mechanism. First, ACO-related background information is pro-
vided and it is argued why ACO is appropriate to be used in the
establishment of communication overlays in anonymous group
communication systems. Second, the ACO-based overlay estab-
lishment mechanism is introduced as a three-phase approach.
Last, the novel ACO–based communication overlay is evaluated
using a simulation study that ensures the usage of representa-
tive networks, evaluates the parameters of the ACO-based over-
lay establishment mechanism, and considers the influence on
efficiency and anonymity.
The ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism is per-
formed in a distributed fashion:
1. Recipients emit agents that perform a (biased) random
walk and search senders. Agents bias their selection prob-
abilities based on pheromones that have been placed by
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preceding agents in phase 2, and based on their strict-
ness factor. The strictness factor scales the importance of
pheromones to foster either exploration of the neighbor-
hood or exploitation of already found paths.
2. When agents have found a sender, they return to their
recipient and mark the connections on their path with
pheromones to bias the selection probabilities of subse-
quent agents in phase 1. Also, pheromones evaporate in
this phase to enable further optimizations.
3. Recipients emit agents that activate the strongest known
pheromone trail towards the senders regularly. This ex-
plicit activation enables the termination of the overlay es-
tablishment mechanism.
The key lessons of this chapter are as follows:
• ACO consolidates path and foster late message duplication
by a combination of exploration and exploitation.
• The novel ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism
creates communication overlays with less connections than
the state of the art flooding-based communication overlays:
– 5.69% less connections on social networks
– 10.61% less connections on random networks with an
average degree of 10 (random10)
– 6.71% less connections on random networks with an av-
erage degree of 4 (random4)
– 40.66% less connections on RGGs
• Due to the path consolidation, the communication delay
increases:
– 10.42%—or 0.5 hops—on social networks
– 8.19%—or 0.37 hops—on random networks with an av-
erage degree of 10 (random10)
– 4.53%—or 0.27 hops—on random networks with an av-
erage degree of 4 (random4)
– 21%—or 1.8 hops—on RGGs
• Recipient protection measures like probabilistic forward-
ing and the shell game [37] remain intact as the ACO-based
overlay establishment mechanism does only change the se-
lection of connections for the communication overlays.
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• The efficiency improvement is achieved while maintaining
anonymity at the same level as it is achieved with flooding-
based communication overlays. The anonymity degrees
are:
– 0.9962 on social networks
– 0.8981 on random networks with an average degree of
10 (random10)
– 0.7463 on random networks with an average degree of
4 (random4)
– 0.7730 on RGGs
The anonymity degrees on overlay that are established
with the ACO-mechanism are at least as high as the
anonymity degrees on traditional flooding-based overlays.
Diaz et al. [44] suggest that an anonymity degree of >0.8
is sufficient to provide anonymous communication.
The explicit overlay activation may leak information about the
active participants of an communication overlay to an adversary.
The following chapter discusses different options to establish
the routing information exchange with which the communica-
tion overlay activation can be performed. Also, the impact of
dynamic subjects on the communication overlays is studied in
the next chapter.

5
R O U T I N G W I T H T H E T E N S I O N O F E F F I C I E N C Y,
A N O N Y M I T Y, A N D C H U R N
This chapter introduces how the ACO-based overlay establish-
ment mechanism increases the reliability of the communication
system when the communication system faces subject churn, i.e.,
it faces joining, leaving, and failing subjects. The ACO-based
overlay establishment mechanism increases the ratio of con-
nected recipients by utilizing pheromones that agents deposited
during the initial overlay establishment. Additionally, this chap-
ter discusses the exchange of routing information during the
overlay establishment—and the overlay repairing under the in-
fluence of churn—under the angle of efficiency and anonymity.
The second part of this chapter introduces and discusses four dif-
ferent mechanisms to share routing information, each of which
reveals its advantages and disadvantages.
This chapter is structured as follows: after providing a moti-
vation in Section 5.1, the different possibilities of subject churn
are introduced in Section 5.2 and evaluated using a study. After
that, Section 5.3 introduces and discusses different mechanisms
to share routing information in anonymous communication sys-
tems.
5.1 motivation
Routing information exchange ensures that every subject in the
communication system, especially the subjects in a specific com-
munication overlay Ot, have the necessary topological knowl-
edge to relay messages from senders s ∈ St to recipients r ∈ Rt.
The necessity to share knowledge about the topology to estab-
lish routing information highlights the tension of efficiency and
anonymity:
• Efficiency is improved when more topological information,
i.e., information about the connection structure and inter-
ests of the subjects, is available. Additional information
improves the quality (“optimality”) of routing decisions
concerning the chosen optimization criteria. For example,
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the overhead of message dissemination, measured in the
number of messages, can be minimized when routing the
messages along a Steiner tree. To compute the Steiner tree,
however, the subjects need to be aware of the overall con-
nection structure, as well as of the position of senders and
recipients in the overlay.
• Anonymity, in contrast, is reduced when additional infor-
mation is available. The availability of global structural in-
formation, as well as the locations of senders and recipi-
ents, enables an adversary to identify both sender and re-
cipient quickly. In a similar direction, partial information
already enables the adversary to focus their attention and
attack power towards specific areas of the communication
system—or a specific subset of subjects.
Routing information exchange needs to consider and address
this tension to establish efficient and anonymous communica-
tion overlays Ot. While the previous chapter considered the ser-
vice provider as adversary Ap,g, the information leakage of the
exchange of routing information is of particular interest for a
local adversary A_,c. This adversary A_,c can learn information
from details like the size of the routing information included in
messages or stored at subjects. Efficiency considers here the size
of the routing information that is either transmitted in the mes-
sages or is stored by the subjects.
This tension is of particular relevance when churn, i.e., sub-
jects joining and leaving the communication system, changes the
topology from time to time. These topology changes enforce re-
cipients to re-enter their overlay establishment state and adapt
their connection to the communication overlay.
In the following sections, first, the impact of churn on the
communication reliability is analyzed, and it is discussed how
the ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism supports re-
cipients to remain connected or, if necessary, enables them to
reconnect fast. Second, several different several different mecha-
nisms to share routing information are discussed and compared
concerning their impact on efficiency and anonymity.
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5.2 efficiency and anonymity in the presence of
churn
Centralized or decentralized systems can easily control the im-
pact of churn as the service is provided by dedicated subjects
that share their knowledge. However, churn is a challenge in dis-
tributed (P2P) systems where all subjects cooperate to provide
the service.
In a distributed communication system, which is the focus
of this thesis, churn changes the topology from time to time.
These changes require the subjects v ∈ V to continuously adapt
the structure of the communication overlay Ot to reconnect to
the overlay when separated through leaving subjects. Similarly,
newly joining recipients have to able to connect to the communi-
cation overlay, thereby altering the structure of the overlay Ot.
The following sections introduce the possible manifestations
of churn and outline the implications that result from the churn.
This introduction of churn is complemented with a discussion of
properties of the novel ACO-based overlay establishment mech-
anism (see Chapter 4) that reduce the influence of subject churn.
A simulation study shows then the impact of subject churn and
the ability of ACO-based communication overlays to cope with
it.
5.2.1 Concept of Dynamic Subject Behavior
Subjects are showing dynamic behavior for many reasons, for ex-
ample, due to diurnal behavior or turning devices off overnight.
As a result of this, two simplified classes of devices can be de-
rived:
• stable devices that are (nearly) never leaving the system like
servers which are always online except when, for example,
shut down for maintenance—due to their reliability, they
establish the simplified class of stable subjects. They may,
however, join late such that they are not available the whole
time.
• dynamic devices that may leave and join the system at any
point in time. Exemplary devices in this class are smart-
phones, laptops, and PCs.
In research of human-driven P2P systems, for example, for the
purpose of file-sharing, researchers have shown that churn fol-
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lows exponential or Weibull distributions [66, 137, 151, 152]. The
key lesson of this characterization is: the longer a subject is par-
ticipating in the system, the higher the probability that the sub-
ject will participate at a next point in time considered.
A communication system needs to consider three classes of
systems when handling subject churn:
• joining subjects: A subject can join the system and connect
to other subjects. The subject itself can be completely new
or re-join after leaving the system before. Depending on
the interest of this subject, they may only contribute as a
broker b ∈ Bt or they may take an active role as sender
s ∈ St or recipient r ∈ Rt.
• leaving subjects: A subjects can leave the system after an-
nouncing their intent to leave to all adjacent neighbors.
These neighbors can then react and minimize the damage
of the leaving subject.
• failing subjects: A subject can leave the system without an-
nouncing their interest to leave, for example, when the de-
vice crashes or loses its connection. This failure has to be
detected by the neighbors on their own, for example, by
detecting missing synchronization or heartbeat messages.
Here, subjects have to repair already occurred damage in
the communication overlay Ot.
An anonymous communication system that bases its
anonymization and service provisioning on the P2P-principle
needs to consider all three manifestations of subject churn by
addressing the respective challenges.
5.2.2 Addressing the Three Cases of Churn
The ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism utilizes the
pheromones (see Sections 4.3.3–4.3.5) to reduce and cope with
the influence of all three cases of churn.
5.2.2.1 Joining Subjects
The set of joining subjects comprises both late-joining subjects
and re-joining subjects.
Recipients and senders that join an existing communication
system are starting their instance of the overlay establishment
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mechanism in the phase 1, the discovery phase. The subject starts
to emit agents in order to find either senders s ∈ St or recip-
ients r ∈ Rt that are connected to the communication overlay
Ot. During that search, agents recognize previously established
pheromones on the connections and bias their random walk ac-
cordingly. As pheromones evaporate proportionally (see Equa-
tion (13)), the selection probabilities pvi remin stable. As a result
of this, the stronger pheromone trails will still lead towards the
senders or, in general, towards the communication overlay.
The utilization of pheromones that are placed in prior over-
lay establishment enables subjects to quickly (re-)connect to
the communication overlay. The then newly placed pheromone
markers dominate the pheromone-dependent portion of selec-
tion probability (see Equation (10)) quickly if the pheromone
trails are “old”. If the pheromone trails are fresh, they are strong
enough to lead the joining subject towards the communication
overlay. Example 22 exemplifies the influence of old and new
pheromones.
Example 22: Figure 38b shows the pheromones on connections to three
neighboring subjects va–vc where pheromones evaporate with γ=0.07.
In round rd = 10, the connection to neighbor va then receives 10
additional pheromones, the connection to vb receives 5 additional
pheromones. While the relative distance stays stable with the propor-
tional evaporation, and, as result of this, stable selection probabilities,
the selection probabilities shift immediately with the new pheromones
deposited; Figure 38c visualized the progression of selection probabili-
ties.
rd τva τvb τvc (pva ) (pvb ) (pvc )
0 20.00 15.00 25.00 0.3333 0.2917 0.3750
1 18.60 13.95 23.25 0.3333 0.2917 0.3750
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 10.41 7.81 13.01 0.3333 0.2917 0.3750
10 18.98 11.91 12.10 0.3874 0.3052 0.3074
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15 13.20 8.29 8.42 0.3874 0.3052 0.3074
Proposition 6 The ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism can
utilize old pheromones and combine them with newly deposited
pheromones. As a result of this, the agents may exploit previously es-
tablished knowledge, while the evaporation ensures that agents are not
locked in old paths.
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Figure 38: In the first phase (blue) on the left hand side, pheromones evapo-
rate proportional according to Equation (13), the selection probabil-
ities remain stable. In round 10, the connection to va receives 10
pheromones, the connection to vb receives 5 pheromones; the selec-
tion probabilities pv change accordingly.
5.2.2.2 Leaving Subjects
Leaving subjects announce their intent to leave the communi-
cation system. This announcement is intended to enable the re-
maining subjects to react and rebuild the communication overlay
without the leaving subject.
For that, the leaving subject vk sends a message mleave to all
adjacent subjects vl ∈ N-(vk). These subjects perform the follow-
ing two tasks:
• mark vk as inactive: prevent the activation of overlay-paths
that rely on vk
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• inform affected neighbors: evaluate whether vk is part of the
communication overlay Ot by checking whether vk is part
of own routing tables. Forward leave notification along
overlay paths to enable recipients r ∈ Rt to react and to
start emitting agents
Recipients that receive a leave notification will enter the first
phase of the ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism and
start emitting agents. As Section 5.2.2.1 describes and Exam-
ple 22 exemplifies, the emitted agents utilize previously de-
posited pheromones to detect paths around the leaving subject.
5.2.2.3 Failing Subjects
In contrast to leaving subjects, failing subjects are not announc-
ing their leave beforehand, for example, as a result of a system
crash. This is an extreme case of the previous churn type of leav-
ing subjects.
As failing subjects vk do not announce their leaving, all sub-
jects have to check the liveness of their neighbors using regular
heartbeat messages. When a subject vk fails to respond to these
messages, the neighbors realize that the subject failed and will
perform similar tasks to the case of leaving subjects:
• mark vk as inactive: prevent the activation of overlay-paths
that rely on vk
• inform affected neighbors: evaluate whether vk is part of the
communication overlay Ot by checking whether vk is part
of own routing tables. Forward fail notification along over-
lay paths to enable recipients r ∈ Rt to react and to start
emitting agents
Recipients that receive a leave notification will enter the first
phase of the ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism and
start emitting agents. As Section 5.2.2.1 describes and Exam-
ple 22 exemplifies, the emitted agents utilize previously de-
posited pheromones to detect paths around the leaving subject.
Proposition 7 Agents of joining subjects will speedup their discov-
ery with pheromones that are deposited in early overlay establishment
phases. The usage of these old pheromones increases the bootstrapping
speed while new pheromones that dominate the selection probability
will ensure the liveness of found paths.
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Proposition 8 Utilization of previously deposited pheromones help to
counter disruptions of communication overlays through leaving and
failing subjects. The communication will, therefore, be more robust
against churn.
5.2.3 Evaluation of Churn-resistant, Efficient, and Anonymous Com-
munication
This section analyzes the effect of subject churn on anonymous
communication overlays and the effectiveness of the proposed
reactions using the ACO-based overlay establishment mecha-
nisms.
Using the simulation framework from Chapter 4, a simulation
study is performed and described in Section 5.2.3.1; the eval-
uation metrics are described in Section 5.2.3.2. Section 5.2.3.3
presents and discusses the results.
5.2.3.1 Simulation Study
The simulation is performed on the very same networks as the
original overlay establishment mechanism. Therefore and be-
cause of the results of the network configuration simulation in
Section 4.4.3, the churn simulation study is performed on:
• Social Networks following the Barabàsi-Albert model with
m=3. Thus, every subject added to the network adds three
connections.
• Random Networks following the Erdo˝s-Rényi model with
d(v)=4. Thus, every subject in the network has on average
four connections.
• Random Geometric Graphs RGG with random positioning of
the subjects on a euclidean plane of dimension dim = 2,
and the connectivity threshold ct=0.1.
All networks are populated by 2, 000 subjects.
A ratio of 0.015 of the subjects is randomly selected to be re-
cipients of the established communication overlay.
In the ACO configuration, recipients are emitting agents in
Phase 1 (“Sender Discovery”) for phase1dur = {200, 500, 1, 000}
rounds. Joining recipients and recipients that react to leave and
fail notifications emit agents for the same time.
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The session duration (lifetime) and intersession time are con-
figured following the results of [66, 137] using two Weibull dis-
tributions:
• Intersession time: shape kit=0.61511, scale λit=413.6765
• Session duration: shape ksd=0.47648, scale λsd=169.5385
Figure 39 visualizes the respective density functions and cumula-
tive distribution functions. Both Stutzbach et al. [137] and Gross
et al. [66] suggest that the intersession times are significantly
smaller than the session duration; as a result of this, it is ex-
pected that more subjects leave the system than join the system.
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Figure 39: Weibull distributions for intersession times and session durations,
parameterized following [66].
For purpose of visualization, the x-axes are limited to 5,000 and 15,000
rounds respectively.
At the beginning of the experiment, the communication sys-
tem establishes an communication overlays without being af-
fected by churn. The evaluation of the ACO-mechanism in Sec-
tions 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 suggests that the recipients complete the
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overlay establishment in less than 500 rounds. As a result of this,
churn is activated in round 500, i.e., all subjects draw a round
from the session duration distribution and initiate a leave or
fail event as soon as their respective round is due. As soon as
their leave or fail event is initiated, the subjects draw another
round from the intersession time distribution to schedule their
join-event. After additional 1,000 rounds, in which subjects may
leave the system, churn is restricted again to allow only join-
events, i.e., after round 1,500, only join-events are executed by
the subjects, and leave-events and fail-events are discarded. The
experiment continues then until round 10,000 to provide the sub-
jects with enough time to stabilize again, i.e., enough time to
reconnect to the communication overlay.
Table 17 summarizes the configuration of the simulation
study.
Table 17: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Runs 25
Rounds per run 20,000
Network size (|V|) 2,000 (1,000 on RGG)
Recipients (|Rt|) 0.015 ·V⇒ |Rt| = 30
Network types {social; random4; RGG}
Connectivity social network m0=2, m=3
Average degree random network d(v) = 4
Connectivity threshold RGG 0.1
ACO Configuration: see Table 8 in Section 4.4.4 (p. 97)
Evaporation γ 0.07 | 0.01
Strictness σ [0.75, 1.0] | [0.5, 1.0]
Agents per Recipient per Round k 20
Phase 1 Duration phase1dur {200; 500; 1,000 }
Churn Configuration:
Distribution weibull
Intersession time kit=0.61511, λit=413.6765
Session duration ksd=0.47648, λsd=169.5385
Churn start 500
Churn end 1,500
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5.2.3.2 Evaluation Metrics
With the performed simulation study the following metrics are
computed to evaluate the effect of subject churn on the commu-
nication system, the definition of the metrics itself follows the
simulation study in Section 4.4:
• Recipient Success Ratio srRt(Ot): Computes the ratio of
connected recipients and, thus, measures the robustness
against subject churn.
• Weight wE(Ot): Computation of the communication over-
lay size, measured by counting the number of connections.
• Communication Delay cdavg(Ot): Computation of the dis-
tance between sender and recipient, averaged over all
sender recipient pairs.
• Leaf Subjects ls(Ot): Computes the number of recipients in
leaf positions. The number of leaf subjects can also be used
as indicator for the instability of the communication over-
lay: an unstable number of leaf subjects indicates frequent
path disruptions and the resulting repair actions.
5.2.3.3 Communication under Churn
This section presents and discusses the results of the robustness
of the communication system against subject churn. The follow-
ing challenges and research questions are answered:
• Is duration in which recipients emit agents improving the
robustness against subject churn?
• To which extent are subjects able to receive messages while
the communication system is affected by subject churn?
• Is churn increasing the communication costs for the re-
maining subjects?
• How is churn affecting the communication delay?
the influence of subject churn Figure 40 visualizes
the number of inactive subjects over time; the blue highlighted
area is the time in which subjects may leave the system. It shows
the massive effect of subject churn on the availability of sub-
jects in an anonymous communication system by visualizing the
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number of inactive subjects, i.e., visualizes the number of subjects
that left or failed. The differing churn distributions cause the
quick rise in the number of inactive subjects while these subjects
are only slowly re-joining the system. About 400 subjects turn
inactive in the 1,000 rounds between 500 and 1,500 in which the
leave events and fail events are performed while only about 40
of these subjects rejoin in the 3,500 rounds until round 5,000.
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Figure 40: Impact of churn on social networks: Measuring the number of leav-
ing, failing, and joining subjects. Within the blue highlighted inter-
val, subjects may leave the system; the dashed line marks the end
of the initial overlay establishment.
recipient success ratio As described above, churn has a
massive affect on the availability of subjects. Continuously leav-
ing subjects disrupt the connection overlay Ot frequently. Fig-
ure 41 shows that both overlay establishment mechanisms are
hardly able to cope with frequent leave-events.
Notably, the novel ACO-based overlays achieve a success ra-
tio of 0.89–0.90 on social networks, a success ratio of 0.89–0.87
on random networks, and a success ratio of 0.87–0.89 on RGGs.
These high success ratios are facilitated by the ability to react fast
to a changing environment due to the pheromone placement.
In contrast to that, flooding-based communication overlays
achieve only a success ratio of 0.60–0.65 on social networks, a
success ratio of 0.54–0.59 on random networks, and a success
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Figure 41: Success ratio srRt(Ot) of overlays under churn over time. Within
the blue highlighted interval, subjects may leave the system; the
dashed line marks the end of the initial overlay establishment.
ratio of 0.48–0.52 on RGGs. Even when being able to be recon-
nected, recipients have to perform their search for the communi-
cation overlay Ot, the sender s, or recipients r every time from
scratch without utilization of previously established knowledge.
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Figure 42: Success ratio srRt(Ot) of overlays after 10,000 rounds under churn.
As the ratio is constantly over 0.5, the y-axis is limited to [0.5, 1.0] to
highlight the relative differences.
Figure 42 visualizes the success ratios for varied durations of
Phase 1 on social networks. Table 18 reports the respective suc-
cess ratios on all inspected networks. Both show that the suc-
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cess ratios of the ACO-based communication overlays are in-
dependent from the duration phase1dur for which recipients
emit agents and consistently significantly higher than on con-
ventional overlays.
Table 18: Success Ratio under churn after 10,000 rounds.
Network phase1dur ACO Flooding
social
200 0.8936 0.6236
500 0.8976 0.6520
1,000 0.8920 0.5996
random4
200 0.8688 0.5768
500 0.8254 0.5880
1,000 0.7979 0.5428
RGG
200 0.8778 0.5184
500 0.8850 0.5008
1,000 0.8743 0.4800
communication overlay weight Leaving subjects may
cause disruptions in a communication overlay; to keep up the
success ratio and to keep the recipients connected to their com-
munication overlay, the ACO-based overlay establishment mech-
anism has to establish a path around the disruption. The overlay
weight, i.e., the number of connections in the communication
overlay, is therefore expected to increase. Figure 43 visualizes
the overlay weight on social networks over the time. It shows
that the overlay weight is only slightly increasing. The densely
connected core of the social network enables the ACO mech-
anism only moderately to increase the overlay weight. For that,
the agents can explore the dense core to establish “nearby” paths
around the disruption which avoid a steep increase of the over-
lay weight.
Neither random networks nor RGGs provide such a densely
connected core. While the ACO mechanism establishes still over-
lays with comparable success ratios, the overlay weight is in-
creasing more severely.
The overlay weight on conventional flooding-based communi-
cation overlays is decreasing as churn removes parts of the over-
lay where the recipients cannot not recover from as reported in
the analysis of the success ratio before.
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Figure 43: Weight wE(Ot) of overlays under churn over time. Within the blue
highlighted interval, subjects may leave the system; the dashed line
marks the end of the initial overlay establishment.
Table 19 summarizes the weights wE(Ot) of the established
overlays; for the comparison, the overlay weights of the corre-
sponding networks without influence of churn (see Section 4.4.5)
are included. Also, the weights of the flooding-based overlays
are included for completeness.
Table 19: Overlay Weight wE(Ot) under Churn after 10,000 rounds.
Flooding-based overlays are included for completeness even though they
miss to connect 40%–50% recipients.
Network ACO without Churn
(Section 4.4.5)
Flooding
social 64.08 62.2 (+3.04%) 47.3600
random4 107.44 90.93 (+18.16%) 73.3200
RGG 105.39 59.83 (+76.15%) 70.5600
communication delay Churn causes the overlay weight
wE(Ot) to increase; the increasing number of connections can
result in an increasing communication delay cdavg(Ot) which is
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caused by longer path lengths between sender and recipients in
a communication overlay.
Figure 44 visualizes the average path length between senders
and recipients in an overlay under churn over time. As such,
it depicts that the average path length between sender and re-
cipients is unstable under churn, i.e., the paths between sender
and recipients change frequently. The effect is similar to the over-
lay weight wRt(Ot): on social networks, the communication de-
lay cdavg(Ot) remains of stable order (even though shaky over
time). On random networks and on RGGs, communication delay
cdavg(Ot) increases by 2–4 hops.
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Figure 44: Average path length apl between the sender and a recipient. Within
the blue highlighted interval, subjects may leave the system; the
dashed line marks the end of the initial overlay establishment.
Table 20 summarizes the communication delay cdavg(Ot) un-
der churn after 10,000 rounds. for the comparison, the communi-
cation delay cdavg(Ot) of the corresponding networks without
influence of churn (see Section 4.4.6) are included. Also, the com-
munication delay cdavg(Ot) of the flooding-based overlays are
included for completeness.
leaf subjects Under churn, subjects have to react to leaving
subjects by establishing alternative paths between senders and
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Table 20: Communication Delay cdavg(Ot) under Churn after 10,000 rounds.
Flooding-based overlays are included for completeness even though they
miss to connect 40%–50% recipients.
Network ACO without Churn
(Section 4.4.5)
Flooding
social 5.92 5.3 (+11.70%) 4.61
random4 8.23 6.23 (+31.10%) 5.85
RGG 12.25 8.6 (+42.44%) 6.50
recipients. As the ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism
aggregates paths, it is likely that the number of leaf subjects
ls(Ot) changes when new paths are formed.
As such, the number of leaf subjects ls(Ot) under churn is
an indicator for the instability of the communication. Figure 45
visualizes the number of leaf subjects ls(Ot) on social networks
under churn over the time. The drop of the number of leaf sub-
jects when churn is activated is caused by the many subjects that
leave the system; during the time interval in which subjects may
leave the system, the number of leaf subjects is shaky but stable
in its order. When the overlay stabilizes as soon as there are no
more disruptions, the number of leaf subjects stabilizes as well.
The increasing difference between the number of leaf sub-
jects on ACO-based overlays and the number of leaf subjects on
flooding-based overlays can be explained by the different behav-
ior of the overlay establishment mechanisms. The ACO mecha-
nism utilizes pheromones from previous overlay establishment
phases to find the sender quickly. As a result of that, the paths
are likely to be shared. As only churn-affected recipient return
into the overlay establishment phase, only these recipients emit
agents—therefore, only these can connect themselves to other
recipients which will only occur if they directly “find” another
recipient. As a result of this, the number of leaf subjects remains
reasonably high. The steep drop of the number of leaf subjects
on flooding-based overlay is caused by the massive number of re-
cipients that remain unconnected from the communication over-
lay.
Table 21 summarizes the number of leaf subjects under churn
after 10,000 rounds. for the comparison, the number of leaf sub-
jects of the corresponding networks without influence of churn
(see Section 4.4.6) are included. Also, the number of leaf subjects
of the flooding-based overlays are included for completeness.
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Figure 45: Number of recipients in leaf positions ls(Ot) in a churn affected
communication overlay. Within the blue highlighted interval, sub-
jects may leave the system; the dashed line marks the end of the
initial overlay establishment.
Table 21: Number of leaf subjects ls(Ot) under Churn after 10,000 rounds.
Flooding-based overlays are included for completeness even though they
miss to connect 40%–50% recipients.
Network ACO without Churn
(Section 4.4.5)
Flooding
social 25.96 28.34 (-8.40%) 18.52
random4 24.48 26.07 (-6.10%) 16.88
RGG 16.22 13.28 (-22.14%) 14.92
summary ACO-based communication overlays improve the
recipient success ratio over state of the art flooding-based over-
lays and provide a functional communication overlay Ot for
about 90% the recipients. Even when facing immense subject
churn, the communication delay and communication overhead
remain in the same order of magnitude.
However, frequent leave and fail events require a continuous
exchange of routing information. The next section will discuss
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how to share this routing information in the tension of efficiency
and anonymity.
5.3 routing with consideration of efficiency and
anonymity
Routing of messages between senders s ∈ St and recipients
r ∈ Rt requires information about the overlay structure Ot. With
the inherent need of information to achieve successful and effi-
cient transmission of messages, routing is obviously in tension
between the conflicting goals of efficiency and anonymity. Sim-
ply put, the more available information, the higher the efficiency;
the less information available, the better the anonymity.
In this section, first, the concept of routing is discussed in the
light of this tension of efficiency and anonymity. After that, four
possible approaches to routing are introduced, followed by a
qualitative evaluation of the routing information exchange mech-
anisms.
5.3.1 Concept of Routing in the Tension
Routing enables the communication system to transmit mes-
sages between senders s ∈ St and recipients r ∈ Rt. All sub-
jects share routing information during the overlay establishment.
After overlay establishment, this information is memorized and
either available at intermediate subjects that have to relay mes-
sages or included in the messages itself.
However, the amount of information available for routing en-
ables a trade-off between efficiency and anonymity. More infor-
mation enables efficient routing, i.e., provides optimal decisions
for the forwarding of messages by subjects, at the cost of provid-
ing more information to an adversary A. Routing information
encompasses structural properties of the communication system,
i.e., information about senders, recipients, and brokers. Using
this information, an adversary A can reduce the anonymity sets
by excluding subjects from the anonymity set and collecting ev-
idence that increases their probability of identifying senders or
recipients. Reducing information that is used—and shared—for
routing limits the evidence that an adversary A can learn; the
system improves the anonymity protection. However, by reduc-
ing the routing information, subjects are no longer able to make
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optimal—or near optimal—decisions as necessary information
is missing.
Naturally, by distributing functionality and responsibility to
the subjects in a P2P manner, the available knowledge of each
participant is restricted to a local view—if the information is not
further exchanged and accumulated. Routing in the tension of
efficiency and anonymity aims at providing enough information
to achieve routing with reasonable efficiency while still prevent-
ing an adversary A from gaining additional knowledge.
5.3.2 Adversary Model for Analyzing Information Leaks of Routing
Information Exchange Mechanisms
In the previous Chapter 4 and the previous Section 5.2, a global
adversary Ap,g (see Section 2.3) was used. This Ap,g adver-
sary resembles a strong adversary, for example, the service
provider. In this analysis of mechanism for exchanging routing
information, a different adversary instantiation is appropriate.
The global adversary Ap,g is not depending on collecting evi-
dence from routing information; they can trace messages directly
on the network and obtain the same—or even more—evidence
directly. However, a locally restricted adversary A_,l (see Sec-
tion 2.3) is not able to trace messages from this global perspec-
tive, yet, they may be able to collect evidence from leaked in-
formation from the routing information. Thus, the evaluation
of mechanism for routing information exchange focusses on the
analysis of a limited adversary A_,l.
5.3.3 Four Methods to Exchange Routing Information
Routing information is usually distributed using one of two
mechanisms. First, routing information can be included in the
message itself. Every subject checks the respective information to
decide the to which neighbor the message is forwarded. While
this mechanism is inherently simple, adversaries A can also ob-
tain the routing information if they handle a message. Second,
routing information can be maintained by the subjects themselves
by establishing local routing tables. The messages itself are then
only equipped with a topic and a message-id to enable subjects
checking their local routing tables and determine the next hop
for the message.
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Figure 46: Communication system, using the exemplary scenario depicted in
Figure 8: One sender (4; blue), four recipients (1, 5, 8, and 9; orange),
and three brokers (2, 6, 8)
Research Question 12 How can routing be established with the con-
flicting optimization goals efficiency and anonymity? What is the trade-
off between both and can it be controlled?
Based on the topology used in Figure 8 in Section 2.2, the eval-
uation in this section is using the topology shown in Figure 46.
Derived from this topology, the required routing information for
the overlay Ot is visualized in Figure 46b. In this example, sub-
ject 4 is the sender, subjects 1, 5, 8, and 9 are recipients, and
subjects 2, 6, and 7 are brokers.
The following sections introduce four variants of routing in-
formation exchange, namely successor lists, successor lists with
multi-layered encryption, Bloom filter-contained routing infor-
mation, and distributed routing tables.
5.3.3.1 Successor Lists
Using successor lists, routing information is included in commu-
nication messages as an encrypted list of subject-ids. The encryp-
tion is based on a system-wide shared key to prevent subjects
outside of the system from obtaining the routing information.
When forwarding a message using this technique, subjects
check the routing information, i.e., check the successor list, that
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is embedded in the message for the next hop(s), i.e., for their suc-
cessor(s) in the communication overlay. The successor list that is
included in the messages is being collected during the overlay
establishment, for instance, in Phase 3 of the ACO-based overlay
establishment (see Section 4.3.5).
In the exemplary scenario given in Figure 46, the message is
sent from sender s = 4 to the recipients r ∈ Rt = {1, 5, 8, 9}; thus,
the list of routing information looks like the following list, where
junctions are indicated by curly braces:
path = ({(2, 1), (5, 6, {(7, 8), (9)})})
Each subject strips unnecessary information from this succes-
sor list, for example, their own id and the alternative path in case
of junctions. In the example, subject 4 would duplicate the mes-
sage and include (2, 1) and (5, 6, {(7, 8), (9)}) respectively before
forwarding the message to subjects 2 and 5.
Example 23: The routing information included for the succeeding trans-
mission steps in the given example scenario (see Figure 46) are as fol-
lows:
1. round
4 → 2 : path = (2 , 1)
4 → 5 : path = (5 , 6 , {(7 , 8) , (9)})
2. round
2 → 1 : path = (1)
5 → 6 : path = (6 , {(7 , 8) , (9)})
3. round
6 → 7 : path = (7 , 8)
6 → 9 : path = (9)
4. round
7 → 8 : path = (8)
Proposition 9 Successor lists disseminate topological information us-
ing plain lists of subject-ids. They minimize overhead by avoiding ad-
ditional protection measures and ensure routing in the limits of the
overlay establishment mechanism.
efficiency Using successor lists, senders include all routing
information in the messages. For that, senders save the lists with
routing information and have, thus, to provide enough memory
for the lists. The necessary memory equals the size the addresses
|v.address| that are used for the subjects, for example, 128 bit
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for an IPv6 address, times the number of subjects of which the
addresses have to be included:
s.mem = |Vt| · |v.address|− |v.address| (26)
The communication overhead is defined by the path length
succeeding each subject; therefore, the upper limit of the commu-
nication overhead is equal to s.memory. The average communica-
tion overhead is defined by the apl of the communication overlay
apl(Ot) times the address size:
comoh = apl(Ot) · |v.address| (27)
anonymity As the successor list contains clear routing infor-
mation, the adversary A_,l can easily derive the structure of the
following parts of the communication overlay.
• Dissemination paths and participants in Ot: The adversary
A_,l learns the message path that is subsequent to the ad-
versary A_,l. However, based on the routing information,
the adversary A_,l is not able to distinguish brokers and
recipients (except in the following case of subjects in leaf-
position).
• Leaf-subjects: Subjects in leaf-positions are exposed as recip-
ients. Following from the model (see Section 2.2.1), subjects
only join a communication overlay, if they are senders or re-
cipients, or are required to relay messages. Thus, subjects
in leaf-positions are recipients by design. Additional pro-
tection measures can relax this requirement and add usual
subjects in leaf positions to the overlay.
With the recipient protection mechanisms (Probabilistic For-
warding and Shell Game [37]; details for both mechanisms are
discussed in Section 6.3 in the context of sender and recipient
protection) in place, the probability of correctly identifying leaf
subjects can be reduced below 0.5. The adversary A_,l cannot de-
termine the identification probability for subjects located in in-
ner positions of the communication overlay Ot without utilizing
additional knowledge. Equation (28) formalizes the probability
of an adversary A_,l identifying a subject v as a recipient based
on the information in a successor list. For subjects at the end of
the included paths, the probability is less or equal to 0.5 if the re-
cipient protection measures were applied. For the other subjects,
an adversary A_,l cannot provide a conclusive answer.
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p
v
?∈Rt
=
6 0.5, d−(v) = 0?, otherwise (28)
The adversary A cannot learn information about subjects be-
yond the direct predecessor. This is caused by the efficiency im-
proving removal of unnecessary ids from the successor list. Thus,
the adversary A_,l cannot learn whether the immediate prede-
cessor is the sender or a broker without using additional knowl-
edge, such as another controlled subject on the preceding part
of the communication overlay.
5.3.3.2 Successor Lists with Multi-Layer Encryption
Using multi-layered encryption, the routing information is en-
crypted similarly as in OR [62, 124] and mix networks [23]. Each
subject on the path can decrypt a single layer of encryption, i.e.,
can access the very next hop. For that, every subject agrees on a
key with each of its neighbors (symmetric encryption) or estab-
lishes a public-private key pair and shares the public key with
its neighbors (public-key encryption)—the respective keys are
then used to encrypt the routing information such that the next
subject can access the very next hop.
The encrypted routing information are collected during the
overlay establishment, for example in Phase 3 of the ACO mech-
anism (see Section 4.3.5). For that, subjects perform the following
steps:
1. create routing information block rivi
a) recipients: include own id.
b) brokers bi: include own id and received encrypted
(with kbi) routing information block. Merge multiple
received routing information blocks if necessary.
2. forward to next subject towards sender.
Recipients that receive routing information, i.e., recipients that
are also brokers, follow also step 1.b) and merge their routing in-
formations as well. The merged encrypted routing information
do not reveal whether there is a junction, i.e., there are multi-
ple (partially) disjoint paths included, or just a single but longer
path; thus, brokers cannot learn the topology beyond their di-
rect neighbors. The merging, however, requires subjects to cache
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their routing information blocks. The routing itself is also pos-
sible without merging but leaks information about the disjoint
paths.
Figure 47 and Example 24 exemplify the how the routing infor-
mation for the example overlay in Figure 46 will look like. The
respective encryption keys are noted with kx where x denotes
the respective subject-id.
4 2 
k4
1
k2
5 
k4
6 
k5
9
k6
7
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8k7
Figure 47: The routing information from the example in Figure 46 using suc-
cessor lists with multi-layer encryption.
Example 24: The routing information in Figure 47 are established step-
wise as follows:
1. round
8 : ri8 = enck7 (8); forward to subject 7.
2. round
7 : ri7 = enck6 (7 , enck7 (8)); forward to subject 6.
9 : ri9 = enck6 (9); forward to subject 6.
3. round
6 : merge ri7 and ri9 ;
ri6 = enck5 (6 , enck6 (7 , enck7 (8) ; 9));
forward to subject 7.
1 : ri1 = enck2 (1); forward to subject 2.
4. round
5 : ri5 = enck4 (5 , enck5 (6 , enck6 (7 , enck7 (8) ; 9)));
forward to subject 4.
2 : ri2 = enck4 (2 , enck2 (1)); forward to subject 4.
5. round
4 : store ri5 and ri2 to include both in messages towards recip-
ients in Ot .
The sender will use the received routing information block
and include it in all messages that are emitted for the respec-
tive overlay. When relaying messages, subjects will decrypt their
respective layer and can access the next hop. If a subject has
to duplicate the message and forward it to two (or more) sub-
jects, it will find multiple encrypted routing blocks and copies
the message accordingly. As in the successor list-based mecha-
nism, subjects will only include necessary routing information,
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i.e., will remove their own id and routing information of other
branches.
Proposition 10 Multi-layered encryption provides a trade-off be-
tween efficiency and anonymity by enabling routing (in the limits of
the overlay establishment mechanism) with protected routing informa-
tion where each subject can only see the direct predecessor and direct
successors.
The encryption itself is based upon symmetric encryption
using AES with 128 bit key length, which is, according to
ENISA [50], assumed to be sufficient for at least ten years. There-
fore, the blocksize encblocksize is also 128 bit.
efficiency Successor lists with multi-layer encryption re-
quire memory at every subject v for the key storage, here, for
each key is a memory of 128 bit necessary. The memory require-
ment of each subject is therefore determined by the key size and
number of neighbors, on average the required memory is:
v.mem = |sk(v,vk)| · d(v) (29)
To encrypt their id, subjects have to fill a complete encryption
block by the requirements of symmetric encryption if necessary
they have to add padding to the id. Each encrypted id adds there-
fore d|v.address|/encblocksizee · encblocksize bits to the routing
information.
Example 25: Using with IPv6 addresses, no additional overhead due to
padding arises as the size of the IPv6 addresses (128 bit) matches the
blocksize of AES (encblocksize=128 bit). In contrast, when using IPv4
addresses, the id requires only 32 bit. Therefore, each id will be padded
to match the 128 bit block size; each id results in an 128 bit cipher text.
id (size) SL Entry Size
SL w. MLE IPv6 (128 bit) (d128 bit/128 bite · 128 bit) = 128 bit
IPv4 (32 bit) (d32 bit/128 bite · 128 bit) = 128 bit
The sender has also to save the whole list with routing infor-
mation; thus, the sender has to provide additionally:
s.mem = vl.mem+
Vt · (d|vl.address|/encblocksizee · encblocksize)
(30)
5.3 routing with consideration of efficiency and anonymity 151
Similar to pure successor lists, the communication overhead
induced by successor lists with multi-layer encryption on sub-
jects depends on the length of the following path. This com-
munication overhead, in comparison to pure successor lists, is
increased by the necessary padding:
comoh = apl(Ot)·
(d|vl.address|/encblocksizee · encblocksize)
(31)
anonymity When the successor list is encrypted with multi-
layered encryption, the adversary A_,l is no longer able to de-
crypt the whole list of succeeding subject ids.
Using the encrypted successor list, the adversary A_,l, never-
theless, can learn the following information:
• Size of the succeeding paths in Ot: The adversary A_,l can
use the knowledge about the identifier size to estimate the
number of subjects numof(id) being contained in the en-
crypted successor list SLenc, as formalized by Equation (32)
numof(id) = sizeof(SLenc)/sizeof(idenc) (32)
where SLenc denotes the encrypted successor list.
Using the size estimation of Equation (32), the adversary A_,l
is obviously able to identify subjects in leaf positions if the A_,l is
the direct predecessor of the leaf subject. For the other subjects,
an adversary A_,l is not able to provide a conclusive answer as
they cannot even decide whether a specific subject is part of the
communication overlay. Equation (33) formalizes the probability
of an adversary of identifying a subject v as recipient given that
the recipient protection measures were applied.
p
v
?∈Rt
=
6 0.5, sizeof(SLv) ≈ 0?, otherwise (33)
Here, SLv denotes the encrypted (and thus not accessible) re-
maining part of the successor list that is forwarded towards sub-
ject v—depending on the implementation, this part may be actu-
ally non-existent, which leads to the same conclusion.
In contrast to the successor lists described before, this mecha-
nism using multi-layer encryption prevents the adversary from
learning about junctions in the communication overlayOt where
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messages are duplicated and send towards different paths. Con-
sidering the example given in Figure 46, an adversary is not able
to distinguish a straight path, for instance, provided by (2–1),
from a junction, for example, given by {7, 9}, if the number of
subjects in the considered part of the communication overlay Ot
is equal.
Similar to the successor lists without multi-layered encryption,
subjects remove their ids to improve efficiency. As a result of
this, an adversary A cannot learn information about preceding
parts of the communication overlay Ot, and, thus, the sender of
a message.
5.3.3.3 Vt contained in Bloom Filters
Bloom filters [16, 57] (see Section 2.2.7) can be used to enable the
dissemination of routing information. In contrast to the other
mechanisms (successor lists (with multi-layer encryption) and
distributed routing tables), Bloom filter-based routing is based
on a probabilistic data structure. Thus, the occurrence of false-
positives in the evaluation of the Bloom filter may lead to sub-
jects receiving messages—or relaying messages—even though
they are not involved in the communication overlay Ot.
During the overlay establishment, subjects interested in receiv-
ing information (the recipients) are including themselves in a
Bloom filter and forward the Bloom filter towards the senders.
Brokers relay the Bloom filter after including their ids—and, if
they are junctions in the communication overlay, merging the
Bloom filters as described in Section 2.2.7 using the or operation
to combine two Bloom filters1 bfl and bfr to the resulting Bloom
filter bfm:
bfm[i] =
1, if bfl[i] = 1 or bfr[i] = 1
0, otherwise
Senders will include the established Bloom filter in all mes-
sages. Subjects will check if the ids of their neighbors are in-
cluded in the Bloom filter, and forward the message to all neigh-
bors that are contained in the Bloom filter.
If appropriately configured (see Section 2.2.7), false positive
hits are in the worst case “as configured” and falsely forwarded
1 More than two Bloom filters are merged by applying the or-operator on all
Bloom filters that are to be merged.
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messages stop after only a few unnecessary hops eventually. Ex-
ample 26 shows probabilities of messages that are relayed due
to consecutive false positive evaluations; it is assumed that the
fill level of the Bloom filter is at maximum as high as chosen
in the configuration, i.e., the probability of false positives is as
expected.
Example 26: Let the Bloom filter be configured to have a false positive
probability of pfp = 0.1 and 0.01 the average outgoing degree is d− = 4.
The probability of having n consecutive false positive hits is (pfp ·d−)n
Consec. False Pos. pfp = 0.1 pfp = 0.01
n=1 0.41 = 0.4 0.041 = 0.04
n=2 0.42 = 0.16 0.042 = 0.0016
n=3 0.43 = 0.064 0.043 = 0.000064
n=4 0.44 = 0.0256 0.044 = 2.56e−6
n=5 0.45 = 0.01024 0.045 = 1.024e−7
Proposition 11 Bloom filters enable successful routing by providing
the subject-ids that are included in the communication overlay. As such,
Bloom filters require constant space and provide efficient communica-
tion if configured appropriately. Bloom filters provide anonymity due
to the non-invertible property of the used hash functions.
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Figure 48: Bloom filter-based routing information with merging of Bloom fil-
ters at subject 6; Subjects 7 and 8 are hashed into bfl; subject 9 is
hashed into bfr. Subject 6 merges both bfl and bfr to establish bfm
and hashes their own id.
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efficiency Using Bloom filters, subjects add their id to a
Bloom filter when they receive such a Bloom filter during overlay
establishment. To establish these Bloom filters, recipients create
a Bloom filter and forward it to their predecessor. Intermediate
junction-subjects merge the Bloom filters received in the same
round; otherwise, they will simply forward the Bloom filter; bro-
kers and recipients do not store the Bloom filters. Senders merge
all received Bloom filters and create the Bloom filter that com-
prises all necessary routing information to relay messages to all
connected recipients.
The Bloom filter configuration determines the expectable rate
of false positives; the probability of false positive depends on the
number of hash functions, the size of the Bloom filter, and the
number of entries added to the Bloom filter. The configured size
of the Bloom filter depends on the number of expected subjects
that are required to establish the communication overlay—and,
thus, their ids are added to the Bloom filter.
For the estimation of mbf, an aggressive strategy can be used
that directly estimates |Vt| to derive the necessary Bloom filter
size mbf, for example, by using precomputed tables as given
in Table C.30. A more conservative strategy adds a buffer to the
estimate before deriving mbf and not use the estimated size of
Vt directly. The size of this buffer depends on the impact of in-
creased communication overhead on the system; if the system is
sensitive to communication overhead, the size mbf of the Bloom
filter may even be estimated using V instead of Vt.
With that, the configuration also determines the memory de-
mand and communication overhead.
The memory demand differs between senders and the other
subjects. Only senders s ∈ St have to store the Bloom filter:
v.mem =
mbf, v = s ∈ St
0, otherwise
(34)
The communication overhead is stable with the sizembf of the
Bloom filter as the Bloom filter is not flexible and depending on
the actual number of added ids. Even though some Bloom filter
variants (for example, Fan et al. [57]) enable deletion of entries,
the size mbf of the Bloom filter itself does not change.
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Example 27: Using an exemplary Bloom filter configuration with three
hash functions, communication overlay sizes |Vt| of 8 (see example in
Figure 46) and 60 (see communication overlay sizes in Section 4.4.5),
and acceptable false positive probabilities pfp of 0.1 and 0.01, the Bloom
filter has to have the following sizes. In this example, the conservative
strategy adds a buffer of 30%.
nbf estimation pfp = 0.1 pfp = 0.01
aggressive
Vt = 8 40 bit 104 bit
Vt = 60 300 bit 780 bit
conservative
Vt = 8 · 1.3 = 11 55 bit 143 bit
Vt = 60 · 1.3 = 78 390 bit 1, 014 bit
A precomputed table of Bloom filter sizes, added entries, the number
of hash functions and the resulting false positive probabilities is given
in Appendix C.
anonymity Including the subject ids in a Bloom filter pre-
vents the adversary A_,l from learning structural information
about Ot. If the adversary A_,l is aware of the id-space, they
are able to check the ids using brute force; this, however, also
yields the blur of false positive hits.
When evaluating the routing information contained in the
Bloom filter, the adversary A_,l can learn the following informa-
tion:
• Subjects Vt of Ot: By evaluating the routing information us-
ing brute force, the adversary A_,l can derive Vt. However,
the connections Et are not derivable using this technique
and are, therefore, out of reach of such an adversary A_,l
without access to additional information, for example, a
global view on the system.
• Sender s: The adversary A_,l can identify a sender s relying
on strong assumptions:
1. The sender s does not include their id to the Bloom
filter and
2. The adversary A is a direct successor of the sender s.
If both requirements are fulfilled, the adversary A_,l can
learn that the id of their predecessor is not included in the
Bloom filter, even though the subject handled the message.
Accounting for the false positive probability, the adversary
156 routing with the tension of efficiency, anonymity, and churn
A_,l learns that their predecessor v is sender swith p
v
?∈St
=
1− pfp.
Beyond this information, an adversary A_,l is not able to learn
additional information about the communication overlay Ot.
5.3.3.4 Subjects maintaining Distributed Lookup Tables
Distributed lookup tables enable subjects to act as brokers with-
out having routing information, besides a topic-id and message-
id, included in the messages. Using lookup tables, subjects main-
tain their own limited view of the system and the overlay.
Subjects add successors and predecessor to their local lookup
table when the subject learns about a topic and the respective in-
terests of sending or receiving messages for this topic. These ta-
bles manifest the distributed knowledge on the topological struc-
ture of the communication overlay.
Senders s include the topic identifier t in each message that
they disseminate in the communication overlay Ot. Upon receiv-
ing a message, subjects try to map the included topic identifier
to their neighbors using their local lookup table. The message is
then relayed to all entries that match the topic identifier.
Example 28: Subjects 4 and 6 maintain the following routing tables, for
the specified topic t (see Figure 46) and the additional, not further spec-
ified topic t2.
Topic Direction v = 4 Topic Direction v = 6
t
Pre {}
t
Pre {5}
Suc {2,5} Suc {7,9}
t2
Pre {5}
t2
Pre {5}
Suc {} Suc {7}
Proposition 12 Distributed lookup tables establish routing informa-
tion by memorizing successors and predecessors at the subjects itself.
Routing information do not need to be included in messages, yet, shared
knowledge ensures successful routing, while improving anonymity as
information is not repeatedly spread in the system.
efficiency Using distributed lookup tables, subjects keep
the routing information locally; messages are associated with
communication overlays by including the topic identifier t.
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During the overlay establishment, subjects establish their rout-
ing tables by storing topic identifiers t with their respective pre-
decessors and successors to be able to relay messages. With that,
the memory demand of each subject is bound by the number of
direct neighbors and the number of topics in T :
v.memmax = d−(v) · |v.address| · |T | (35)
As messages do not include routing information, the commu-
nication overhead is determined by the size of the topic identifier
itself:
comoh = |ti| (36)
There is no differentiation of requirements for different roles
necessary; all subjects have to maintain the routing information
based on their neighborhood.
anonymity With distributed lookup tables, all subjects keep
their routing information locally. The adversary A_,l is not able
to learn information from these tables as they are not intended
to be shared.
Without additional information about the communication
overlay Ot, the adversary A_,l cannot even identify leaf-subjects
when they are directly adjacent to the adversary.
5.3.4 Qualitative Discussion of Routing Information Exchanges
This section analyzes the different routing information exchange
mechanisms in detail using a detailed qualitative discussion. The
discussion focusses on the adversary presented in 5.3.2. First,
efficiency is discussed from the perspective of communication
overhead in message size as well as memory overhead at the
subjects. Second, the influence on anonymity is discussed by an-
alyzing the information leakage towards the adversary.
5.3.4.1 Efficiency: Communication & Memory Overhead
Efficiency depends on the characteristics of the specific mech-
anisms to exchange routing information but may also depend
on the properties of the system. For that, this section discusses
the communication and memory overhead for three exemplary
system manifestations:
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1. (EX) Example given in Figure 46
• |V|=9, |Rt|=4, |Vt|=8
• apl(Ot)=3, d(v)=2.4
2. (SOC-F) Social network with few recipients, based on Sec-
tion 4.4.4.2 with rr = 0.015
• |V|=2, 000, |Rt|≈30, |Vt|≈62
• apl(Ot)=5, d(v)=4
3. (SOC-M) Social network with many recipients, based on Sec-
tion 4.4.4.2 with rr = 0.05
• |V|=2, 000, |Rt|≈100, |Vt|≈161
• apl(Ot)=6, d(v)=4
4. (SOC2-F) Larger social network with few recipients, based on
Section 4.4.1 with V = 4, 000 and rr = 0.0075
• |V|=4, 000, |Rt|≈30, |Vt|≈70
• apl(Ot)=6, d(v)=4
5. (SOC2-M) Larger social network with many recipients, based
on Section 4.4.4.2 with V = 4, 000 and rr = 0.025
• |V|=4, 000, |Rt|≈100, |Vt|≈181
• apl(Ot)=6, d(v)=4
The remaining relevant properties are assumed to be:
• IPv6 as ids: |v.address| = 128 bit
• Bloom filter: pfp = 0.01; kbf = 3
• |t| = 12 bit; |T |max = 4, 096
communication overhead
• Successor lists do not add additional information beyond
the plain ids. Using Equation (27) (comoh = apl(Ot) ∗
|v.address|), the following communication overheads re-
sult for the five example networks:
1. comEXoh = 1.5 · 128 bit = 192 bit
2. comSOC−Foh = 2.5 · 128 bit = 320 bit
3. comSOC−Moh = 3 · 128 bit = 384 bit
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4. comSOC2−Foh = 3 · 128 bit = 384 bit
5. comSOC2−Moh = 3 · 128 bit = 384 bit
• Successor lists with multi-layer encryption add padding
through the encryption of the ids and may, therefore, add
further overhead. Using Equation (31) (comoh = apl(Ot) ·
(d|vl.address|/encblocksizee ·encblocksize)), the following
communication overheads result for the five example net-
works:
1. comEXoh = 1.5·(d128 bit/128 bite·128 bit)=192 bit
2. comSOC−Foh = 2.5·(d128 bit/128 bite·128 bit)=320 bit
3. comSOC−Moh = 3·(d128 bit/128 bite·128 bit)=384 bit
4. comSOC2−Foh = 3·(d128 bit/128 bite·128 bit)=384 bit
5. comSOC2−Moh = 3·(d128 bit/128 bite·128 bit)=384 bit
• Bloom filters are configured with an expectation of the re-
quired size to meet a specific false positive probability (see
Section 2.2.7); the size of a Bloom filter remains stable inde-
pendent from the number of added entries. For the aggres-
sive strategy, which configures the size of the Bloom filter
with the size of the overlay directly, the following commu-
nication overhead result for the five example networks:
1. comEXoh = 104 bit
2. comSOC−Foh = 806 bit
3. comSOC−Moh = 2, 093 bit
4. comSOC2−Foh = 910 bit
5. comSOC2−Moh = 2, 353 bit
For the conservative strategy, which configures the size of
the Bloom filter with the size of the overlay and adds 30%
buffer, the following communication overhead result for
the five example networks:
1. comEXoh = 143 bit
2. comSOC−Foh = 1, 053 bit
3. comSOC−Moh = 2, 730 bit
4. comSOC2−Foh = 1, 183 bit
5. comSOC2−Moh = 3, 059 bit
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• Using distributed lookup tables, subjects keep routing in-
formation locally. To enable the routing, messages carry a
topic identifier ti.
1. comEXoh = 12 bit
2. comSOC−Foh = 12 bit
3. comSOC−Moh = 12 bit
4. comSOC2−Foh = 12 bit
5. comSOC2−Moh = 12 bit
memory overhead
• Successor lists are stored at the senders s; other subjects v
are not required to hold memory. Therefore, the memory
requirements for usual subjects v.mem for the three exam-
ple networks are:
1. v.memEX = 0 bit
2. v.memSOC−F = 0 bit
3. v.memSOC−M = 0 bit
4. v.memSOC2−F = 0 bit
5. v.memSOC2−M = 0 bit
As senders have to store the successor list, they have to
hold memory for the list. Their memory requirement can
be derived using Equation (26) (s.mem = Vt · |v.address|−
|v.address|):
1. s.memEX = 8 · 128 bit− 128 bit = 896 bit
2. s.memSOC−F = 62 · 128 bit− 128 bit = 7, 808 bit
3. s.memSOC−M = 161 · 128 bit− 128 bit = 20, 480 bit
4. s.memSOC2−F = 70 · 128 bit− 128 bit = 8, 832 bit
5. s.memSOC2−M = 181 · 128 bit− 128 bit = 23, 040 bit
• Successor lists with multi-layer encryption require subjects
v to establish keys with all neighbors. Using Equation (29)
(v.mem = |sk(v,vk)| · d(v)), the memory requirements for
usual subjects v.mem have to be met for the three example
networks:
1. v.memEX = 2.4 · 128 bit)=307.2 bit
2. v.memSOC−F = 4 · 128 bit)=512 bit
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3. v.memSOC−M = 4 · 128 bit)=512 bit
4. v.memSOC2−F = 4 · 128 bit)=512 bit
5. v.memSOC2−M = 4 · 128 bit)=512 bit
Senders also have to store the encrypted succes-
sor list, their memory requirement can be de-
rived using Equation (30) (s.mem = v.mem + Vt ·
(d|v.address|/encblocksizee · encblocksize)):
1. s.memEX = 307.2 bit + 8 · (d128 bit/128 bite·128 bit) =
1, 344 bit
2. s.memSOC−F = 512 bit + 62 · (d128 bit/128 bite ·
128 bit)=8, 448 bit
3. s.memSOC−M = 512 bit + 161 · (d128 bit/128 bite ·
128 bit)=21, 120 bit
4. s.memSOC2−F = 512 bit + 70 · (d128 bit/128 bite ·
128 bit)=9, 472 bit
5. s.memSOC2−M = 512 bit + 181 · (d128 bit/128 bite ·
128 bit)=23, 680 bit
• Bloom filters are stored only at the sender subjects s; other
subjects v are therefore not required to provide memory:
1. v.memEX = 0 bit
2. v.memSOC−F = 0 bit
3. v.memSOC−M = 0 bit
4. v.memSOC2−F = 0 bit
5. v.memSOC2−M = 0 bit
For the aggressive strategy, senders s have to hold the fol-
lowing memory for the three example networks:
1. s.memEX = 104 bit
2. s.memSOC−F = 806 bit
3. s.memSOC−M = 2, 093 bit
4. s.memSOC2−F = 910 bit
5. s.memSOC2−M = 2, 353 bit
For the conservative strategy, senders s have to hold the fol-
lowing memory for the three example networks:
1. s.memEX = 143 bit
2. s.memSOC−F = 1, 053 bit
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3. s.memSOC−M = 2, 730 bit
4. s.memSOC2−F = 1, 183 bit
5. s.memSOC2−M = 3, 059 bit
• Using distributed lookup tables, subjects have to maintain
their routing information locally. As such, all subjects have
to hold the following memory per topic t ∈ T which is also
described by Equation (35):
1. v.memEX = 2.4 · 128 bit = 307.2 bit
2. v.memSOC−F = 4 · 128 bit = 512 bit
3. v.memSOC−M = 4 · 128 bit = 512 bit
4. v.memSOC2−F = 4 · 128 bit = 512 bit
5. v.memSOC2−M = 4 · 128 bit = 512 bit
Table 22 summarizes the results of the efficiency properties of
the four mechanisms to exchange routing information on the five
exemplary networks. An important finding is that the memory
requirements seem to depend on the size of the communication
overlay but not on the size of the communication system itself.
Only the successor lists with multi-layer encryption and the dis-
tributed lookup tables require all subjects to hold memory—the
memory requirements depend on the size of the neighborhood
of the subjects in the communication system. The size of the
Bloom filters depend on the size of the communication overlay;
larger overlays require larger Bloom filters and therefore more
memory. Smaller Bloom filters still enable routing. However, the
false positive ratio will increase and cause messages that are for-
warded to subjects that are not part of the overlay.
5.3.4.2 Anonymity
The adversary A_,l may collect evidence from the routing infor-
mation that increases their probability of identifying sender and
recipients of a message. Also, the adversary A_,l may be able
to derive the topology of the communication overlay from the
routing information.
sender and recipient identification Section 4.4.6
pointed out that an adversary Ap,g can identify subjects in leaf
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Table 22: Comparison of efficiency properties of routing information exchange
mechanisms.
Measure Network SL SLenc BFaggr. BFcons. DLT
comoh
EX 192 bit 192 bit 104 bit 143 bit 12 bit
SOC-F 320 bit 320 bit 806 bit 1, 053 bit 12 bit
SOC-M 384 bit 384 bit 2, 093 bit 2, 730 bit 12 bit
SOC2-F 384 bit 384 bit 910 bit 1, 183 bit 12 bit
SOC2-M 384 bit 384 bit 2, 353 bit 3, 059 bit 12 bit
v.mem
EX 0 bit 307.2 bit 0 bit 0 bit 307.2 bit
SOC-F 0 bit 512 bit 0 bit 0 bit 512 bit
SOC-M 0 bit 512 bit 0 bit 0 bit 512 bit
SOC2-F 0 bit 512 bit 0 bit 0 bit 512 bit
SOC2-M 0 bit 512 bit 0 bit 0 bit 512 bit
s.mem
EX 896 bit 1, 344 bit 104 bit 143 bit 0 bit
SOC-F 7, 808 bit 8, 448 bit 806 bit 1, 053 bit 0 bit
SOC-M 20, 480 bit 21, 120 bit 2, 093 bit 2, 730 bit 0 bit
SOC2-F 8, 832 bit 9, 472 bit 910 bit 1, 183 bit 0 bit
SOC2-M 23, 040 bit 23, 680 bit 2, 353 bit 3, 059 bit 0 bit
positions as senders or recipients. Even with the recipient pro-
tection measures, for example, shell game and probabilistic for-
warding [37], leaf positions leave evidence. The different mech-
anisms to exchange routing information enable routing differ-
ently; therefore, the leaked information to the adversary A_,l dif-
fers when the routing information is accessed:
• Successor Lists include the routing information in messages
as a list of subject ids. When the adversary A_,l accesses
such a successor list, they can directly derive the leaf po-
sitions by learning the subjects at which the paths in the
successor list end. As a result of this, the adversary A_,l
can collect evidence on recipients in leaf positions.
As subjects remove their own id from the successor list
before forwarding the message, the adversary A_,l can-
not collect evidence beyond their direct predecessor. There-
fore, the adversary A_,l cannot provide a conclusive answer
about the sender of a message.
• Successor Lists with Multi-Layer Encryption include the rout-
ing information as a list of subject ids with multiple layers
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of encryption. As such, the adversary A_,l cannot derive
subject ids beyond their direct neighbors. As a result of
this, the adversary can also no longer collect evidence on
leaf subjects, and therefore the adversary cannot collect ev-
idence on recipients in leaf positions. However, the adver-
sary A_,l is still able to estimate the number of subjects that
follow their direct successor— with this, the adversary A_,l
can, of course, identify immediate successors that do not
further forward the message.
Similar to simple successor lists, subjects strip their own
ids from the successor list. As a result of this, the adver-
sary A_,l cannot collect evidence beyond their direct pre-
decessor. Therefore, the adversary A_,l cannot provide a
conclusive answer about the sender of a message.
• Bloom filter-based routing uses a Bloom filter which con-
tains the subject ids of subjects that participate in the com-
munication overlay. While the adversary A_,l may use a
brute force approach to identify all subjects that participate
in the communication overlay (including possible false pos-
itives), this information does not provide evidence about
leaf positioned recipients.
Similar to the case for recipients, the information about
participation in the overlay itself does not yield evidence
that may enable the adversary A_,l to provide a conclusive
answer about the sender of a message. In an edge case, the
adversary A_,l can identify the sender: the sender has to be
the direct predecessor of the adversary A_,l and must not
hash their own id into the Bloom filter. Then, the adversary
A learns that the Bloom filter does not contain the subject
that sent the message; the only case that allows this is that
the sending subject is the actual sender of the message.
• Distributed Lookup Tables do not distribute any routing infor-
mation using the messages; the knowledge is kept within
the 1-hop neighborhood of a subject. As a result of this,
the adversary A cannot collect any evidence about subjects
that are located behind their direct successors, or predeces-
sors respectively. The adversary A cannot provide a con-
clusive answer about senders or recipients based on the
knowledge of their own distributed lookup table.
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topology learning Learning the topology, i.e., learning
the participants of an overlay and their respective connections
in the overlay, may enable the adversary A_,l to prepare further
attacks even though it might not help to identify sender and
recipients of a message directly.
The mechanisms to exchange routing information leak differ-
ent information about the participants of an overlay and their
respective connections. Obviously, the adversary A_,l is aware
of their direct predecessor as well as of their direct successors.
Beyond that, the information leakage is as follows:
• Successor Lists enable the adversary A_,l to learn the whole
subsequent dissemination tree. As such, the adversary A_,l
learns the ids of all succeeding subjects as well as their
connections in the communication overlay.
Towards the sender of a message, successor lists do not in-
clude any information. As a result of this, the evidence that
the adversary A_,l collects depends strongly on their posi-
tion in the communication overlay—the closer the position
to the sender, the more information is accessible.
• Successor Lists with Multi-Layer Encryption enable the adver-
sary A to estimate the size of the overlay behind their po-
sition. This does, however, not leak information about the
participants or their connections.
• Bloom filters enable the adversary A_,l to check every possi-
ble subject id and thereby derive the ids of the participants
in the overlay. Hereby, the adversary will also learn the
false positives as participants of the communication over-
lay.
The adversary A_,l cannot collect information about the
connections in the overlay as the Bloom filters carry only
subject ids but not information about the order of their
adding or the connections of the subjects.
• Distributed Lookup Tables keep the routing information local
with the subjects; messages carry only the topic id. The ad-
versary A_,l cannot collect any information about the par-
ticipants of the overlay or their connections.
Table 23 summarizes the results of the mechanisms for rout-
ing information exchange with respect to protection of senders
and recipients in leaf positions as well as protection of overlay
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participants and of the respective connections. Bloom filters and
distributed lookup tables have the advantage as they limit the in-
formation leakage by removing all connectivity information or
keeping the information locally at the subjects. Successor lists
with multi-layer encryption leak information about the number
of subjects in the overlay and about recipients in edge cases.
Simple successor lists leak information about recipients in leaf
positions as well as information about the overlay behind the
adversary A_,l.
Table 23: Comparison of efficiency properties of routing information exchange
mechanisms.
Property SL SLenc BF DLT
Sender Protection 3 3 3 3
Recipient Protection 7 ﬂ 3 3
Participant Protection ﬂ 3 7 3
Connection Protection ﬂ 3 3 3
5.3.4.3 Summary
Exchange of routing information is in the tension of the conflict-
ing goals efficiency and anonymity. This section introduced and
discussed four methods, namely successor lists, successor lists
with multi-layer encryption, Bloom filter-based routing informa-
tion, and distributed lookup tables.
Successor lists are an easy mechanism to exchange routing
information. While they are easy to use, their communication
overhead increases with the depth of the communication over-
lay. Similarly, the sender has to hold more memory to store the
successor list when the overlay size increases. By including the
path information into the message, an adversary A_,l can collect
evidence on the subsequent overlay and recipients in leaf posi-
tions.
Successor lists with multi-layer encryption limit the informa-
tion leakage about the subsequent communication overlay. How-
ever, to enable the encryption, subjects have to establish keys
with all direct neighbors. Apart from that, the properties are sim-
ilar to the simple successor lists: the communication overhead
remains stable and depends on the depth of the dissemination
tree; the same holds for the memory requirements of the sender.
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Additionally, to the memory requirements of all subjects, there
is also the computational overhead of the encryption itself.
Bloom filter-based exchange of routing information requires
no memory at subjects in the overlay. The sender has to hold
the memory to store the Bloom filter; the size of the Bloom filter
also defines the communication overhead. The size of the Bloom
filter itself depends on the (estimated) size of the communica-
tion overlay and the acceptable false positive ratio. The Bloom
filter also hides senders, recipients, the connections between the
subjects in the overlay, and the order of their adding. With that,
the adversary A_,l cannot obtain evidence about the senders and
recipients.
Distributed lookup tables maintain the routing information
local at every subject. As a result of this, the memory require-
ments depend on the size of the neighborhood of the subjects
and the number of topics—more specifically on the number of
topics in which a subject is involved. The communication over-
head is constant with the size of the topic id of the message and
is independent of the size of the communication system and the
size of the communication overlay. The adversary A_,l cannot
learn information beyond their direct neighbors as subjects to
not exchange any routing information.
5.4 conclusion
This chapter reasoned about the challenge of dynamic subjects
and routing in the tension between efficiency and anonymity.
For that, this chapter presented and discussed mechanisms of
the novel ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism that fa-
cilitated the establishment of communication in dynamic envi-
ronments with leaving and joining subjects. After that, an in-
depth discussion of different mechanisms to exchange routing
information is described.
Dynamic subjects, i.e., subjects that may leave, fail, and join
(churn) the communication system at any point in time, require
mechanisms to handle disruptions in communication overlays.
The temporal behavior of subjects is described using long-tailed
distributions, e.g., the Weibull distribution [66, 137]. Defining
session durations and intersession times of subjects according
to a Weibull distribution, a simulation study with dynamic sub-
jects was performed to show that the utilization of pheromones
to decrease the reconnection time of subjects in the system to
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the communication overlay. The simulation study has shown
that the ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism with its
techniques to counter disruptions can provide higher reliability
towards the active subjects in a communication compared to tra-
ditional flooding-based shortest path communication overlays.
Subject churn requires frequent exchanges of routing informa-
tion. This information exchange reveals the tension between ef-
ficiency and anonymity. The more information is available to
subjects, the better the routing decisions; as a result of these bet-
ter routing decisions, the efficiency is improved. However, these
efficiency improvements impede anonymity. The available infor-
mation has to be assumed to be available to an adversary A, and,
as a result of this leaks information to identify active subjects.
Besides the information leakage, also the communication over-
head due to the amount of shared routing information and the
memory overhead to store the shared routing information have
to be considered. The appropriate routing information exchange
mechanism strongly depends on the application scenario. In a
computer- or smartphone-based application scenario, memory
as well as connection are usually no limiting factors and provide
more freedom to vary the routing information exchange mech-
anism. In a WSN-based application scenario, both are limited,
and the selection has to consider, for example, the population.
The key lessons of this chapter are as follows:
• Dynamic subjects impair communication reliability by dis-
rupting the communication overlay.
• ACO-based communication overlay mechanism can utilize
previously established pheromones to improve the recon-
nection speed and probability.
• Leaving and joining subjects require a frequent exchange
of routing information
• Routing information exchange challenges the conflicting
goals efficiency and anonymity. More available routing in-
formation improve efficiency but impede anonymity
• Different routing information exchange mechanisms differ
in their communication overhead, memory overhead, and
information leakage. The appropriate mechanism depends
on the application scenario.
6
E F F I C I E N T A N D E F F E C T I V E S E N D E R
P R O T E C T I O N
This chapter introduces a novel mechanism to protect senders
from being identified by an adversary. The sender protec-
tion mechanism is based upon the anonymization primitive
DCnet [22]. The proposed asymmetric DCnets (ADCnets) provide
means for an adjustable trade-off between the conflicting goals
efficiency and anonymity.
This chapter is structured as follows: after providing a mo-
tivation in Section 6.1, an extended model and terminology is
introduced in Section 6.2 which extend the general model from
Section 2.2 with features that are only relevant for this chapter.
Section 6.3 addresses the necessity for additional sender protec-
tion by showing topological weaknesses of group communica-
tion systems and discussing existing protection measures for re-
cipients. In Section 6.4, the usage of the anonymization primitive
cover traffic for sender protection, the approach to improving its
efficiency, and the results of this approach are discussed. The
mechanism of ADCnets is then introduced in Section 6.5. Lastly,
this chapter is concluded in Section 6.6
6.1 motivation
Communication overlays Ot often leak information about some
senders s ∈ St and recipients r ∈ Rt. By definition, only ac-
tive subjects, i.e., senders and recipients, join the communication
overlay Ot initially. This is usually not sufficient to connect all
senders with all recipients; therefore, a subset of the remaining
subjects may join as brokers b ∈ Bt to establish a connected
overlay. Following this design, the positions in the communica-
tion overlay Ot hold information about the role of a subject: the
root is the sender, leaves are recipients, and “inner” positions are
brokers that may also be recipients. A global adversary Ap,g like
the service provider can derive the communication overlay by
tracing the message flow. As a result of this, the adversary Ap,g
can identify subjects in endpoint positions, i.e., senders in root
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positions and recipients in leaf positions. Thus, anonymity for
senders and recipients requires additional protection measures.
6.2 model and terminology
In the following, this section extends the basic model and termi-
nology given in Chapter 2.
6.2.1 Cover Traffic and Noise
Cover traffic composes cover messages mcov with noise that is
cover messages mcov contain random bits. The random content
ensures that an adversary Ap,g cannot distinguish noise and en-
crypted messages.
Sender protection is usually based on noise, may it be in form
of cover messages as in the anonymization primitive cover traffic
(see Sections 2.4.2.5 and 6.4) or in the form of cryptographic mes-
sages of DCnet participants (see Sections 2.4.2.6 and 6.5) that are
necessary to decrypt the actual communication messages. Both
have in common that an adversary Ap,g, which can observe the
message flow in the communication system, cannot distinguish
communication messages mcom from noise mcov.
6.2.2 One-Time Pad
One-time pads provide perfectly secure encryption: the XOR-
result of a message mcomt with a pad otp = GF(2)
n of the same
length n that is truly random appears to be random as well [131,
132]. The pad otp is used as encryption—and decryption—key.
With that, the adversary does not learn anything from intercept-
ing a message that is being encrypted with a one-time pad as
all possible decryptions are equally probable with the correct
decryption of the message. Only the originally used pad can de-
crypt the message mcomt .
In the following DCnet-based anonymization scheme, a group
of subjects uses their pair-wise keys as one-time pads. Only with
all used keys at hand, a subject can decrypt the message. Follow-
ing from requirement, all subjects in the DCnet-subgroup have
to contribute their share in the form of their respective keys.
6.2 model and terminology 171
6.2.3 Dining-Cryptographer Networks
As described in Section 2.4.2.6, DCnets are originally proposed
by Chaum [22].
A DCnet connects an arbitrary set of subjects V and enables
them to share information with provable anonymity. The com-
munication in DCnet is protected by using a form of secure multi-
party computation
6.2.3.1 Keys Establishment
To establish anonymous communication, each subject has to es-
tablish keys with a set of neighbors:
rkk,l = rkl,k : shared key of subjects vk and vl
The set of neighbors with which keys are established depends
on the underlying key graph for which Chaum proposed four
options:
• complete graph: in a complete key graph (i.e., a clique), a
subject vk establishes keys with every other subject vl ∈ V.
In a complete graph, an adversary A_,g will always see the
set of non-controlled subjects AS = V \ C as anonymity set.
• ring: in a ring-based key graph, a subject vk establishes
keys with their two adjacent subjects vk−1 and vk+1. This
key-sharing construct enables an adversary Aa,l or Aa,c to
easily partition the ring; with multiple controlled subjects,
i.e., a colluding adversary Aa,c, the adversary can easily
de-anonymize the participant that is immediately between
them by establishing two anonymity sets AS1 and AS2
where AS1 contains only the suspected subject.
• subclique: in a subclique key graph, s subset of subjects
forms a clique that ensures the anonymization of the com-
munication. The remaining subjects are attached to this
clique and share a key with each of the subjects in the
clique. The anonymity towards an adversary A is formed
by the set of subjects of the anonymization clique that is
not under their control AS = VDC \ C: as long as there is
at least one subject vk ∈ VDC that is not under the adver-
sary’s control, i.e., if there is at least one subject vk /∈ C, it is
impossible for the adversary to distinguish subjects send-
ing cover messages mcov from actual senders si sending
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communication messages mcomt . As the anonymization is
solely based on the clique VDC, the communication does
not rely on contributions of other subjects that are not part
of VDC. Dissent [30] establishes anonymous communica-
tion based on this scheme.
• hierarchical: a hierarchical key graph enables economical
key establishment in the presence of large amounts of sub-
jects. In such a setting, subsets of subjects VCi form local
cliques and share pairwise keys within each of the subsets.
From each of these subsets VCi , a subject is “elected” to be
the representative for their subset VCi . All representatives
form another clique where keys are established amongst
all pairs of representatives. Depending on the actual num-
ber of subjects in the system, more layers of this hierarchy
can be introduced. Herbivore [61] uses a similar idea, but
connects the respective subsets VCi using Chord [136].
Figure 49 visualizes the aforementioned key graph topologies
to illustrate the differences in the complexity of the key estab-
lishment and management. Connections between two subjects
represent a shared key between the two respective subjects.
To communicate, each participant vk creates a message mvk
by combining all their established keys kk,l with either 0 (i.e.,
null) or the message m, if the subject is the sender vk = s:
mvk =
⊕
vl∈NKG(vk)
kk,l ⊕
m, if vk = s
0, otherwise
(37)
Hereby, NKG(vk) describes the neighbors of vk in the key
graph, i.e., the subjects with which vk establishes keys for the
communication in the DCnet.
6.2.3.2 Communication in DCnets
The messages mvk are then sent to all subjects whose key is be-
ing used in the XOR-chain (⊕). By collecting all messages, each
of the subjects is able to compute the XOR-function over all re-
ceived messages to rule out the keys and derive the actual mes-
sage.
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(a) Complete (b) Ring
(c) Subcliques
(d) Hierarchy
Figure 49: Key Graph Topologies for DCnets
Example 29: Subjects a to d establish their keys in a complete key graph,
i.e., subject a has keys ka,b, ka,c, and ka,d—subjects b to d have the
keys likewise. Subject a acts in this example as sender s. All subjects
compose their messages m{a,b,c,d} as follows:
ma = ka,b ⊕ ka,c ⊕ ka,d ⊕m
mb = kb,a ⊕ kb,c ⊕ kb,d ⊕ 0
mc = kc,a ⊕ kc,b ⊕ kc,d ⊕ 0
md = kd,a ⊕ kd,b ⊕ kd,c ⊕ 0
The messages are then exchanged and each participant can derive the
message m as follows:
ma ⊕mb ⊕mc ⊕md =ka,b ⊕ ka,c ⊕ ka,d ⊕m
⊕ kb,a ⊕ kb,c ⊕ kb,d ⊕ 0
⊕ kc,a ⊕ kc,b ⊕ kc,d ⊕ 0
⊕ kd,a ⊕ kd,b ⊕ kd,c ⊕ 0
=ka,b ⊕ kb,a ⊕ ka,c ⊕ kc,a
⊕ ka,d ⊕ kd,a ⊕ kb,c ⊕ kc,b
⊕ kb,d ⊕ kd,b ⊕ kc,d ⊕ kd,c
⊕ 0⊕ 0⊕ 0⊕m
=m
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By this dependence on the XOR-function, the presence of
multiple senders si and sj causes a collision and results in a
scrambled message. The efficiency can be improved by using a
message-vector, where subjects can place their message at differ-
ent positions to reduce the probability of collisions.
An adversary, however, may decide to jam the communication
by replacing their “0” content with random bits, which would
yield a collision for each message. To counter this, several au-
thors [22, 30, 63] propose trap-functionalities to identify (but not
de-anonymize) the jamming subject; the jamming subject can
then be excluded from the system.
6.2.3.3 Anonymity in DCnets
In [22], Chaum proves the sender anonymity. For that, Chaum
shows by reduction of the applied encryption to one-time pads
(see Section 6.2 for the security and anonymity of one-time
pads) that the information leakage of (for an adversary A) vis-
ible variables—the messages of the subjects V \ C encrypted us-
ing the encryption keys on vectors of the prime field GF(2)—is
restricted to the parity of the respective vectors. With that re-
duction, Chaum proves that the remaining set of V \ C acts as
irreducible anonymity set for the senders si ∈ St ⊆ V \ C.
6.3 focussing on sender protection, are recipients
protected?
This thesis contributes an approach to protect sender anonymity.
This focus raises the question of the protection recipient
anonymity. This section outlines why sender anonymity is a par-
ticular challenge and why current approaches for recipient pro-
tection, for example, Daubert et al.’s probabilistic forwarding and
shell game [37] cannot protect sender anonymity.
In this section, first the information leakage by topological
properties are formalized in Section 6.3.1. After that, Daubert et
al’s recipient protection measures are introduced in Section 6.3.2
and the challenges for sender anonymity are introduced in Sec-
tion 6.3.3.
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6.3.1 The Issue of Topological Leaks
Communication overlays Ot leak information about senders and
recipients based on their respective positions in the overlay.
The overlay establishment mechanisms introduce this infor-
mation leakage. As such, either senders s or recipients r initi-
ate the overlay establishment. By this initialization, they create
a leaf (or root for senders) in the communication overlay; only
senders and recipients can establish these endpoints of an over-
lay. Other subjects v /∈ St ∪ Rt will only join a communication
overlay Ot as brokers b if they are required to connect a sender
s or recipient r to the communication overlay. Thus, overlay es-
tablishment mechanisms place brokers b only at inner positions
in the communication overlay Ot but not on endpoints of the
communication overlay.
The information leakage is prevalent amongst all communica-
tion systems, for example:
• Pub/Sub-based Communication Overlays: Recipients r or
senders s initiate the overlay establishment. As such, some
of them form the endpoints of the established communica-
tion overlay; others may be required to relay messages to
subsequent recipients and are, therefore, “inner” subjects.
• Web Mixes & Tor: Web MIXes [15] and Tor [46] (see Sec-
tions 3.3.2 and 3.3.3) establish point-to-point connections
between a sender si and a recipient rj. Naturally, both are
leaf subjects in their respective communication overlay.
6.3.2 Obfuscating Recipients due to Topology Adaption
Daubert et al. [37] propose two mechanisms, namely probabilis-
tic forwarding, and shell game, to adapt the topology of the com-
munication overlay Ot. They aim to reduce the information leak-
age from recipients in leaf positions. First, additional subjects
are opportunistically included in the communication overlay to
extend the dissemination paths beyond only leaf-recipients. Sec-
ond, the topology itself is altered by position swaps between
subjects, where two subjects exchange their neighborhoods and
positions in the communication overlay Ot.
probabilistic forwarding Using probabilistic forward-
ing, recipients request other subjects to join the communication
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overlay Ot opportunistically. For that, brokers bk and recipients
rj evaluate for each neighboring subject whether to request them
to join the communication overlay Ot as additional brokers ex-
tending the dissemination paths beyond the original leaves. The
opportunistically joining subjects evaluate their neighbors them-
selves again. Figure 50 visualizes this mechanism: left, the dis-
semination tree without probabilistic forwarding; the recipients
r1, r2, and r4 are exposed as being leaf-subjects. In the middle,
recipients r1 and r3 are including one of their neighboring sub-
jects each; on the right, broker b3, which was included by r3,
includes one of its neighbors.
By including more subjects into the communication overlay,
the anonymity set increases, and the adversary A can no longer
identify a leaf as a recipient.
s1
b1 r3
r1 r2 r4
(a) no probab. forw.
s1
b1 r3
r1
b2
r2 r4 b3
(b) probab forw. (1).
s1
b1 r3
r1
b2
r2 r4 b3
b4
(c) probab forw. (2).
Figure 50: Obfuscating recipients using probabilistic forwarding [37]
shell game Using the shell game, any two subjects vl, vm
being part of the communication overlay Ot can swap their posi-
tions. For that, they exchange their neighborhood sets N+/−(vl)
and N+/−(vm). By this exchange, leaf-positioned recipients may
rotate into the inner part of the communication overlay Ot—
reducing the ratio of recipients in exposed leaf positions.
In the shell game, subject vl evaluates with a decaying func-
tion whether to perform a position swap or not. If subject vl
decides to perform the shell game, vl chooses a neighbor vm ∈
{N+(vl)∪N−(vl)} and initiate the two-phase commit swapping-
protocol where vl and vm exchange their neighborhoods and in-
form their respective neighbors. The decaying function enables
the shell game to increase the number of brokers in leaf posi-
tions and still reduces the number of position swaps over time.
Figure 51 shows three snapshots of a communication overlay
Ot with two swaps: first broker b2 swaps position with recipi-
ent s4; second, broker b3 swaps with recipient s3. However, the
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shell game is not limited to broker–recipient pairs but can be
performed with any two subjects.
s1
f1 f2
r1 r2 f3
r3
r4
(a) initial Ot.
s1
f1 r4
r1 r2 f3
r3
f2
(b) Ot after shell game #1.
s1
f1 r4
r1 r2 r3
f3
f2
(c) Ot after shell game #2.
Figure 51: Randomizing the topology using the Shell Game [37]
resulting recipient protection Both probabilistic for-
warding and shell game work together to increase the mixture of
recipients and brokers in leaf positions. By bringing brokers into
leaf positions—and rising their ratio in the mix of leaf subjects—
the information leakage caused by topology is limited.
Daubert et al. [37] use a simulative evaluation to show that
the combination of probabilistic forwarding and shell game can
easily achieve a mix of recipients and brokers in leaf positions of
0.5. As a result of this, if the adversary A picks a random subject
in leaf position, their probability of having a recipient is worse
than a (fair) coin flip.
6.3.3 The Challenge with Senders
Senders s may emit a message at any point in time. Thus, the
communication system has to be prepared to hide the sender at
every possible point in time.
The lack of knowledge about a sender’s message emission
leads to two intuitive approaches:
1. message dissemination with opportunistic subjects
2. dummy messages for covering communication messages
protection by opportunistic subjects In the first ap-
proach, the communication overlay Ot may be randomized and
extended using mechanisms like the aforementioned probabilis-
tic forwarding and shell game. However, both require not only
synchronization but also that the sender s can transfer the ac-
tual communication message mcomt in a concealed fashion. At
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first sight, one might think of embedding the message in regu-
larly exchanged heartbeat messages that are a necessity in every
P2P system. However, as heartbeat messages are usually by mag-
nitude smaller than a communication message; this restriction
of size requires the sender to include an actual communication
message in multiple heartbeat messages. This increases the com-
munication delay.
These issues lead to the second, following approach where
communication between subjects is hidden in a large number of
dummy messages.
dummy messages for covering senders Dummy mes-
sages can cover communication messages, and, thus, senders, by
all subjects continuously sending messages in the system all the
time. This prevents an adversary A from identifying the sender
of an actual message. This approach can be performed in two
manifestations:
1. Creation of “container” messages that are (randomly) for-
warded until they are replaced with a real communication
message by a sender s. This requires communication mes-
sages mcom to be distinguishable from containers from an
internal perspective; otherwise, a sender would not be able
to select an empty container for replacement and might
replace a communication message—leading to a message
loss. While being distinguishable, the containers have to be
indistinguishable by an adversary A to provide cover for
senders. The adversary can mask out container messages
if communication messages mcom and container messages
are distinguishable; as a result of this, the adversary can
trace communication messages mcom without container
messages once again.
2. Utilization of all connections using “cover traffic” (see Sec-
tion 2.4.2.5 for the cover traffic primitive) to hide communi-
cation message behind noise. In contrast to 1., cover traffic
requires all subjects to utilize all connections at all time.
Hence, an encrypted message is hidden as it is not distin-
guishable from the random noise generated by all subjects.
Both, container messages and cover traffic lead to efficiency
issues. For the latter technique, the efficiency issue is analyzed
in the following section in more detail.
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6.4 cover traffic revisited
Cover traffic is the state of the art method to protect senders from
de-anonymization attempts; all anonymous communication sys-
tems [15, 29, 30, 34, 58, 61, 87, 133, 146] of the last decade that
provide sender protection use mechanisms that can be reduced
to the mechanism of cover traffic.
As introduced in Section 2.4.2.5, cover traffic is based on the as-
sumption that a global adversary Ap,g, for example, the service
provider, cannot distinguish an encrypted message from random
noise that is utilizing a connection. Therefore, cover traffic re-
quires that all subjects utilize all unused connections with cover
messages mcov, i.e., send a cover message mcov on all connec-
tions that are not used to relay/send a communication message
mcom. For all connections, both directions—if existing—have to
be considered for cover traffic. Such an implementation of cover
traffic does not only provide unlinkability or anonymity—but it
also provides untraceability against a non-internal adversary A_,g.
A service provider, for example, cannot recognize a communica-
tion when cover traffic is applied in their system.
However, while protecting senders and recipients, cover traffic
adds massive load to the communication system as all connec-
tions are utilized at all times. Facing heterogenous participants
with different capabilities to communicate, the message load of
cover traffic yields problems and may lead to an anonymous but
impractical communication system.
Considering the transmission of a single communication mes-
sage mcomt with cover traffic, the utilization with communica-
tion messages can be calculated as formalized by Equation (38).
utilcom =
mcomt
mcov
=
|Et|
|E| · diam(Ot) − |Et| (38)
Every connection in the communication overlay Et has to be uti-
lized with the communication message once. As messages are
relayed every round, the “time” from sender to the farthest re-
cipient is defined by the diameter of the communication overlay
diam(Ot), i.e., by the longest shortest path in the communica-
tion overlay. While the message is being transmitted, i.e., during
“diam(Ot)-many” rounds, all unused connections have to be
utilized with cover messages. Therefore, number of cover mes-
sages mcov can be calculated by multiplying all connections in
the system (E) times the diameter of the communication over-
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lay diam(Ot), i.e., “utilizing all connections at all time”, minus
the number of connections in the communication overlay (Et) as
these are utilized with the communication message mcomt once.
Example 30 and Figure 52 exemplify the utilization to show the
load induced by cover traffic. The overall utilization decreases
with increasing difference between |Et| and |E| and increases
with the number of subjects being involved in communications.
G
Ot
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
2 4
5
6
7
8
9
Figure 52: Cover traffic on the example system from Figure 8. Connections col-
ored for the first communication round with cover traffic: blue con-
nections are used to transmit the communication message mcomt ,
red dashed connections are used to transmit cover messages mcov.
Example 30: Assume a communication system with a structure as de-
picted in Figure 52. Cover traffic generation considers the connection
of the logical underlay G; this is the layer which is visible to the adver-
sary Ap,g and does not distinguish between different communication
overlays Ot.
Sending a single message mcomt (1) from sender s = 4 to the recipients
Rt = {1, 5, 8, 9} requires 4 rounds (diam(Ot) = 4 between s = 4 and
r = 8). G contains |E| = 24 directed connections.
In the first round, subject 4 sends the messagemcomt to subjects 2 and 5.
The remaining 22 connections are utilized with cover messages mcov.
round rd # com. msgs # cov. msgs ratio comcov
rd = 1 2 (4→ {2, 5}) 22 111 ≈ 0.09091
rd = 2 2 (2→ {1}, 5→ {6}) 22 111 ≈ 0.09091
rd = 3 2 (4→ {7, 9}) 22 111 ≈ 0.09091
rd = 4 1 (7→ {8}) 23 123 ≈ 0.04348∑
7
∑
89 789 ≈ 0.07865
The per-round utilization with communication messages in this exam-
ple is between 4.35%–9.09%; the overall utilization utilcom is approxi-
mately 7.87%.
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Research Question 13 Can the efficiency of cover traffic be improved
while the anonymity is preserved at a “reasonable” level?
6.4.1 Parameterized Cover Traffic
The lack of efficiency is caused by the constant utilization of all
connections of all subjects which is inherent to the mechanism
cover traffic [15, 29, 30, 34, 58, 61, 87, 133, 146]. To reduce the re-
sulting overhead, i.e., to improve utilization and, thus, improve
the efficiency of cover traffic, a set of parameters has been de-
rived. These parameters control the aspects of cover traffic that
control its efficiency: 1) subject participation probability, 2) connec-
tion utilization probability, and 3) temporal behavior.
subject participation probability The subject partici-
pation probability (spp) enables the system to produce spotty
cover traffic—cover traffic that resembles communication behav-
ior where not every subject sends a message at every point in
time. Lowering this probability reduces the number of subjects
that generate cover messages mcov and, with that, improves ef-
ficiency. Subjects evaluate the subject participation probability
spp in every round to balance the load of cover traffic generation
among all subjects. Assessing the subject participation probabil-
ity spp once would free some subjects from the burden of cover
traffic while others have the same obligations as before.
Proposition 13 Controlling the number of subjects participating in
the generation of cover traffic mcov with the subject participation
probability spp influences the induced communication overhead.
connection utilization probability The connection
utilization probability (cup) transfers the concept of adjustable
intensities to the connections—after having evaluated their sub-
ject participation probability spp, subjects that generate cover
traffic decide which of their connections to populate with cover
traffic mcov. Subjects evaluate the connection utilization proba-
bility cup in every round if they evaluated the subject participa-
tion probability spp positively before. Subjects evaluate the con-
nection utilization probability cup regularly to keep the cover
traffic load balanced for all subjects.
Proposition 14 Controlling the utilization of connections that are
populated with cover traffic mcov with the connection utilization
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probability influences the induced communication overhead, similar
to the subject participation probability-based overhead control.
dynamic connection utilization probability adap-
tation When a subject v is a broker b ∈ BT the overlay Ot
which has to relay an actual communication messagemcomt , sub-
ject, the usage of the connection utilization probability cup as
is leads to a statistically recognizable distortion. Over time, an
adversary Ap,g may learn to trace the flow of communication
messages by tracking these distortions. Thus, the connection uti-
lization probability cup has to be dynamically adapted, when-
ever the subject has to relay a communication message mcomt ;
the adaptation follows from Equation (39) where d-(b) denotes
the number of connections of subject b and d-t(b) denotes the
respective number of outgoing connections of b that are part
of the communication overlay Ot as described in Equation (40).
After relaying communication messages mcomt , the adaption is
reverted to the simple connection utilizatio probability cup.
cupmod =
cup · d-(b) − d-t(b)
d-(b) − d-t(b)
, (39)
d-t(bl) = |{ei : ei = (bl,bk) ∈ Et}| (40)
The adaptation of the connection utilization probability cup to
cupmod accounts for the necessary utilization of overlay connec-
tions ei ∈ Et of a subject b and reduces the connection utilization
probability for the connections that are not part of the communi-
cation overlay such that the overall connection utilization proba-
bility stays stable even when relaying communication messages.
Example 31 visualizes the necessity to adapt the connection uti-
lization probability when a subject b has to relay communication
messages mcomt .
If the number of connections in Ot results in a negative mod-
ified connection utilization probability cupmod, the distortion
cannot be accounted for without delaying the communication
messages mcomt .
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Example 31: Subjects that are forwarding communication messages
mcomt introduce distortions with the generation of cover traffic when
using the connection utilization probability cup. Assume the following
subject b, which is part of the of the overlay Ot that has four outgoing
connections to vi–vl, neighbor vi is also part of the overlay Ot. The
connection (b, vi) is therefore part of the overlay Ot as well.
b
vi vj vk vl
The adapted connection utilization probability cupmod accounts for
the increased probability due to relaying communication messages
mcomt by reducing the connection utilization probabilities cup of the
remaining connections:
cup exp. num.
of msgs
actual num.
of msgs
cupmod exp. num.
of msgs
1.0 4 4 1.0 4
0.75 3 3.25 0.6667 4
0.5 2 2.5 0.3333 2
0.25 1 1.75 0.0 1
0.0 0 1 -0.33 (0) 1
Proposition 15 The adapted connection utilization probability
cupmod prevents the distortion caused by handling mcomt as far as
possible.
temporal behavior Often, it is not required to have cover
traffic in every possible round (“permanent” or “constant”, see
Section 2.2.2) as communication takes some time as messages
have to be processed before relaying them or replying to them.
The emerging overhead can be reduced further by pausing the
generation of cover traffic in intervals to use these “idle” times
to improve efficiency.
Depending on the communication scenario, the two natural
options for the temporal behavior of cover traffic generation are
as follows:
• Intervals: using interval-based cover traffic, subjects gener-
ate cover traffic in configurable sized intervals. This ini-
tialization method is suited for, for example, machine-to-
machine communication where communication occurs on
a regular interval. The size of the interval can be adapted
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to match the requirements of the specific communication
scenarios to avoid prohibitive delays.
• Request: using request-based cover traffic, subjects control
the generation of cover traffic based on requests. Subjects
request the generation of cover traffic, for example, using
regularly exchanged heartbeat messages of the underlying
P2P system. It is essential to hide the requests to avoid that
the adversary Ap,g learns about the communication—and
the sender of communication messages—by tracking the
requests. Also, the requests have to be relayed to enable
larger groups of subjects to emit cover messages. This set-
ting avoids the generation of cover traffic when no subject
intends to emit a message and, thus, reduces the overhead
when, for example, people are communicating.
Proposition 16 Avoiding constant cover traffic improves the effi-
ciency of communication that is protected by cover traffic. Interval-
based cover traffic generation protects fixed intervals, for example, to
provide anonymity for machine-to-machine communication. Request-
based cover traffic generates cover traffic only upon request, for exam-
ple, to account for irregular communication patterns of people.
the necessity of relaying cover traffic When chang-
ing the temporal behavior of cover traffic generation, subjects
have to align their communication behavior with the genera-
tion of cover messages mcov. This alignment is important to
obfuscate the communication message mcomt in a set of cover
messages mcov. However, this obfuscation is not only important
for the initial emission of a communication message mcomt at
the sending subject but also for the subsequent relaying of the
message. Otherwise, an adversary A is not able to identify the
sender of the communication message but, as the next relaying
subject is not obfuscated, can derive the first relaying subject.
With the knowledge about the first relaying subject, the sender
has to be one of this subject’s neighbors—this information leak-
age reduces the sender anonymity set size from |V| to number
of common neighbors of the first relaying subjects of a message
|{∩N-(vl) : vl ∈ N-t(si)}|.
There are two possibilities to circumvent this information leak-
age:
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• Delaying the communication message until the next cover
traffic interval is present—or the next cover traffic request
is performed.
• Relaying cover traffic to simulate ongoing communications
instead of putting cover messages only on one connection
where the recipients discard them.
While the first possibility would unnecessarily delay commu-
nication, the latter solution provides a trade-off between effi-
ciency and anonymity. Upon receiving a cover message mcov,
a subject decides whether to relay the cover message or not by
using the relay probability rp. The relay probability rp is the adap-
tation of the subject participation probability spp for rounds in
which, due to the temporal behavior, no new cover messages
mcov are emitted. As such, the relay probability should be con-
figured such that it is in the order of magnitude of the subject
participation probability.
The cover messagesmcov will decay with the relay probability
rp; subjects will terminate the relaying eventually. With that, the
number of cover messages mcov decreases over time.
6.4.2 Quantitative Simulation
This section discusses the influence of the randomized genera-
tion of cover messages on efficiency and anonymity. For that,
a simulation study is conducted to compute the efficiency im-
provements and changes in anonymity.
simulation setup Efficiency, as well as anonymity, are in
their absolute numbers depending on the underlying network;
however, their relative improvement—or deterioration—is inde-
pendent of the underlying network structure network. This sim-
ulation focusses on the evaluation of the influence of the random-
ized cover traffic initialization; the simulation is conducted only
on social networks that are generated following the Barabàsi-
Albert model [13].
Following Section 4.4.3, the social networks are generated
with 1, 000 subjects,m0=2, andm=3; on each network, 1 subject
is randomly chosen to be the sender s, a ratio of 0.015 of subjects
(i.e., on average 15 subjects) are chosen as recipients r ∈ Rt. Each
experiment is repeated 50 times to reduce the influence of ran-
domly chosen sender and recipients, as well as the influence of
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neighbor-selection during network generation. Each simulation
measures efficiency and anonymity over 20 messages that are
emitted by the sender s—each message is given 50 rounds to be
relayed from the sender to the recipients.
Efficiency is measured using the noise to content ratio ncrwhich
is the number of cover messages mcov which is sent per commu-
nication message mcomt ; the lower the noise to content ratio ncr,
the better the efficiency. Equation (41) shows the calculation of
the noise to content ratio ncr which measures the number of
cover messages mcov sent per communication messages mcomt
and is summed over all rounds.
ncr =
|
∑
rd∈RD{m
cov}rd|
|
∑
rd∈RD{mcomt }rd|
(41)
Anonymity is measured using the number of remaining cover
subjects rcs, which collects a set of subjects, that emit a message
mcov together with the sender. These sets are derived for every
round in which the sender emits a message mcomt ; then, the
intersection of the sets is established. This approach follows an
adversary Ap,g that executes an intersection attack [36, 143]. This
adversary Ap,g resembles, for example, the service provider.
The overlay establishment itself does not influence cover traf-
fic. To minimize start-up time and message delivery time, a con-
ventional overlay based on flooding is used to connect sender
and recipients.
Table 24: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Repetitions 50
Rounds per repetition 50 (overlay establ.) + 1050 (comm.)
Network size (|V|) {1, 000}
Recipients (|Rt|) 0.015 of V (on average 15 subjects)
Network type social
Network configuration m0=2, m= 3
Cover Traffic Configuration:
Subject Participation Probability [0, 1] in steps of 0.1
Connection Utilization Probability [0, 1] in steps of 0.1
Temporal Behavior {constant, interval(10), request}
Relay Probability [0, 1] in steps of 0.1
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6.4.2.1 Improving the Efficiency of Cover Traffic
The reduced amount of overhead of cover traffic with varying
(combinations of) subject participation probability spp and con-
nection utilization probability cup after sending 20 messages
from the sender s ∈ St to the recipients r ∈ Rt is depicted in
Figure 53; Figure 53 visualizes the noise to content ratio ncr as
introduced by Equation (41).
The following paragraphs discuss both the influence of the
subject participation probability spp and connection utilization
probability cup and the—not shown—influence of the temporal
behavior and relay probability rp.
varying subject participation and connection uti-
lization Both the subject participation probability (spp) and
the connection utilization probability (cup) have the expected
linear effect on the noise to content ratio in Figure 53.
• Varying the subject participation probability: Lowering the
probability will increase the number of subjects that are
not generating cover messages mcov on their incident con-
nections. The noise to content ratio is linearly correlated
with the number of subjects participating in the generation
of cover traffic.
• Varying the connection utilization probability: Lowering the
probability with which a subject is utilizing incident con-
nections with cover messages mcov is linearly correlated
with the noise to content ratio as well. The probability of
utilizing a connection is directly correlated with the num-
ber of cover messages mcov and therefore influencing the
noise to content ratio.
This correlation follows from the formalization of the noise
to content ratio ncr in Equation (45) which is based on the fol-
lowing steps. Equation (42) provides the number of rounds with
communication messages rdcom.
∑
rd∈RD |{m
com
t }rd| sums the
number of communication messages mcomt observed. By divid-
ing this sum by the number of connections in Ot, the number
of messages emitted by senders s ∈ St is the result. The diame-
ter of the communication overlay diam(Ot) denotes the number
of rounds that is required to transmit a message from a sender
s ∈ R to all recipients r ∈ R.
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rdcom =
∑
rd∈RD |{m
com
t }rd|
Et
· diam(Ot) (42)
The noise to content ratio per communication message
ncrmcomt is given by:
ncrmcomt =
|E| · diam(Ot) − |Et|
|Et|
(43)
With |E| =
∑
v∈V d
-(v) and |Et| = |
⋃
v∈Vt N
-
t(v)| follows:
ncrmcomt =
∑
v∈V d
-(v) · diam(Ot) − |
⋃
v∈Vt N
-
t(v)|
|
⋃
v∈Vt N
-
t(v)|
(44)
In rounds without communication message mcov, the noise to
content ratio ncr!mcomt is naturally given by |E|.
Combined with the sequence of observed rounds RD, Equa-
tion (45) provides the overall noise to content ratio.
ncr = ncrmcomt ·
rdcom
diam(Ot)
+ncr!mcomt · (|RD|− rdcom)
=
∑
v∈V d
-(v) · diam(Ot) − |
⋃
v∈Vt N
-
t(v)|
|
⋃
v∈Vt N
-
t(v)|
· rdcom
diam(Ot)
+
∑
vl∈V
(d-(vl)) · (|RD|− rdcom)
(45)
The parametrization of spp and cup is then naturally applied
by first evaluating the subjects and then their respective connec-
tions ∑
v∈V
d-(v)→
∑
v∈V
d-(v) · spp · cup (46)
Combining the parameterized participation with the noise to
content ratio ncr in Equation (45) explicates the visually recog-
nized linear correlation of the noise to content ratio ncr with
each of the probabilities spp and cup.
6.4 cover traffic revisited 189
Figure 53: Noise to content ratio ncr with varied subject participation proba-
bility spp and varied connection utilization probability cup.
varying temporal behavior Until now, cover messages
mcov are generated in every round; the efficiency improvement
is based on the reduced and randomized subject participation
and connection utilization.
Adapting the temporal behavior yields another stage of effi-
ciency improvement. In both the interval-based and the request-
based configuration, the relay probability rp expands the subject
participation into rounds without generation of new cover mes-
sages mcov.
The generation of new cover messagesmcov is controlled with
varying subject participation probability spp and connection uti-
lization probability cup. When subjects generate cover traffic, i.e.,
when the interval-based generation is due, or cover traffic is re-
quested, subjects in the system generate on average the following
number of cover messages mcov:
|mcov| = |V| · spp · cup (47)
In the rounds in between, each subject that receives a cover
message mcov decides whether or not to relay the message us-
ing the relay probability rp. That implies the number of cover
messages is decreasing with each additional round. The effect is
linear with rp (and cup).
The efficiency improvement is larger as with cover traffic with
constant generation. The factor of improvement depends on the
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actual temporal behavior and the relay probability rp; usually, it
follows the same progression as visualized in Figure 53.
6.4.2.2 Cover Traffic in the Tension of Efficiency and Anonymity
The protection by cover traffic bases on the obfuscation of com-
munication messages mcomt in cover messages m
cov. Reducing
the number of cover messages may, therefore, have a negative im-
pact on anonymity. Figure 54 depicts the number of remaining
cover nodes rcn after transmitting 20 messages from the sender
s to the recipients r ∈ Rt.
The shown remaining cover subjects rcss are computed as de-
scribed in Equation (48) by intersecting the active subjects. Ac-
tive are those subjects, that send at least one message in a win-
dow of ±1 around the rounds rds ∈ RDsend ⊆ RD in which the
sender s ∈ St emits a communication message:
rcss(rds) = |{v : v.sentIn(rds − 1)
∨ v.sentIn(rds)∨ v.sentIn(rds + 1)}|
(48)
Figure 54 visualizes the remaining cover subjects rcs, on the z-
axis, dependent of varied subject participation probabilities spp,
on the y-axis, and varied connection utilization probability cup,
on the x-axis. It shows that a reduction of the probabilities for
subject participation and connection utilization reduces the pro-
tection of the sender for values of spp < 0.5 and cup < 0.4—
larger probability values establish a stable plateau of cover sub-
jects for the sender. Comparing the plateau with the efficiency
improvement shown in Section 6.4.2.1, the results promise im-
proved efficiency with stable anonymity through stable numbers
of cover subjects.
However, when analyzing the set of cover subjects over time,
the anonymity is constantly decreasing. Figure 55 depicts the
size of the respective sets of cover subjects for varying settings of
the subject participation probability spp with a fixed connection
utilization probability cup = 0.4. Figure 55 visualizes the per-
formance of an adversary Ap,g who can perform a global traffic
analysis attack, i.e., shows the performance of an adversary Ap,g
being able to analyze the message flow in the overall system. By
intersecting the sets of cover messages for individual communi-
cation messages rcss, as given by Equation (49), the adversary
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Figure 54: Remaining cover subjects with varied subject participation probabil-
ity spp and varied connection utilization probability cup.
Ap,g can rule out cover subjects over time; thus, the adversary
can identify the sender s eventually.
rcs = |
⋂
rds∈RDsend
{vl : vl.sentIn(rds − 1)
∨ vl.sentIn(rds)∨ vl.sentIn(rds + 1)}|
(49)
By this intersection attack, the adversary Ap,g can remove of
cover subjects over time. If the system significantly improves effi-
ciency, i.e., configures the spp with a value of around 0.5, the ad-
versary Ap,g is able to remove 25% of the cover subjects. Over a
series of 20 communication messages mcomt , the adversary Ap,g
is able to remove cover subjects; the loss of anonymity is negligi-
ble only if the subject participation probability spp is larger than
0.8. Figure 55 also shows the influence of additional changes in
the subject participation probability spp.
Additional results with varied connection utilization probabil-
ity cup are reported in Appendix D.
6.4.3 Inability of Cover Traffic to Persistently Protect Senders
The results of Sections 6.4.2.1 and 6.4.2.2 show that the effi-
ciency of cover traffic can be improved by randomized initializa-
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Figure 55: Remaining cover subjects over up to 20 communication messages
tion. However, the results also show that cover traffic with ran-
domized initialization cannot protect sender anonymity over the
course of communication—the longer communication lasts, i.e.,
the more communication messages are exchanged, the higher
the chances of an adversary A to identify the sender of these
communication messages.
The variation of the subjects that generate cover messages
mcov is the weakness of the randomized cover traffic initial-
ization. However, fixing the set of of cover subjects introduces
another set of challenges:
• How are brokers b protected? If brokers b are not protected,
an adversary Ap,g can identify the source by identifying the com-
munication message that is forwarded.
• How are cover subjects and senders as well as brokers
connected? If the dissemination trees are disconnected—or
implausible—, i.e., if the communication overlay looks parti-
tioned to the adversary A, the sender is again unprotected.
The following section proposes a mechanism that resolves
these issues together with efficiency and anonymity considera-
tions to provide efficient and effective sender protection that is
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independent of the duration of—or number of communication
messages in—the communication.
6.5 adcnets for configurable , efficient cover traf-
fic
This section introduces and evaluates a novel ADCnet-based ap-
proach to protect the anonymity of senders using a novel con-
cept for generating secure cover traffic that is not susceptible to
traffic analysis or cryptanalysis. Moreover, the presented mech-
anism provides this cover traffic with provable guarantees and
configurable anonymity sets.
In this section, first the concept of asymmetric DCnets is in-
troduced in Section 6.5.1, also related approaches are discussed.
Section 6.5.2, the adapted and novel ADCnets are established
with their three stages: i) initialization, ii) group formation, and
iii) message initialization. The introduction is accompanied with
recommendations for different variations, depending on the de-
sired properties; these variations have, however, no influence on
anonymity-related properties. Lastly, Section 6.5.3 evaluates the
novel ADCnet-based approach with a qualitative discussion of
the properties of the proposed ADCnets.
6.5.1 Concept of Asymmetric DCnets
Symmetric DCnets require every participant of the used key
graph to contribute to the communication. Usually, this commu-
nication is performed in a broadcast-like manner. This type of
communication put an immense load on the system and every
subject that participates in the communication.
Asymmetric DCnets (ADCnets) reduce the load of communi-
cation by avoiding either large groups or broadcast communica-
tion. The following systems from related work use asymmetric
approaches
• Herbivore [61] forms small DCnets of dynamic size. Within
these small DCnets, subjects communicate using the tra-
ditional DCnet technique. Inter-DCnet communication is
established by connecting them using a Chord-based net-
work [136].
• Dissent [30] uses a hybrid approach to reduce the mes-
sage load for subjects. For that, subjects connect to a set
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of dedicated entities. These dedicated entities form a sym-
metric DCnet which anonymizes the communication on
behalf of the subjects. This asymmetry requires the broad-
cast communication only from the entities that form the
DCnet; usual subjects need to establish keys with all of the
DCnet-entities and send their message to all of them.
The anonymity set is formed by all subjects that are com-
municating using the system. However, their dynamic be-
havior, i.e., churn, will reduce anonymity over time, similar
to the evaluation of cover traffic shown by Section 6.4.2.2.
• Asymmetric-DCnets [19] are first introduced as a combina-
tion of DCnets and additive homomorphic encryption for
scenarios like casting votes and privacy-preserving smart-
metering applications.
Subjects form subgroups that establish keys within their
groups. Subjects send their message then only to a “tally-
man” which can evaluate the messages without being able
to contribute parts of the result to specific subjects.
The following ADCnet-based approach is based on the idea of
de Borges et al. [19]. The ADCnet-based approach of this thesis
goes beyond the concept of de Borges et al. with a novel connec-
tion to the ACO-based communication overlay. With this connec-
tion, the efficiency of sender protection can be further optimized.
Also, this thesis contributes mechanisms to initialize and assem-
ble the group of subject that establishes an ADCnet.
Figure 56
Ot
1
2 RS
5
6
7
8
9
c1
c2
c3
4
Figure 56: ADCnet-based sender protection: an ADCnet protect the sender 4
in a group of subjects c1–c3. The rendezvous subject RS connects
acts as “sender” and connects the ADCnet to the communication
overlay.
The following sections assume different adversary manifesta-
tions ranging from a global passive adversary Ap,g to local or
colluding active adversaries Aa,l and Aa,c. The adversary man-
ifestation is chosen based on the actual goal of discussion such
that the strongest realistic adversary is assumed.
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6.5.2 Introducing ADCnet for Sender Protection
In this section, the concept of ADCnets for sender protection is
described. First, an overview is provided; then, the three phases
of the mechanism are described in more detail.
concept of adcnets for sender protection Using
ADCnet groups, each sender s ∈ St hides in a local1 group of
subjects that forms a “small” (and adapted) DCnet. As the par-
ticipation (or non-participation) of subjects in an ADCnet may
leak information about locations of senders s, every subject will
join—or establish—an ADCnet eventually.
Within each of these ADCnets, the key graph is a complete
graph, i.e., the subjects in a group have pairwise keys estab-
lished, and the communication graph forms a star with a ren-
dezvous subject establishing the center of such an ADCnet. This
rendezvous subject provides a connection to the remaining com-
munication system.
Depending on the computational resources of a subject, each
subject may join multiple ADCnets.
The size of the local ADCnets constrains efficiency and
anonymity. Larger groups require more messages—and more
cryptographic operations—than smaller ones and have a lower
resulting efficiency. However, larger groups also establish larger
anonymity sets and therefore higher anonymity. The concept of
ADCnets for sender protection is equipped with configurable
sized anonymization groups to suit different application scenar-
ios, ranging from low sensitivity to high sensitivity communica-
tions.
The anonymity of an ADCnet is grounded on the anonymity
of DCnets. As a result of this, the strength of anonymity relies
on the number of honest subjects in the group, i.e., the number
of subjects |V \ C| that are not controlled by the adversary A.
6.5.2.1 Initialization
ADCnets need to be initialized before a subject v intends to send
a message with respect to any topic t ∈ T , i.e., before a subject
1 Local is defined according to the actual application and may lead to, for ex-
ample, a spatial locality definition or a community or friend-based locality
definition
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v can take an active role as sender s ∈ St. For that initialization,
two intuitive points in time are possible:
• On-demand initialization where this subject v will assemble
the ADCnet as soon as they decide to enter the active role
of the sender s. In order to enter this role, the ADCnet has
to be in place.
• In-advance initialization requires that every subject v checks
at random points in time whether they are part of an
ADCnet or not. If they are not part of an ADCnet, they
may initiate the assembly of one with a specifiable proba-
bility parameter pinit.
On-demand initialization improves efficiency as the key estab-
lishment and storage as well as the regular communication are
only performed if communication is taking place. As subjects
set up an ADCnet if they are about to take the sender role, the
setup—and existence—of an ADCnet leaks information about
the location of senders.
In-advance initialization, however, improves the anonymity.
As the ADCnets are established beforehand, the establishment
itself does not leak information about the sender s—or the sub-
ject v that intends to take that active role. The continuous set up
of ADCnets that may not even be used degrades efficiency.
6.5.2.2 Group Formation
The concept of ADCnets is a general technique that applies to
a variety of applications. Group formation is one of the core
elements of this technique. However, ADCnets are independent
of the actual group formation mechanism as long as it meets the
following requirements:
1. The group size is configurable, and subjects can evaluate
whether the configured group size is met by an ADCnet or
not—without exposing information about the group par-
ticipants.
Subjects need to decide whether enough subjects are already col-
lected to form the group to decide on their own participation. For
that, they need to be able to assess the number of subjects and
the desired group size. Exposing the subjects that agreed to par-
ticipate may leak information to an adversary A and has to be
avoided.
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2. Subjects assembled in an ADCnet are similar concerning a
definable metric, for example, connectivity or location.
Subjects that form the ADCnet have to communicate with each
other; therefore, subjects should be close, for example, to avoid
unnecessary load and delay, or have similar communication ca-
pabilities to prevent bottlenecks—and the overloading of some
subjects that are less capable.
3. Within each ADCnet, and also outside of the groups, infor-
mation on whether the group formation was induced by
an intent to take an active role as a sender is not leaked.
If an adversary may learn that a group formation is induced by
the intent to take a sender role, it is likely that one of the already
collected subjects is an actual sender. The anonymity set of this
subject is, therefore, smaller as expected.
4. Within each ADCnet, a random subject is chosen to be
the rendezvous subject. This subject is representing the
ADCnet to the remaining communication system.
A random subject is chosen as rendezvous subject to avoid infor-
mation leakage. Moreover, if the adversary is able to take over the
rendezvous subject deliberately, they can disrupt communication
more stealthy by, for example, preventing the connection to the
communication overlay. Such an approach is harder to detect in
contrast to disrupting the communication by causing collisions
(see Section 6.2.3).
5. An adversary A is prevented from taking over targeted
ADCnets, e.g., by appropriate (peer-verified) randomiza-
tion of subject selection for the group formation.
The anonymity in DCnets—and therefore in ADCnets—relies
on the honesty of some participants, i.e., the anonymity is
grounded on the assumption that an adversary cannot take con-
trol of all participants in a DCnet. If the adversary A could take
over a complete DCnet, except the one targeted subject, the ad-
versary A can evidently de-anonymize the subject.
Any mechanism that fulfills the requirements is suitable for
the assembly of subjects for an ADCnet.
In the following, two appropriate schemes, the second one
adapted from related work, are described in short.
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randomized group formation Using a randomized ap-
proach, subjects assemble a set of participants to establish an
ADCnet without involving additional external entities like a
trusted third party.
1. An initiator establishes an ID set by adding their own ID
and adding one or multiple IDs of known subjects. By
adding those IDs, the initiator can hide the origin of the
initiation.
The initiator adds a random number of known subjects to the
collection message. If an adversary receives such an initiate-
message, they cannot decide easily whether all subjects added
themselves (see step 2) or (one of) their predecessor(s) added mul-
tiple subjects to add noise. The initiator has to set the target size
of the ADCnet to account for the cover-subjects; otherwise, the
resulting ADCnet will be too small.
2. The ID-set is forwarded to a random neighbor who will
add their own ID. If the configured target-size is not yet
reached, the ID-set is forwarded to the next random neigh-
bor.
Forwarding the ID-set to a random neighbor limits the probabil-
ity that an adversary A_,l or A_,c will receive this message. It has
to be assumed that the adversary A_,l or A_,c fills the remaining
places in the ADCnet with subjects under their control, i.e., that
the adversary A_,l or A_,c adds subject c ∈ C. With this, the ad-
versary could reduce the anonymity set of actual senders in the
ADCnet.
3. After collecting a sufficient number of IDs, subjects recon-
struct the full set of collected subjects. Subjects that have
been added to cover the initialization ignore the establish-
ment of this ADCnet.
a) Send the collection-message back to its source by
matching the neighbors with the IDs in the message.
The IDs are now encrypted using a system-wide key
to hide the IDs from an adversary Ap,g that is not a
participant of the system. Then, the encrypted IDs are
added to a set.
Every subject relays the collection-message back towards
its source. For that, subjects memorize the neighbor from
whom they received the collection-message in the first place.
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b) The initiator receives the set containing all encrypted
IDs and informs each subject contained about other
participants of the ADCnet.
The initiator can recognize its own collection-message by
storing some ID for the message. By also memorizing the
intentionally added cover subjects, the initiator can retrieve
the actual set of subjects that agreed to participate in the
ADCnet.
4. The subjects establish pairwise keys for multiple rounds.
For example by using out-of-band communication, or car-
rying out a key establishment or agreement protocol such
as Diffie-Hellmann key exchange [45, 103] or a key deriva-
tion function like HKDF [85].
Pairwise keys are required to use the DCnet-based communica-
tion and anonymization. As the anonymization is based on one-
time pads, every round a new key has to be used.
5. One of the subjects is selected to be the rendezvous subject.
This can be achieved by having the subjects draw a ran-
dom number. Each subject commits their respective num-
ber without revealing the number—after all subjects per-
formed their commit, the numbers are revealed to select
the rendezvous subject. The commit procedure prevents
that an adversary A from changing their number to manip-
ulate the selection process.
The rendezvous subject connects the ADCnet with the commu-
nication overlay and acts as a bridge. As such, the rendezvous
subject pretends to be the sender(s) s that are covered in the
ADCnet. The randomization balances the load of handling the
cryptographic operations of the ADCnet, and the load of han-
dling the communication on behalf of the sender amongst all sub-
jects.
global adcnet assignment An alternative group forma-
tion process can be adapted from Herbivore [61]. Using this
process, subjects have to follow an entry protocol with a global
ADCnet assignment party.
The global ADCnet assignment party ensures that subjects
• get a random ADCnet assigned. With this, it is ensured
that an adversary A cannot target a specific ADCnet and
take over this ADCnet to de-anonymize a subject.
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• obey a rate limit of joins. With this, an adversary A is ham-
pered in the whitewashing of their controlled subjects, i.e.,
removing history of events from maliciously behaving sub-
jects
6.5.2.3 Communication
ADCnets improve the efficiency of communication with sender
protection by having the subjects in within each ADCnets send-
ing their composed messages only to the respective rendezvous
subject instead of circling the message amongst all other partici-
pants of their ADCnet.
The rendezvous subject of an ADCnet represents the re-
spective, included senders s. For that, the rendezvous subject
acts on behalf of the included senders—without knowing their
identities—and follows the overlay establishment protocol, for
example, the ACO-based overlay establishment from Chapter 4,
to connect the ADCnet to the communication overlay Ot.
For the actual communication, each subject vk in an ADCnet
follows the following steps:
1. select/derive the session keys skrdk,l for each of other par-
ticipants vl (similar to Section 6.2.3, skrdk,l denotes the key
shared between subjects vk and vl) for the next communi-
cation rd.
2. compose the ADCnet message as introduced in Equa-
tion (37) and as follows
• sender s=vk: ms=
⊕
vl∈N-(s) sk
rd
k,l ⊕mcomt
• others vk: mvk=
⊕
vl∈N-(vk) sk
rd
k,l ⊕ 0
3. send the ADCnet message mvk to the rendezvous subject.
The rendezvous subject removes the session keys and derives
the communication message mcomt by combining the received
messages using the XOR-function2 (see Example 29). Then, the
rendezvous subject forwards the derived message mcomt to the
communication overlay Ot.
In order to be able to communicate, all subjects in an ADCnet
have to contribute in in the “correct” rounds; otherwise, the ses-
sion keys skrdk,l do not match and an encryption is not possible.
2 This application of the XOR-function removes only the ADCnet encryption but
not the end-to-end encryption that ensures confidentiality.
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For that, they have synchronize and agree on time-intervals that
are used as representation of the concept of rounds (see also
Section 2.2.2).
6.5.3 Qualitative Discussion
This section evaluates the proposed approach of ADCnets for
efficient and effective sender protection. Efficiency related prop-
erties are discussed first to understand the impact of ADCnet-
based sender anonymization on the communication system. Af-
ter that, the discussion is revisitedfrom the perspective on effec-
tivity in the provision of sender protection.
This section concludes with a discussion in brief of issues that
are inherited from classical DCnets.
6.5.3.1 Efficiency
The efficiency discussion consists of two parts: first, the effi-
ciency concerning the actual communication is discussed. Sec-
ond, the efficiency of group formation and the key establishment
is briefly discussed.
communication overhead With kADCnet being the num-
ber of subjects in each of the ADCnets, each communication mes-
sage mcomt of a sender si in such an ADCnet is accompanied
with kADCnet − 2 messages: every usual subject in the ADCnet
sends a message only composed of the respective session keys
towards the rendezvous subject, the sender includes the commu-
nication message in the message towards the rendezvous sub-
ject, and the rendezvous subject does not send an additional
message. As a result of this, the noise to content ratio ncr (see
Section 6.4.2.1) is as follows:
ncr =
kADCnet − 2
1
(50)
Obviously, the noise to content ratio ncr of ADCnets is linearly
dependent on the size of the ADCnets kADCnet—for n added
subjects, n additional messages must be send.
group formation During the group formation, the effi-
ciency depends on the utilized mechanism. Considering the ex-
ample of gossiping-based randomized group formation (see Sec-
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tion 6.5.2.2), the efficiency is dominated by steps 2 and 3 in which
3 · (kADCnet − 1) messages are sent:
• kADCnet − 1 messages to collect the subjects,
• kADCnet − 1 to reconstruct the set of subjects, and
• kADCnet − 1 to inform all subjects about the other subjects
in the ADCnet.
This shows, the group formation is dependent on the group
size—the influence on the efficiency of this dependency hinges
on the applied group formation technique.
key establishment The key establishment phase ensures
that all subjects within a single ADCnet have their keys shared
such that either the session keys are already established (pre-
shared keys) or derivable using a key derivation function (using
a pre-shared secret as input).
While pre-shared session keys do not influence the efficiency
in the key establishment phase for ADCnets, this method is ques-
tionable in the application scenario of this thesis where subjects
are assumed to be dynamic, and the groups are assembled dy-
namically.
A commonly accepted mechanism to establish a shared key
using an insecure channel is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol [20, 45, 103]. Using the Diffie-Hellman protocol in its
authenticated version [20], subjects establish a shared key with
three sent messages.
In the key establishment phase of ADCnets of size kADCnet, all
participants have to establish pairwise keys, in sum, 0.5 ·kADCnet ·
(kADCnet − 1) keys have to be established.
The established keys can then be used as input for a key
derivation function, for example, HKDF [85], to derive the ac-
tual session keys. The derivation of session keys does not require
additional communication—yet, the security degrades over time
with the number of derived session keys. The number of session
keys that are safely derivable depends on the bit-length of the
output of the used hash function (in HKDF); after this threshold,
a new set of keys has to be established.
As a result of this, the efficiency of key establishment in
ADCnets, using the simple (authenticated) Diffie-Hellman pro-
tocol, depends with a quadratic factor (“O(n2)”) on the size
kADCnet of the ADCnets.
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summary The efficiency of sender protection using ADCnets
depends on the size of the actual ADCnets. In stable environ-
ments, the costly establishment of ADCnets not performed fre-
quently; the higher costs to form groups and key establishment
process occur only occasionally.
The communication overhead itself is linearly dependent on
the ADCnet size kADCnet; only when kADCnet converges to |V|, the
efficiency suffers similar to the cover traffic-based sender protec-
tion.
Assume a social network as used in the experiment in Sec-
tion 4.4.1 with the following configuration:
• |V| = 2, 000, |E| = 5, 994
• |Et| = 62, diam(Ot) = 5
Table 25 reports the number of messages that is handled by the
communication system during the transmission of one commu-
nication message mcomt . For the ADCnets, the number of mes-
sages are differentiated for the communication and the estab-
lishment phases. The noise to content ratio ncr is calculated for
the respective communication phases. ADCnets reveal a higher
efficiency, especially considering that the additional load of the
group formation and key establishment phase.
Table 25: Comparing the Efficiency of ADCnets and Cover Traffic
Mechanism Number of Messages ncr
CT 29,970 482.3871
CT (spp = 0.5, cup = 0.5) ≈10,000 160.2903
message Comm. Establ. ncr
ADCnet20 m1 80 57 18
ADCnet20 m>2 80 - 18
ADCnet100 m1 160 297 98
ADCnet100 m>2 160 - 98
6.5.3.2 Anonymity Protection
The sender anonymity of ADCnets is provided similar to classi-
cal DCnets [22] by reducing them to the anonymity of one-time
pads [131, 132].
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In an ADCnet, each subject composes its message as by com-
puting the XOR-function with the respective session keys as
input (see Equation (37) on page 172). By that construction
and given sufficient randomness in each key kk,l, the XOR-
composition of the session keys creates a uniformly random
one-time pad P = GF(2)n such that the adding of the mes-
sage M = P ⊕ {mcomt or 0} is still uniformly random and does
not yield an information leakage that would affect the sender’s
anonymity.
A controlling an internal subject Obviously, an ad-
versary A_,c knows the session keys that belong to their collud-
ing subjects C. As a result of this, the anonymity of a sender
can be quantified with the anonymity set size kADCnet − |C |. Ev-
idently, the sender anonymity can be improved further by estab-
lishing larger ADCnets.
A controlling the rendezvous subject The ren-
dezvous subject is special in its function as bridge to the com-
munication overlay Ot and the communication system itself. Be-
sides that particular functionality, the rendezvous subjects does
not hold any additional knowledge. As a result of this, the ren-
dezvous subject can derive the contained message but cannot
identify which of the subjects included the message. The ad-
versary A_,c can remove the keys from its colluding subjects C.
However, the remaining subjects still act as a single anonymity
set of size kADCnet − |C |.
A controlling an outside subject An adversary A out-
side of the ADCnet is not aware of the members of the ADCnet
and does not posses the keys necessary to remove members of
the ADCnet from the anonymity set.
6.6 conclusion
This chapter reasoned about the special relevance of sender pro-
tection and why sender protection can hardly be achieved with
conventional measures like overlay obfuscation; after the reason-
ing about the importance of sender protection, this chapter ana-
lyzed the current state of the art mechanism for sender protec-
tion cover traffic and a novel proposal, the ADCnets.
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The reason for the special relevance of sender protection is lo-
cated in topological information leaks and the unpredictability
of the sender behavior. Senders are in particular topological posi-
tions in a communication overlay, as are recipients. Senders form
the roots of their respective dissemination trees, recipients may
form the leaves of the dissemination trees. These positions are
caused by the nature of communication systems: senders create
or emit information, so they are information sources; recipients
consume information, so they are information sinks. Daubert et
al. tackled the information leakage for recipients and proposed
randomized forwarding and the shell game to obfuscate the loca-
tion of recipients by altering the topology. These procedures,
however, are limited to recipients and not applicable to provide
sender protection.
Moreover, it is not clear upfront at which points in time a send-
ing subject s is going to emit a message. Therefore, sender pro-
tection mechanisms have to be in place continuously to protect
the sender s. The current state of the art mechanism for sender
anonymity is cover traffic; often, cover traffic is disguised by en-
forcing empty requests (for example, [29]) or dummy requests
and messages when no communication takes place (for exam-
ple, [15, 34, 58, 133, 146]). Cover traffic hides the communication
itself in noise, for example, cover messages that appear random
and are, thus, not distinguishable from encrypted messages. To
enable effective protection, cover traffic needs to be in place con-
tinuously. While this continuous utilization allows anonymity
for senders and recipients, the efficiency degrades massively.
The efficiency can be improved by reducing the number of
subjects that generate cover messages and by reducing the num-
ber of connections that are populated with these cover messages.
Further efficiency improvements can be achieved by altering the
temporal behavior when generating cover traffic, i.e., creating
cover message only in larger intervals or even only upon request.
Implementing these improvements in a randomized fashion to
distribute the load over all subjects degrades anonymity if the
subject participation probability spp is configured to be below
0.4. The same holds for the connection utilization probability
cup. Analyzing the information leakage over time reveals that
the adversary Ap,g can remove the noise over time, i.e., the ad-
versary Ap,g may identify the senders eventually.
In the second part of this chapter, this thesis proposes
the novel mechanism ADCnets to protect senders from de-
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anonymization and subsequent identification by an adversary A.
Based on the classical anonymization primitive DCnet, senders
are hidden in a local group that forms an ADCnet. This group
uses a rendezvous subject to enable the overlay establishment
on behalf of the actual senders that are included in the ADCnet,
and to relay messages from within the ADCnet to the commu-
nication overlay Ot. The ADCnet provides provable anonymity
against adversaries that are inside the ADCnet, under the as-
sumption that at least one other subject in the ADCnet is not
colluding with the adversary; moreover, ADCnets also protect
against a global adversary who overlooks the complete message
flow within such an ADCnet.
The costs establishment of ADCnets for forming the group
and establishing the encryption keys are quadratic in the size of
the established groups; the establishment of ADCnets is, how-
ever, only performed occasionally. The communication overhead
is linear in the size of the ADCnet. The costs of both the establish-
ment of the ADCnet and the communication depend on the size
of the ADCnet, as is the anonymity but inversely proportional.
As a result of this, ADCnets provide a configurable trade-off be-
tween efficiency and anonymity.
The key lessons of this chapter are as follows:
• Sender anonymity cannot be achieved with overlay adap-
tation alone and requires continuous protection. Typical
mechanisms to provide recipient anonymity are not appli-
cable.
• Cover traffic provides anonymity by hiding commu-
nication among noise—communication is untraceable.
Anonymity is provided at the cost of drastically reduced
efficiency.
• Randomized cover traffic can mitigate the efficiency loss;
the efficiency improvement of randomized cover traffic is
linear with both the subject participation probability spp
and the connection utilization probability cup. However,
efficiency improvement also enables intersection attacks;
enabling an adversary A to reduce anonymity over time
and to de-anonymize senders eventually. Improving the ef-
ficiency by 50%, the loss of anonymity is 10% after only 20
messages.
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• ADCnets provide fixed groups of subjects that provide
cover for senders. The cover of ADCnets is computation-
ally secure and cannot be removed by an adversary A.
• ADCnets enable to trade efficiency and anonymity by be-
ing adaptable in their size. Smaller groups favor efficiency,
larger groups favor anonymity.
• In ADCnets, the communication overhead increases linear
with the size of the respective ADCnets. The group forma-
tion is also linearly dependent on the size of ADCnet; the
key establishment is quadratic. Both the group formation
and the key exchange are only performed occasionally.

7
C O N C L U S I O N
Over the course of this thesis, a novel overlay establishment
mechanism was developed. This overlay establishment mecha-
nism enables the assembly of groups that are using communi-
cation resources more efficiently than conventional overlay by
reducing the load in the system. The pure overlay establishment
mechanism was complemented with measures to cope with dis-
ruptions by subject churn and provides higher robustness than
the state of the art. Additionally, a new efficient scheme for
sender anonymity protection that provides computationally se-
cure anonymity for senders was suggested.
This chapter summarizes the core contributions and findings
of this dissertation, draws conclusions and presents an outlook
to future work.
7.1 summary and conclusions
(Digital) communication is still becoming ubiquitous and per-
vaded everyone’s life. Communication services are no longer
bound to specialized devices like personal computers or mobile
phones but are available on devices of all sorts like, for example,
smartwatches, smartphones, sensors in smart environments. The
congregation of ubiquity and rising heterogeneity with central-
ized and quasi-monopolistic service providers raises additional
challenges for the anonymity of users in digital communication.
Nowadays, service providers can access data of all kinds of their
users, ranging from metadata to contents of a communication.
The exploitation of metadata—in particular about communica-
tion relationships—is only just beginning. Service providers like
Facebook are in a wealth of personal data, especially metadata.
They are expected to utilize these data systematically for mone-
tization and discovery of additional business cases (if not done
today); government agencies may also use this information for
their purposes like understanding and predicting social move-
ments. Even today, the data usage without the users’ consent
runs rampant, often already causing undesirable consequences
for users [14, 89, 95, 144].
210 conclusion
This thesis tackled the challenge of efficient anonymous group
communication. With newly arising heterogeneity and ubiquity,
efficiency raises to a considerable challenge that has to be considered
when designing and developing anonymous communication sys-
tems. This thesis proposed a novel ACO-based overlay establish-
ment mechanism that connects senders and recipients while con-
sidering both efficiency and anonymity as requirements. With ef-
ficiency in mind, also sender anonymity has to be rethought. This
thesis proposed a new mechanism to blend the sender in groups
of subjects with configurable size.
To address the challenges arisen from the motivation in Chap-
ter 1, this thesis introduced in Chapter 2 background informa-
tion that is necessary to follow the contributions of this thesis.
The core requirements efficiency and anonymity were defined; in
the case of anonymity, a clear distinction of the often confused
terms anonymity, confidentiality, and privacy was provided. The
underlying communication model was also presented in Chap-
ter 2 and was complemented with an adversary model that is
backed with real-world adversary examples that manifest them-
selves by combinations of described adversary properties. Then,
this background chapter discussed several metrics that aim at
measuring and evaluating anonymity. With the communication
model, the adversary model, and anonymity metrics at hand,
a selection of anonymization primitives was derived and intro-
duced.
In Chapter 3, this thesis provided a selection of characteris-
tics to describe properties of anonymous communication sys-
tems concerning efficiency, anonymity, and their general struc-
ture. These properties were combined with the previously es-
tablished anonymization primitives and used to introduce and
compare the state of the art in anonymous communication sys-
tems.
efficient and anonymous group communication
Chapter 4 proposed a novel ACO-based overlay establishment
mechanism. After an introduction to the ACO optimization
heuristic, the chapter elaborated on the three-phase approach
to establishing communication overlays:
1. Recipients create and emit agents that explore the communi-
cation system to find senders. These agents are being sent
through the system and perform a random walk. The ran-
dom walk decisions to select the next hop are biased with
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pheromones that are deposited by preceding agents in
phase 2. Using these pheromones, agents can consolidate
their paths and improve the overall efficiency in the commu-
nication system.
2. Agents that found a sender return on the same path back to
their recipient. On this return, agents mark the used connec-
tions with pheromones which will bias the random walk of
subsequent agents in phase 2.
3. The paths exhibiting the strongest pheromone trails will be
“activated” and persisted as the communication overlay.
In a simulation study, it was shown that the communication
overlays that were created using the novel ACO-based commu-
nication establishment mechanism require up to 40% fewer con-
nections to provide a connected communication overlay to the
senders and recipients. Compared to conventional communica-
tion overlays, ACO-based communication overlays do not en-
force the usage of shortest path—and increase the communica-
tion delays by 9% to 21%—or up to two additional hops between
sender and recipients.
While efficiency and anonymity are conflicting optimization
goals, the efficiency improvement of ACO-based communica-
tion overlays does not impede the achieved anonymity. The
anonymity degrees stay stable at 0.996 on social networks, 0.722
on random networks, and 0.773 on RGGs.
increased robustness in dynamic environments
Chapter 5 complemented the ACO-based overlay establishment
mechanism with approaches to cope with subject churn.
In application scenarios with ubiquitous communication, a sta-
ble environment cannot be assumed. Subjects may join and leave
the communication system at any point in time, i.e., the commu-
nication overlays are exposed to subject churn [66, 138, 151, 152].
The ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism facilitates
the handling of churn events by distributing knowledge using
pheromones—this knowledge can be utilized to repair overlay
disruptions that were caused by leaving subjects. Compared to
conventional overlays, the established ACO-based communica-
tion overlays are more robust when exposed to churn and keep
up to 90% of the recipients of recipients connected to the com-
munication overlay while 20% of subjects were leaving due to
churn.
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routing in the tension of efficiency and anonymity
Also in Chapter 5, this thesis reasoned that churn-induced
disruptions—as well as the overlay activation in phase 3 of the
ACO-based overlay establishment mechanism—require frequent
sharing of routing information. Routing information contains
knowledge about senders, recipients, and the structure of the
communication overlay. With that knowledge, it increases the at-
tack surface for an adversary that aims to identify senders and
recipients of a communication. The discussion of behavior un-
der churn is therefore complemented with a discussion of four
different mechanisms to establish and share routing information:
Successor Lists and Successor Lists with multi-layer encryption—
both included in the messages, Bloom filters that carry the rout-
ing information, and distributed lookup tables that are stored
locally at the subjects. Both successor lists with multi-layer en-
cryption and Bloom filters protect anonymity but rise the com-
munication overhead due to the inclusion of routing information
in every message. Distributed lookup tables store the routing in-
formation at the subjects, therefore, improve the communication
overhead as only a comparably small topic-identifier has to be
included in the messages; also, distributed lookup tables protect
anonymity by avoiding further sharing of routing information.
Chapter 5 concluded that providing mechanisms to cope with
subject churn is facilitated with ACO-based communication
overlays and the sharing of routing information can be estab-
lished with restricted information leakage.
efficient and effective sender protection In Chap-
ter 6, this thesis emphasized the special role of sender anonymity
and underlined the associated challenge.
The challenge of sender anonymity is often tackled with ap-
proaches that are based upon cover traffic. This chapter first ana-
lyzed the influence of cover traffic randomization on the efficiency
and anonymity and concluded that randomization enables the
adversary to remove the cover traffic eventually. With that, the
adversary can derive and identify the actual sender.
Therefore, to provide sender anonymity, this chapter proposed
a novel approach to provide sender anonymity based on ADCnets.
Using ADCnets, senders blend into a group of other subjects
that use encryption based on multi-party computation: they es-
tablish pairwise keys and share their ADCnet-messages with a
rendezvous point. Similar to classical DCnets, the sender in the
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ADCnet includes their message in the ADCnet-message while
the others include nothing (“null”) in their message. A so-called
rendezvous subject is then able to derive the actual message—
without being able to pinpoint the actual sender—and relays the
message into the communication overlay; the transmission to-
wards the recipients follows the general communication model.
Chapter 6 reasoned about the anonymity of this scheme by
showing that the security proofs of DCnets still hold. Also, effi-
ciency was analyzed, concluding that the communication over-
head linearly depends on the size of the ADCnet. The occasional
ADCnet establishment is more expensive; the costs for the group
formation grow linear with the size of the ADCnets, the costs
for the key establishment grow quadratic with the size of the
ADCnets.
With the ADCnets-based approach, this thesis proposed in
this chapter a scheme for configurable sender anonymity that
is efficient and effective.
7.2 outlook
This thesis proposed novel mechanisms to establish communica-
tion overlays and to provide sender anonymity while consider-
ing both efficiency and anonymity as compulsory optimization
goals. The thesis also goes beyond the state of the art by ana-
lyzing and diminishing the impact of subject churn on the ro-
bustness of the anonymous communication system that is inher-
ent in dynamic and realistic environments. These contributions
advanced the research on anonymous group communication in
ubiquitous, heterogeneous, and dynamic environments enabling
user anonymity without lower costs for the system and all sub-
jects.
Nonetheless, various aspects and possibilities for further re-
search remain open and will be briefly discussed in the follow-
ing.
existing networks may not be good enough Today’s
systems mostly depend on bootstrapping from existing struc-
tures, for example, systems use the friend structures in an Online
Social Network (OSN) or real-world relations to initialize the
connections in their anonymous communication system. How-
ever, it is known that graph-structures can be used to identify
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communities and even users across different graph-structured
datasets [9, 75].
This research in mind, it should be analyzed to which extent
information about those structures can be used as evidence to
learn about communication structures in an anonymous commu-
nication system. In that case, it needs to be studied how logical
underlays can be assembled such that they do not leak informa-
tion; moreover, then it is also inevitable to develop mechanisms
that impede the adversaries’ efforts to attack already this assem-
bly process.
establishing an appropriate user model This thesis
used state of the art churn models to predict session durations
and intersession times. However, these models were derived
from file-sharing networks where the temporal user behavior
was observed.
Facing today’s vastly different types of devices that may coop-
erate in such an anonymous communication system, there is a
need for new appropriate user models that incorporate the diver-
sity and specifics of devices. Apparent target systems may con-
tain today’s anonymous communication systems. Nonetheless,
the particular “not-anonymous” equivalent application scenario
should also be considered; targeting only anonymous commu-
nication systems may introduce a bias towards privacy-aware
users which likely are not representative of the whole popula-
tion.
coping with the users Churn has a manifold influence
on a communication system. As shown in this thesis, leaving
users may disrupt communication overlays; also, joining users
may have to be connected to the communication overlay—or
they may even yield substantial improvements for the efficiency
and anonymity of the system.
The repair of communication overlays to bypass disruptions
may lead to significantly different communication overlays. As
such, a global adversary like the service provider will be able
to analyze to persistent users and, thereby, reduce the provided
anonymity with an intersection attack. As a result of this, the
influence of churn also has to be considered from the perspective
of an adversary trying to identify senders and recipients.
Similarly, joining users may yield the possibility for more effi-
cient or more anonymous communication overlay. However, for
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that, the overlay has to be reconsidered. Without global knowl-
edge, this reconsideration will likely lead to a new phase of over-
lay establishment. As users may continuously join (and leave),
the system will remain in a constant overlay establishment stage.
As such, it has to be analyzed how—and when—to utilize join-
ing subjects to improve a communication overlay.
utilize anonymous communication for anonymous
data publishing The usage of the anonymous communica-
tion system opens the opportunity to request information from
subject in the anonymous communication system. The subjects
may cooperate and anonymize the supplied data iteratively to
answer such requests with statistically correct but anonymous
information.
Google [52] and Apple [6] did first steps in this direction.
Their idea of anonymous data collection may stimulate research
in distributed anonymous data publishing. With that, service
providers may realize that they can operate their business with-
out relying on the usage of their users’ data.
incentivize service providers to offer anonymous
communication Fully decentralized OSNs aimed at remov-
ing the service provider as central entity; prominent representa-
tives were Safebook [31, 32] and Diaspora*1. Mostly, they failed
to succeed; Diaspora*, for example, is said to have about 670,000
users as of now [142]. The number of users stagnates; in compar-
ison to that, Facebook had 2,2 billion users in the last quarter of
2017 and grew steadily over the last years 2. One of the essential
factors for their failure is the so-called network effect [81]; with-
out considerable “start” population or interest, a network offers
limited benefit for new users—which in turn deters other users
and so on.
With the idea of distributed anonymous data publishing in
mind, it is reasonable to think about hybrid services; in these
hybrid services, service providers offer their service and also
an anonymity-preserving realization based on the cooperation
of their users. Their business model that relies on the collected
data may then be realized with the help of the anonymously
collected information.
1 https://diasporafoundation.org
2 Source: https://www.statista.com
216 conclusion
For this approach of incentivizing service providers to offer
their service also with anonymity, interdisciplinary research is
required. Information systems and economics research need to
reveal how to transform today’s business models to novel ones
that rely only on the utilization of anonymous data. Computer
science, therefore, has to ensure that the anonymous data pro-
vides enough utility to realize those business models.
A P P E N D I X

A
N O M E N C L AT U R E A N D A B B R E V I AT I O N S
This chapter summarizes the nomenclature and abbreviations
used throughout this thesis. First, the common nomenclature of
all chapters is summarized. After that, the specifics of each of
the chapters are summarized.
220 nomenclature and abbreviations
Table A.26: Nomenclature and Abbreviations used throughout this Thesis
Abbreviation Instances Meaning
G - Logical Underlay
Ot - Communication overlay for topic/interest t
V {v1, . . . , vn} Vertices, the subjects in the system
Vt ⊆ V - Subjects, participating in Ot
E {e1, . . . , en} Edges, the connections in the system
Et ⊆ E - Edges, used to connect subjects in Ot
T {t1, . . . , tn} Topics, the interests of comm. groups
RD {rd1, . . . , rdn} Rounds, the time steps that order the events
d+/-(v) - Incoming (d+)/outgoing (d-) degree of v
N+/-(v) - Incoming (N+)/outgoing (N-) neighbors of v
p(vk, vl) (e1, . . . , en) Path between vk and vl
sp(vk, vl) - Shortest possible path between vk and vl
|p(vk, vl)| - Length of a path between vk and vl, the num-
ber of connections in the sequence
apl(G) - Average shortest path length |sp(vk, vl)| be-
tween any connected pair of subjects
diam(G) - Diameter of G, the longest shortest path be-
tween any pair of subjects
wE(G) - Weight of G, the number of connections
kbf - Number of hash functions of the bloom filter
mbf - Size of the bloom filter
St {s1, . . . , sn} Sources, the senders of information
Rt {r1, . . . , rn} Receivers, the recipients of information
Bt {b1, . . . , bn} Brokers, the forwarders of information
mcomt - Communication messages for topic t
A
Ap,−, Aa,− passive or active Adversary
A−,l, A−,c, A−,g local, colluding, or global Adversary
C {c1, . . . , cn} Subjects controlled by the adversary
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Table A.27: Nomenclature and Abbreviations specific to Efficient and Anony-
mous Group Communication (Chapter 4)
Abbreviation Instances Meaning
A=ADisc ∪ARet {a1, . . . , an} Agents, establishing the communication
overlay
ADisc - Agents, looking for senders
ARet - Agents, returning to recipients
τvi - Pheromones, placed at the connection to-
wards subject vi
τei - Pheromones, placed at connection ei
ai.σ - Agent ai’s strictness
Table A.28: Nomenclature and Abbreviations specific to Routing in the Ten-
sion of Efficiency and Anonymity (Chapter 5)
Abbreviation Instances Meaning
sk skvl,vk Symmetric key shared between vl and vk
encblocksize Block size of the cryptographic algorithm
Table A.29: Nomenclature and Abbreviations specific to Efficient and Effective
Sender Protection (Chapter 6)
Abbreviation Instances Meaning
mcovt Cover message; Noise
kADCnet Size of ADCnets
sk skrdvl,vk session key shared between vl and vk for
round rd ∈ RD
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Figure B.57: Graph-theoretic properties of social networks following the
Barabàsi-Albert model. The gray, dashed vertical line marks the
selected network size of 2,000 subjects.
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Figure B.58: Graph-theoretic properties of random networks. The gray, dashed
vertical line marks the selected network size of 2,000 subjects.
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Figure B.59: Graph-theoretic properties of RGGs. The gray, dashed vertical line
marks the selected network size of 2,000 subjects.
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The probability of false positive hits of a Bloom filter follows
from
pfp = (1− e
mk/n)k,
if the Bloom filter is configured with m being the size of the
Bloom filter, n the number of entries that are added to the Bloom
filter, and k being the number of hash functions that are used to
fill the Bloom filter. The ratio m/n provides then the number of
bits per entry in the Bloom filter. Table C.30 lists pre-calculated
false positive probabilities for m/n ∈ [0, 20] and k ∈ [0, 20]
Table C.30: False positive probabilities in dependency of size m, number of
entries added n, and number of hash functions k.
k–number of hash functions used
m
/n
–n
um
be
r
of
bi
ts
pe
r
en
tr
y
ad
de
d
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0.6321 0.7476 0.8580 0.9287 0.9668 0.9852 0.9936
2 0.3935 0.3996 0.4689 0.5590 0.6516 0.7361 0.8068
3 0.2835 0.2368 0.2526 0.2941 0.3511 0.4179 0.4897
4 0.2212 0.1548 0.1469 0.1597 0.1849 0.2198 0.2628
5 0.1813 0.1087 0.0918 0.0920 0.1009 0.1164 0.1378
6 0.1535 0.0804 0.0609 0.0561 0.0578 0.0638 0.0734
7 0.1331 0.0618 0.0423 0.0359 0.0347 0.0364 0.0403
8 0.1175 0.0489 0.0306 0.0240 0.0217 0.0216 0.0229
9 0.1052 0.0397 0.0228 0.0166 0.0141 0.0133 0.0135
10 0.0952 0.0329 0.0174 0.0118 0.0094 0.0084 0.0082
11 0.0869 0.0276 0.0136 0.0086 0.0065 0.0055 0.0051
12 0.0800 0.0236 0.0108 0.0065 0.0046 0.0037 0.0033
13 0.0740 0.0203 0.0088 0.0049 0.0033 0.0026 0.0022
14 0.0689 0.0177 0.0072 0.0038 0.0024 0.0018 0.0015
15 0.0645 0.0156 0.0060 0.0030 0.0018 0.0013 0.0010
16 0.0606 0.0138 0.0050 0.0024 0.0014 0.0009 0.0007
17 0.0571 0.0123 0.0042 0.0019 0.0011 0.0007 0.0005
18 0.0540 0.0111 0.0036 0.0016 0.0008 0.0005 0.0004
19 0.0513 0.0100 0.0031 0.0013 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003
20 0.0488 0.0091 0.0027 0.0011 0.0005 0.0003 0.0002
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k–number of hash functions used
m
/n
–n
um
be
r
of
bi
ts
pe
r
en
tr
y
ad
de
d
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 0.9973 0.9989 0.9995 0.9998 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000
2 0.8625 0.9043 0.9346 0.9560 0.9707 0.9806 0.9873
3 0.5621 0.6315 0.6954 0.7521 0.8011 0.8422 0.8761
4 0.3125 0.3670 0.4246 0.4835 0.5418 0.5980 0.6510
5 0.1646 0.1967 0.2336 0.2748 0.3194 0.3667 0.4155
6 0.0865 0.1031 0.1233 0.1471 0.1747 0.2056 0.2398
7 0.0463 0.0544 0.0646 0.0772 0.0923 0.1101 0.1306
8 0.0255 0.0292 0.0342 0.0405 0.0483 0.0578 0.0691
9 0.0145 0.0161 0.0184 0.0215 0.0254 0.0303 0.0362
10 0.0085 0.0091 0.0102 0.0116 0.0136 0.0160 0.0190
11 0.0051 0.0053 0.0058 0.0064 0.0074 0.0085 0.0100
12 0.0031 0.0032 0.0033 0.0036 0.0041 0.0046 0.0054
13 0.0020 0.0019 0.0020 0.0021 0.0023 0.0026 0.0029
14 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0015 0.0016
15 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009
16 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
17 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
18 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
19 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
20 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
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k–number of hash functions used
m
/n
–n
um
be
r
of
bi
ts
pe
r
en
tr
y
ad
de
d
15 16 17 18 19 20
1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2 0.9917 0.9946 0.9965 0.9978 0.9986 0.9991
3 0.9036 0.9255 0.9428 0.9563 0.9668 0.9749
4 0.6998 0.7440 0.7833 0.8178 0.8478 0.8735
5 0.4649 0.5138 0.5616 0.6073 0.6506 0.6909
6 0.2767 0.3159 0.3568 0.3988 0.4413 0.4836
7 0.1538 0.1798 0.2083 0.2390 0.2719 0.3064
8 0.0823 0.0976 0.1151 0.1347 0.1565 0.1803
9 0.0433 0.0517 0.0616 0.0730 0.0861 0.1009
10 0.0227 0.0271 0.0324 0.0387 0.0460 0.0546
11 0.0119 0.0142 0.0170 0.0203 0.0243 0.0289
12 0.0063 0.0075 0.0089 0.0106 0.0127 0.0152
13 0.0034 0.0040 0.0047 0.0056 0.0067 0.0080
14 0.0019 0.0021 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035 0.0042
15 0.0010 0.0012 0.0014 0.0016 0.0019 0.0022
16 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0009 0.0010 0.0012
17 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006
18 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
19 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
20 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
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C O V E R T R A F F I C : A N O N Y M I T Y O V E R T I M E
Randomized subject participation and connection utilization en-
able an adversary A to reduce the set of cover subjects over time.
This chapter presents extended results of the conducted simu-
lation study of Section 6.4 that substantiate the conclusion of the
inability to improve the efficiency of cover traffic by randomized
initialization.
Figure D.60 shows the results of the simulations in which
the connection utilization probability cup is fixed with
{1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5}; Figure D.61 shows the respective plots
in which the connection utilization probability cup is fixed with
{0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1}.
If considerable efficiency improvement is achieved with con-
figuring the subject participation probability spp and the con-
nection utilization probability cup at 0.5 or lower, the anonymity
over degrades with every communication message that is sent.
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Figure D.60: Number of Cover Nodes over multiple Messages with varying
spp probabilities. The cup probability is fixed between 1.0 and
0.5 in each plot.
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Figure D.61: Number of Cover Nodes over multiple Messages with varying
spp probabilities. The cup probability is fixed between 0.4 and
0.1 in each plot.
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